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AIT Assembly, Integration and Test 
ATLO Assembly, Test and Launch Operations 
BPOCC Best Practice of Organic Contamination Control 
CAD Computer Aided Design 
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CCAM Contamination Collision Avoidance Maneuver 
CDR Conceptual Design Review 
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Planetary Protection Glossary 
 
Decontamination Removal of contaminating agents, e.g., microorganisms or organic com-
pounds 
Disinfection Elimination of nearly all recognized pathogenic microorganisms but not 
necessarily all microbial forms 
Encapsulated 
bioburden 
Bioburden encapsulated in non-metallic material, protected from gas ex-
change 
Exposed surfaces Internal and external surfaces free for gas exchange 
Extant life Form of life, or signatures thereof, that is viable today whether metaboli-
cally active or dormant 
Extinct life Form of life, or signatures thereof, that is unambiguously no longer met-
abolically active or dormant 
Inbound leg (In the frame of sample return missions) Part of the mission returning to 
Earth 
Mated surfaces Surfaces joined by fasteners rather than by adhesives 
Outbound leg (In the frame of sample return missions) Part of the mission leaving Earth 
Planetary Protection 
Officer 
Within a space agency, the PPO oversees compliance with policy, includ-
ing providing requirements and verification, working closely with the 
Project Manager to implement the established requirements to achieve 
compliance with policy 
Planetary Protection 
Mission/Program 
Manager 
Responsible for project compliance, scheduling, negotiating/overseeing 
implementation and documentation of all planetary protection activities. 
Ensures that the project meets the PP requirements and is granted permis-
sion to launch 
Restricted Earth 
Return 
Planetary protection sub-Category V for sample return missions from So-
lar system bodies deemed by scientific opinion to have a chance of har-
boring indigenous life forms 
Sterilization A validated process used to render, through elimination (through removal, 
inactivation or killing) of all living microorganisms and viruses, a product 
“free” from viable microorganisms 
Unrestricted Earth 
Return 
Planetary Protection sub-Category V for sample return missions from So-
lar system bodies deemed by scientific opinion to have no indigenous life 
forms 
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Introduction 
 
Historical Perspective 
As J. Lederberg and D.B. Cowie explain: 
“…we are in the awkward situation of being 
able to spoil certain possibilities for scientific 
investigations for a considerable interval be-
fore we can constructively realize them…we 
urgently need to give some thought to the con-
servative measures needed to protect future 
scientific objectives on the moon and the plan-
ets…” J. Lederberg and D.B. Cowie, Science, 
1958. 
Planetary Protection serves to preserve plane-
tary conditions for future scientific investiga-
tions and is the most effective way to protect 
space science and exploration. Its regulation 
concerning sample return missions aims to 
protect the Earth and its biosphere (including 
the Moon) from potential harmful extraterres-
trial biological and organic contamination. 
It responds to concerns raised by the scientific 
community (namely the International Astro-
nautical Federation (IAF), the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS) and the US National Acad-
emy of Science), that space missions might 
compromise future scientific exploration, if 
not handled carefully. In 1958, the Interna-
tional Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), 
now known as the International Council for 
Science, established an ad-hoc Committee on 
Contamination by Extraterrestrial Exploration 
(CETEX) and adopted its Code of Conduct. 
ICSU established COSPAR in 1958 and trans-
ferred the CETEX mandates to the newly 
founded Committee. 
In 1961, the Ranger missions were the first 
spaceflight missions to use the Code-of-Con-
duct. The United Nations Outer Space Treaty’s 
(1966) article IX establishes the legal basis for 
Planetary Protection. It stipulates: “... parties 
to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer 
space including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as 
to avoid their harmful contamination and also 
adverse changes in the environment of the 
Earth resulting from the introduction of extra-
terrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall 
adopt appropriate measures for this pur-
pose...” 
COSPAR established the Consultative Group 
on Potentially Harmful Effects of Space Ex-
periments, has throughout provided an interna-
tional forum to discuss such matters and then 
formulated a policy (with implementation re-
quirements) recognized as an international 
standard which now serves as a guide of com-
pliance with Article IX of the UN Outer Space 
Treaty. Since then, all planetary missions have 
had to implement planetary protection 
measures at different degrees – ranging from 
simple documentation to the terminal steriliza-
tion of entire flight systems. 
 
  
 INTRODUCTION   
The International Planetary Protection Handbook 
15 
Introduction 
 
Historical Perspective 
As J. Lederberg and D.B. Cowie explain: 
“…we are in the awkward situation of being 
able to spoil certain possibilities for scientific 
investigations for a considerable interval be-
fore we can constructively realize them…we 
urgently need to give some thought to the con-
servative measures needed to protect future 
scientific objectives on the moon and the plan-
ets…” J. Lederberg and D.B. Cowie, Science, 
1958. 
Planetary Protection serves to preserve plane-
tary conditions for future scientific investiga-
tions and is the most effective way to protect 
space science and exploration. Its regulation 
concerning sample return missions aims to 
protect the Earth and its biosphere (including 
the Moon) from potential harmful extraterres-
trial biological and organic contamination. 
It responds to concerns raised by the scientific 
community (namely the International Astro-
nautical Federation (IAF), the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS) and the US National Acad-
emy of Science), that space missions might 
compromise future scientific exploration, if 
not handled carefully. In 1958, the Interna-
tional Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), 
now known as the International Council for 
Science, established an ad-hoc Committee on 
Contamination by Extraterrestrial Exploration 
(CETEX) and adopted its Code of Conduct. 
ICSU established COSPAR in 1958 and trans-
ferred the CETEX mandates to the newly 
founded Committee. 
In 1961, the Ranger missions were the first 
spaceflight missions to use the Code-of-Con-
duct. The United Nations Outer Space Treaty’s 
(1966) article IX establishes the legal basis for 
Planetary Protection. It stipulates: “... parties 
to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer 
space including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as 
to avoid their harmful contamination and also 
adverse changes in the environment of the 
Earth resulting from the introduction of extra-
terrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall 
adopt appropriate measures for this pur-
pose...” 
COSPAR established the Consultative Group 
on Potentially Harmful Effects of Space Ex-
periments, has throughout provided an interna-
tional forum to discuss such matters and then 
formulated a policy (with implementation re-
quirements) recognized as an international 
standard which now serves as a guide of com-
pliance with Article IX of the UN Outer Space 
Treaty. Since then, all planetary missions have 
had to implement planetary protection 
measures at different degrees – ranging from 
simple documentation to the terminal steriliza-
tion of entire flight systems. 
 
  
 THE PPOSS PROJECT   
The International Planetary Protection Handbook 
16 
The Planetary Protection of Outer Solar System (PPOSS) Project  
 
The Planetary Protection of Outer Solar Sys-
tem (PPOSS) project tackled the science, tech-
nology and policy-making components related 
to biological and organic contamination of 
outer solar system bodies, in particular icy 
moons. This intensive three-year program has 
provided an international platform and forum 
where science, industry and policy actors met 
to nurture and catalyze discussions, exchange 
of knowledge and produce policy recommen-
dations on the matter of planetary protection. 
The main objectives of the PPOSS project are 
to: 
 Describe the state-of-the-art and good 
practice for implementing planetary pro-
tection requirements, and identify good 
practices and lessons to be learnt. 
 Identify scientific challenges, requirements 
and knowledge gaps related to planetary 
protection of outer solar system bodies, in-
cluding small solar system bodies. 
 Develop a European engineering roadmap 
for the industry sector. 
 Review the international outer solar system 
planetary protection regulation structure 
and categorization and suggest improve-
ments, and, 
 Facilitate the dissemination of knowledge 
related to planetary protection. The PPOSS 
project gathers seven European partner or-
ganizations, one international partner and 
one international observer. 
Kicked off for three years in January 2016, 
PPOSS was supported by the European Com-
mission Horizon 2020 program under grant 
agreement 687373. 
For more information: http://pposs.org 
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Introduction to Planetary Protection in the Outer Solar System, 
from Mars to the Icy Moons 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Planetary protection aims to limit the harmful contamination of habitable worlds beyond Earth by 
terrestrial organisms and organic molecules. The recent shift in focus of astrobiological exploration 
from just Mars to include the icy moons of the outer solar system necessitates the review and expan-
sion of our planetary protection protocols. There are significant differences between Mars and the icy 
moons: the former is dry and organic matter-poor (at least at the surface) while the latter are poten-
tially wet and organic matter-rich. Contamination on Mars can be expected to comprise local isolated 
events, although storms and dust transport do involve planet-wide atmospheric transport. On the other 
hand, contamination of subsurface oceans on icy moons can potentially become global. The produc-
tion of false positives on life detection missions to Mars and the icy moons are likely to be different 
in nature and frequency. Mars life detection experiments are more likely to suffer from terrestrial 
contamination whereas those on icy moons are subject to being overwhelmed by non-biological mim-
ics of biopolymers. 
 
WHY HAS PLANETARY PROTEC-
TION SO FAR CONCENTRATED 
ON MARS? 
So far, the search for life beyond the Earth has 
focused on Mars. The Viking landers in the 
1970s looked directly for life and the Curiosity 
lander is currently looking for organic com-
pounds which may provide evidence of past or 
present life (Grotzinger et al., 2012; Klein, 
1976; Leshin et al., 2013; Levin and Straat, 
1976; Levin and Straat, 1979; Ming et al., 
2014). The lure of Mars exploration reflects its 
proximity to Earth and the possibility of its 
past habitability. 
Studies of biology in extreme environments on 
Earth continue to expand the known range of 
environmental parameters compatible with 
life, increasing our knowledge about the likeli-
hood of organisms surviving in isolated cir-
cumstances on Mars. 
Present day habitability is a possibility for a 
number of areas on the red planet identified as 
potential ‘special regions’ (Rummel et al., 
2014). These locations (should any exist) may 
accommodate the survival and replication of 
terrestrial microbes (Rettberg et al., 2015; 
Rettberg et al., 2016). An environment of bio-
tic relevance may be as small as 10 to 1,000 
microns. Thus, habitable conditions need only 
be restricted to that/those area(s) with which 
microbial life is in direct contact. Several envi-
ronments which may exist and be important to 
sensitivity of contamination by terrestrial life 
(and by similarity, may also be important for 
present-day extant life on Mars) have already 
been documented and include: extreme condi-
tions with liquid brines; underground shelters 
and impact related hydrothermal systems 
(Rummel et al., 2014). 
The delivery of terrestrial microbes to Mars 
and their subsequent survival and proliferation 
may obscure or preclude the discovery of pris-
tine evidence of bona fide Martian life. Fortu-
nately, the most common terrestrial microor-
ganisms that may contaminate spacecraft sur-
faces can be expected to be killed off by the 
radiation exposure, high temperatures and des-
iccation associated with spaceflight. Yet it 
must be noted that studies have shown that 
some microorganisms (especially spores) dis-
play adaptations to desiccated and high radia-
tion environments (Musilova et al., 2015) and 
may survive space travel (Schuerger et al., 
2003; Tauscher et al., 2006; Vaishampayan et 
al., 2010). It is noted that, even if rendered 
non-viable by exposure to spaceflight condi-
tions, dead microbes are still composed of or-
ganic compounds that could obfuscate analysis 
of native data collected on Mars. 
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The rolling wave of current Mars exploration 
has several implications for causing the for-
ward contamination of Mars. First, the number 
of planned Mars missions alone increases the 
potential for contamination. Second, the scope 
of activities conducted during surface missions 
and the number of known potentially habitable 
environments to be explored in the near future 
are expected to increase dramatically and will 
target regions deemed likely to provide evi-
dence of past or present water (liquid or ice) 
(NRC, 2006). 
WHY IS PLANETARY PROTEC-
TION NOW LOOKING TO THE ICY 
MOONS? 
There is increasing evidence of the potential 
for life to exist on the icy moons of our outer 
solar system. Subsurface oceans may be com-
mon on icy moons. Magnetic field data suggest 
the presence of highly conductive saline water 
below the surface of Europa (Kivelson et al., 
2000), Ganymede (Kivelson et al., 2002) and 
Callisto (Kivelson et al., 2000). 
It was recently announced (2016) in Nature 
News that observations led by W. Sparks using 
the Hubble Space Telescope had three times 
observed plumes of, what is suspected to be, 
water vapor emanating from the surface of Eu-
ropa. These observations, which are ongoing 
(Sparks et al., 2016) support earlier reports by 
Roth et al. (2014) of the possible presence of 
water plumes at Europa which, if linked to a 
subsurface ocean, could potentially form con-
duits to a regime that supports life. 
Recently the Cassini mission detected the ex-
pulsion of hydrothermally driven plumes from 
Enceladus (Porco et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2015; 
McKay et al., 2014; Spencer and Nimmo, 
2013). The possibility of subsurface water on 
the icy moons has implications for the origin 
and distribution of life in the solar system be-
cause liquid water is a key prerequisite for hab-
itability (Sephton, 2004). However, the case 
that the icy moons might provide a source of 
life is by no means universally accepted (Pas-
cal, 2016). Numerous lander types (including 
vehicles with the capability to penetrate 
through ice to potential subsurface oceans) and 
flyby missions are being studied or developed 
to search for life on the icy moons. The associ-
ated potential to either contaminate indigenous 
biota or create false positives in life detection 
experiments is enhanced by the presence of 
water. 
HOW ARE MARS AND THE ICY 
MOONS PHYSICALLY SIMILAR? 
Mars and the icy moons of the outer solar sys-
tem share some physical properties. Both are 
irradiated by the Sun although, in addition, the 
icy moons receive particle radiation from the 
magnetospheres of the planets they orbit. This 
radiation leads to the production of highly oxi-
dized surfaces (Klein, 1978; Raulin et al., 
2010). Both Mars and the icy moons contain 
requisite abundances of all the elements neces-
sary for life (Kargel et al., 2000; Zolotov, 
2007; Zolotov and Shock, 2001). Hydrother-
mal systems, often cited as locations of astro-
biological interest, are present on Mars 
(Cockell and Barlow, 2002) while ocean-floor 
interactions are argued to occur on the icy 
moons (McCollom et al., 1999; Raulin et al., 
2010; Vance et al., 2007). 
HOW ARE MARS AND THE ICY 
MOONS PHYSICALLY DIFFER-
ENT? 
Mars is relatively close to the Earth and can be 
reached by spacecraft in about six months. Icy 
moons take longer to reach by spacecraft (Voy-
ager arrived at Jupiter in two years but Juno 
took five years to arrive at Jupiter and Cassini 
took seven years to arrive at Saturn). Mars is 
bathed in galactic and solar radiation (Kminek 
and Bada, 2006) but the radiation levels pre-
sent at the surface on Mars are less than those 
experienced by some icy moons (Bagenal et 
al., 2015). Mars has high levels of dust while 
the icy moons have large areas of water ice. 
Excluding surface processes, Mars can be con-
sidered geologically ‘dead’ with a stagnant 
lithosphere. In contrast, tidal interactions on 
Icy Moons may drive active cryospheres that 
facilitate chemical cycles with the capability to 
exchange surface material with a subsurface 
ocean (Hand et al., 2007; Phillips et al., 2000; 
Porco et al., 2006). 
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WHAT IS UNIQUE ABOUT THE 
MARS ENVIRONMENT? 
Mars displays seasonal changes owing to its 
obliquity of 25.19° which leads to variable po-
lar ice caps. The topography and thermophysi-
cal properties of the Martian surface generate 
temperature and pressure gradients which 
drive local and regional scale atmospheric cir-
culation, leading to the production of dust 
storms (Cantor et al., 2001). There are rocks 
and minerals at the surface of Mars but, while 
there is plenty of evidence of a past active plate 
tectonic system, much like that on Earth, dis-
playing frozen preserved subduction and 
spreading zones, transforming faults and vol-
canoes, Mars is now tectonically inactive. 
Plate tectonics ceased when the mantle had 
cooled too extensively to support constructive 
plate margin spreading (Sleep, 1994). 
WHAT IS UNIQUE ABOUT AN ICY 
MOON ENVIRONMENT? 
Liquid water, the primary prerequisite for hab-
itability, is likely to be present at the icy moons 
Europa (Kivelson et al., 2000), Ganymede (Ki-
velson et al., 2002), Callisto (Kivelson et al., 
2000) and Enceladus (Hsu et al., 2015). Tidal 
energy drives the icy moon geological and ge-
ochemical exchange process which may pro-
mote interactions between a subsurface ocean, 
its rocky core and a chemically-rich oxidized 
moon surface (Raulin et al., 2010). Cryovol-
canic plumes which release water ice, gases 
and organic compounds (Hansen et al., 2006; 
Porco et al., 2006; Waite Jr et al., 2009) are 
believed to be present on at least Europa and 
Enceladus. Spreading and subduction zones 
have been identified at Europa. 
HOW DIFFERENT ARE THE HAB-
ITABILITIES OF MARS AND THE 
ICY MOONS? 
Liquid water is an essential requirement for all 
known terrestrial life. Biochemistry relies on a 
medium in which compounds can dissolve and 
chemical reactions occur. Few other solvents 
can match the capability of water to sustain the 
reactions of life under conditions which sup-
port a liquid phase – which is neither too cold 
to inhibit biochemical reactions from being ac-
tive, nor too hot to break the bonds of organic 
compounds (Sephton, 2004). Habitability on 
Mars is likely to be confined to subsurface aq-
uifers and hydrothermal regions or highly het-
erogeneous and transient surface water 
sources, perhaps related to deliquescing salts 
(Gough et al., 2014), owing to the highly arid 
nature and UV flux of the solar-exposed sur-
face environment. Despite showing abundant 
evidence of past habitable conditions, the cur-
rent day Mars surface environment appears rel-
atively challenging for life. The icy moons 
contain liquid water (Hsu et al., 2015; Kivel-
son et al., 2000; Kivelson et al., 2002) and 
therefore present potentially habitable environ-
ments for any still viable microbes brought 
from Earth in a forward contamination event. 
Survival and proliferation of organisms is thus 
plausible, posing the need for careful planetary 
protection consideration. 
Extant life on Mars or the icy moons is likely 
to be subsurface and therefore relies on energy 
sources independent of oxygen and surface 
photosynthesis. Putative extant biospheres 
would therefore likely be supported by chem-
otrophic primary producers. For example, aq-
uifers of acidic brines could provide the ingre-
dients needed to support metabolic pathways 
for subsurface Martian organisms, sustained 
by iron and sulphur chemolithotrophy; analo-
gous to the subsurface anaerobic microbial 
habitat of the Rio Tinto deposits (Fernández-
Remolar et al., 2008). The oxidation of seis-
mogenic H2 is thought to be a major source of 
metabolic energy in the deep subsurface on 
Earth and could similarly support any extant 
biosphere on Mars (McMahon et al., 2016). 
In the high radiation environment of the icy 
moons, oxidants produced by radiation on the 
surface of icy satellites could be carried to sub-
surface liquid water reservoirs that may con-
tain reductants (redox reactions produce an en-
ergy source, see McKay et al., 2008 and refer-
ences therein). In a closed system consisting of 
a moon covered by thick ice, water-rock reac-
tions in a tidally heated reservoir or a series of 
redox reactions produced by the radioactive 
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decay of long-lived radioisotopes could pro-
duce H2, which, together with CO2, would pro-
vide an energy source for methanogenic or sul-
phur reducing ecosystems (McKay et al., 
2008). Also, a radiation-driven ecosystem 
could exist with oxidants and organics suitable 
as energy sources produced in H2O/CO2 ices 
by radiation chemistry (Chyba, 2000). 
HOW DIFFERENT ARE THE POS-
SIBILITIES OF FALSE POSITIVES 
ON MARS AND THE ICY MOONS? 
False positives are generated when a signal is 
detected that can be confused with signals from 
biological materials. On Mars, organic com-
pounds are likely to be scarce today and the 
major challenge lies in detecting them. Non-bi-
ological organic compounds can originate 
from meteoric or cometary material or through 
synthesis in hydrothermal systems. These or-
ganic carbon species can thereafter be trans-
formed via chemical processes which, how-
ever, are not well understood (Mahaffy et al., 
2004). The radiation environment of Mars can 
promote the survival of small organic com-
pounds (Pavlov et al., 2012). On icy moons, 
organic compounds are likely to be plentiful 
and the major challenge lies in diagnosing their 
source. Polymerization of simple organic com-
pounds is favored under conditions thought to 
exist on icy moons1 (Kimura and Kitadai, 
2015). The effects of radiation on pre-existing 
natural organic mixtures have been studied 
(Court et al., 2006). Radiation alteration of 
complex hydrocarbon mixtures in oxygen-free 
environments leads to free radical generation 
and a decrease in the average size and extent of 
alkylation of polycyclic aromatic hydrocar-
bons; an increase in the abundance of oxygen-
containing compounds; irradiation of methane 
produces polymerization and organic solids, 
with progressively increasing average size and 
degree of alkylation for their constituent aro-
matic units (Court et al., 2006). De novo syn-
thesis is also possible and high radiation envi-
ronments may foster the production of amino 
                                                 
1 Generalization is however difficult: Titan vs. Europa; 
surface vs. depth vs. transfer between them. 
acids and their oligomers, polymers or macro-
molecules (Cassidy et al., 2010; Neish et al., 
2010; He and Smith, 2014). Thus, on Mars the 
low abundances of organic compounds could 
lead to false positives from terrestrial contam-
ination, while, on icy moons, the detection of 
polymers and macromolecules could lead to 
false positives if abiogenic polymers are con-
fused with biopolymers. 
WHAT ARE THE STANDARD 
PLANETARY PROTECTION 
STRATEGIES CURRENTLY USED 
FOR MARS? 
Spacecraft that fly by or enter orbit around 
Mars are subject to planetary protection re-
quirements (Category III) designed to control 
contamination and to reduce the risk that a 
spacecraft or its launch system will impact the 
planet. The spacecraft are assembled in clean 
rooms rated at Class 100,000 (ISO 8) or better 
(i.e., less than one hundred thousand particles 
in the size range up to 0.5 μm for every cubic 
foot of air; (ISO, 2016), and it is ensured that 
the probability of impact by the launch vehicle 
and the flyby spacecraft does not exceed 10-4 
and 10-2, respectively, over a time period of 50 
years. The lifetime of an orbiter must be such 
that it remains in orbit for a period in excess of 
20 years from launch, with a probability of im-
pact of 0.01, and the probability of impact dur-
ing the next 30 years must be no higher than 
0.05. If the orbital lifetime requirements can-
not be met, then the surface microbial biobur-
den must be fewer than 3 × 105 total surface 
spores. Following bioassay to confirm that the 
low surface bioburden requirement is met, 
such spacecraft must be protected against pre-
launch recontamination. 
Spacecraft that land on Mars but are not 
equipped with life-detection experiments are 
subject to planetary protection requirements 
designed to control the lander’s bioburden and 
to prevent accidental impact by hardware not 
intended to land. The total probability of any 
accidental impacts by any hardware other than 
 INTRODUCTION TO PLANETARY PROTECTION   
The International Planetary Protection Handbook 
21 
the lander must be no more than 10-4. Biobur-
den control involves assembly in a Class 
100,000 (ISO 8) or better clean room, the im-
plementation of periodic microbiological as-
says, and the maintenance of hardware cleanli-
ness. Bioburden reduction to the level of 
300,000 surface spores and 500,000 total 
spores per landing event is required. The mis-
sion team is also required to provide inventory, 
documentary, and archive samples of organic 
compounds used in the construction of the 
lander and associated hardware that might ac-
cidentally impact the planet. Finally, the loca-
tions of landing sites and impact points must 
be assessed as accurately as possible, and the 
condition of the hardware at each site must be 
estimated to assist in determining the potential 
location of organic compounds. Recently, the 
ESA lander Schiaparelli crashed on Mars with 
almost full thruster propellant tanks and led to 
the unexpected explosive deposition of large 
amounts of fuel on the planetary surface (ESA, 
2016). 
If such an event had occurred at a ‘special re-
gion’ of Mars or into water on an icy moon, 
this level of irreversible contamination could 
be severely damaging to future scientific re-
sults at that location. 
WHAT ARE THE STANDARD OR-
GANIC CLEANLINESS CONSIDER-
ATIONS CURRENTLY USED FOR 
MARS? 
Evidence of past or present life can be revealed 
by the detection of organic compounds that re-
sult from biochemical processes. Achieving ef-
fective organic compound detection in envi-
ronments where indigenous organic contents 
may be very low requires extremely high levels 
of organic terrestrial contamination/organic 
cleanliness (Blakkolb et al., 2014). Organic 
cleanliness has to be maintained during each 
step in manufacturing, assembly, transport, 
sample processing and analysis. Most crucially 
organic cleanliness is required during sample 
collection, processing, and delivery to the ana-
lytical instrument. 
The Mars Science Laboratory mission set a 
limit of 40 parts per billion (ppb, by weight) 
total terrestrial organic contamination load per 
sample analyzed by the Sample Analysis on 
Mars instrument. In detail, the Mars Science 
Laboratory activities subdivided the 40 ppb 
into flight system components to instrument 
sources in a 9:1 ratio. The most important 
sources of terrestrial contamination in samples 
were determined to be surfaces of the sample 
collection and handling equipment, including 
the drill. 
To achieve such a high level of organic clean-
liness aboard the Mars Science Laboratory, the 
individual hardware parts of the sample trans-
fer chain were treated prior to assembly using 
acetone and isopropyl alcohol to achieve 
cleanliness levels corresponding to Level 200 
for particulates and 20 ng cm-2 for molecular 
film residues (IEST, 2013). Class 10 000, or 
better, air quality was maintained when sam-
pling system hardware was exposed for inte-
gration and testing. Surfaces of the sampling 
system were assessed for contaminants using 
swabs and high purity hexane. The redistribu-
tion of particulate and molecular materials, 
e.g., by shock and acoustic excitation, during 
the launch, cruise, entry, descent, and landing 
events was recognized as a means for contam-
inant transport and tests and analysis were per-
formed. During the mission cruise phase, elec-
tronic units were maintained under vacuum 
with elevated temperature leading to outgas-
sing and condensation of volatile contaminants 
elsewhere in the system. 
One method by which terrestrial organic con-
tamination may be further reduced is by dilu-
tion cleaning (Anderson et al., 2012). In the 
context of Mars, dilution cleaning involves the 
use of Mars regolith to repeatedly contact hard-
ware surfaces to physically remove contami-
nants from surfaces within the sample transfer 
path before performing the sample collec-
tion/analysis activity. 
WHAT ARE THE STANDARD 
PLANETARY PROTECTION 
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STRATEGIES CURRENTLY USED 
FOR ICY MOONS? 
The Planetary Protection Categories defined 
by the Committee on Space Research (CO-
SPAR) differentiate between space missions 
according to their type (flyby, orbiter, lander, 
sample return), while also taking into account 
the degree to which the contaminants of a 
spacecraft might compromise the processes of 
understanding local chemical evolution and/or 
the origin of life. COSPAR’s Panel on Plane-
tary Protection (Kminek and Rummel, 2015; 
Rummel et al., 2010) provided an extended, 
but simplified, version of a procedure that had 
previously been recommended by the US Na-
tional Research Council. This divides the icy 
bodies of the outer solar system into three 
groups for analysis: (1) A large group of ob-
jects, including small icy bodies, which were 
judged to have only a ‘remote’ chance of con-
tamination by spacecraft missions of all types. 
(2) A group consisting of Ganymede, Titan, 
Triton, Pluto/Charon and those Kuiper belt ob-
jects with diameters greater than one half that 
of Pluto, that were also thought to pose a ‘re-
mote’ concern for contamination. (3) A 
group/pair consisting of Europa and Enceladus 
that were believed to have a ‘significant’ 
chance of contamination by spacecraft mis-
sions. The ‘significant’ chance of contamina-
tion referred to in (3) requires the implementa-
tion of significant measures (potentially in-
cluding bioburden reduction), for flybys as 
well as for orbiter and lander missions to Eu-
ropa and Enceladus, aimed overall at reducing 
the probability of inadvertent contamination of 
bodies of water beneath the surfaces of these 
objects to <1 × 10-4 per mission. 
The approach adopted by COSPAR for deter-
mining compliance with its 10-4 standard for 
missions targeted to Europa (and Enceladus), 
and to a lesser extent for missions to Gany-
mede (including also Titan, Triton, 
Pluto/Charon and large Kuiper belt objects), 
requires the addressing of conservatively esti-
mated, although as yet poorly known, parame-
ters. In this regard, in the case of Europa, the 
following items are presently included (at a 
minimum) in the probability estimation. i) Bi-
oburden at launch, ii) Cruise survival of con-
taminating organisms, iii) Organism survival 
in the environment of, and on, Europa, iii) 
Probability of landing on Europa, iv) The 
mechanisms and timescales of transport to the 
subsurface of Europa and v) Organism survival 
and proliferation before, during and after sub-
surface transfer. This particular approach also 
leaves open the possibility to include addi-
tional parameters in the calculation. 
WHAT EXISTING PLANETARY 
PROTECTION TECHNIQUES ARE 
PARTICULARLY USEFUL FOR 
ICY MOONS? 
The Task Group on the Forward Contamina-
tion of Europa concluded that current cleaning 
and sterilization techniques are sufficient to 
meet the needs of future space missions to Eu-
ropa. Some useful definitions are listed below 
(Chosewood and Wilson 2009): 
 Sterilization: processes aimed at complete 
elimination (through removal, inactivation 
or killing) of all living microorganisms and 
viruses (see Glossary). 
 Disinfection: elimination of nearly all rec-
ognized pathogenic microorganisms but 
not necessarily all microbial forms. 
 Decontamination: Ensuring that an item is 
safe to handle and reasonably free from the 
transmission of organisms, including re-
moval of contaminating agents, e.g., mi-
croorganisms or organic compounds and 
potentially of biomatter from dead micro-
organisms (see Glossary) 
These techniques include Viking-derived pro-
cedures such as cleaning surfaces with isopro-
pyl alcohol and/or sporicides and sterilization 
by dry heating, as well as more modern pro-
cesses such as sterilization by hydrogen perox-
ide. Demonstration that these techniques, 
along with the calculated effects of exposure to 
the Europan radiation environment, can effec-
tively reduce bio-burden to prescribed levels is 
therefore necessary (NRC, 2006). A significant 
challenge is the need to sterilize the encapsu-
lated spacecraft bioburden. This will require 
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extended exposure to sterilizing dry-heat tem-
peratures (dry heat is one of only two technol-
ogies that can effectively sterilize an encapsu-
lated bioburden, the other being penetrating 
ionizing radiation). Therefore, spacecraft ma-
terial must be carefully selected to be compat-
ible with the selected mode(s) of sterilization. 
All components of the probe instrumentation 
must be decontaminated for chemical and bio-
logical reduction using both physical and 
chemical treatments depending on the material 
properties and size of the component part. 
In brief, physical methods could include dry 
heat up to 250°C (for bulky heat-resistant 
parts), steam at 121°C (for surfaces of heat and 
water-resistant components), germicidal UV 
radiation at 254 nm (for all UV-resistant and 
unshadowed surfaces) and ionizing radiation 
(Frick et al., 2014; Konstantinidis et al., 2015). 
Chemical methods for cleaning, bioburden re-
duction and/or sterilization could include de-
tergent alkaline mixtures, alcohol mixtures, 
hydrogen peroxide (≥ 5%), hypochlorous acid 
(for stainless steel parts), supercritical carbon 
dioxide, ethylene oxide and ozone (Frick et al., 
2014; Konstantinidis et al., 2015). For each 
component, a combination of decontamination 
methods leads to greater effectiveness. Atten-
tion needs to be paid to matching process pa-
rameters with the hardware for the mission. 
For example, heat eventually kills all microbes 
(5 hours at 125°C reduce surface numbers by 
many orders of magnitude). Electronic compo-
nents utilized onboard a mission to the icy 
moons should thus be suitably qualified to 
withstand processes aimed at reducing the 
overall contamination. 
WHAT NEW PLANETARY PRO-
TECTION TECHNIQUES NEED TO 
BE DEVELOPED FOR ICY 
MOONS? 
Owing to the great distances of the icy moons 
from the Sun, nuclear power sources may be 
adopted for transport. Current planetary pro-
tection rules concerning nuclear power sources 
on celestial bodies are not explicit. However, it 
can be assumed that there will be no desire to 
introduce perennial heat sources into a habita-
ble environment under the ice together with 
contaminated spacecraft hardware. To meet 
the probabilistic requirements of radioactive 
material coming into contact with the ocean 
present on an icy moon it is anticipated that 
strict limits will be imposed (Konstantinidis et 
al., 2015). It is likely that planetary protection 
requirements will in future require careful con-
sideration in that regard. The potential global 
connectivity of subsurface oceans means that 
microbial contamination could spread across 
the whole moon (NRC, 2006). It has thus been 
recommended that current Mars-focused 
spore-based culturing techniques used to esti-
mate the total bioload on a spacecraft should 
be supplemented by screening tests for specific 
types of extremophiles, such as radiation-re-
sistant organisms (NRC, 2006). It has also 
been suggested that modern molecular meth-
ods, such as those based on the polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR), may prove to be more 
rapid and more informative for detecting and 
identifying biological contamination than 
NASA’s and ESA’s existing culturing proto-
cols for planetary protection (NRC, 2006; La 
Duc et al., 2014). 
WHAT ORGANIC CLEANLINESS 
CONSIDERATIONS ARE PARTICU-
LARLY USEFUL FOR ICY 
MOONS? 
In the case of icy moons, the organic cleaning 
steps used for Mars during hardware assembly 
are directly transferable. Perhaps the most sig-
nificant difference between icy moons and 
Mars is the type of sample available for analy-
sis. Mars samples of regolith or rock are en-
countered as, or are transformed to, granular 
materials. When orbiting, icy moons, samples 
may be present as volatile or particulate 
plumes. For example, Enceladus is venting 
plumes of water ice, methane, and simple or-
ganic compounds (Postberg et al., 2009) and 
transient plumes have also been suggested for 
Europa (Roth et al., 2014, Sparks et al., 2016). 
When landed, icy moon sampling missions 
will encounter icy solids or possibly liquid wa-
ter. The dilution cleaning approach utilized for 
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Mars may be even more relevant for landed op-
erations because of the ease with which water 
dissolves organic contamination, but only if 
possibilities for forward contamination of the 
moons and their astrobiologically-relevant en-
vironments are adequately addressed. 
WHAT MISSIONS ARE BEING 
PLANNED FOR THE ICY MOONS? 
There are a number of forthcoming missions to 
the icy moons that will require planetary pro-
tection and organic contamination considera-
tions. Preparations for the ESA Jupiter Icy 
Moons Explorer (JUICE) mission are now at 
an advanced stage and it will involve a flyby of 
Jupiter and its icy moons Ganymede, Callisto 
and Europa. Part of its objectives will be to 
search for organic compounds (Grasset et al., 
2013). The NASA Europa Clipper mission will 
repeatedly flyby Jupiter’s icy moon, passing 
25-100 km above the surface. The Europa 
Clipper mission will: seek evidence for liquid 
water in the subsurface, determine the thick-
ness of the ice crust, obtain evidence of mate-
rial exchange and the geomorphology of the 
surface and perform mass spectrometric detec-
tion of plume materials for evidence of habita-
bility (Phillips and Pappalardo, 2014). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our understanding of the transfer and survival 
of terrestrial microorganisms and the develop-
ment of planetary protection protocols to pre-
vent their introduction to inner solar system 
bodies (such as Mars) provides a strong foun-
dation for the development of similar protocols 
for the outer solar system. Our existing 
knowledge must be adapted and enhanced be-
cause the icy moons of the outer solar system 
provide distinct challenges for planetary pro-
tection. The potential presence of abundant and 
contiguous liquid water, organic compounds, 
intense radiation and tidal energy-driven rock-
water interactions provide the possibility of ef-
ficient proliferation following contamination 
from Earth. In addition to planetary protection 
for forward contamination purposes, organic 
cleanliness is also an essential requirement for 
missions to the outer solar system. The poten-
tially habitable environments on icy moons, 
that may be colonized by terrestrial microor-
ganisms, also hold the possibility of hosting in-
digenous biospheres. Organic contamination 
by Earth-sourced materials would confuse or 
corrupt indigenous signals of life. Forthcoming 
missions, such as ESA’s JUICE and NASA’s 
Europa Clipper, will benefit from new plane-
tary protection and organic cleanliness proto-
cols that protect the outer solar system environ-
ment and maximize the scientific return from 
any data acquired. 
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Handbook Objectives 
 
Understanding potential hazards is essential to 
pursue space exploration. Avoiding unneces-
sary challenges coming from introducing un-
wanted invasive Earth forward contamination 
while searching for extra-terrestrial life is key 
to efficiently pursuing exploration. The Hand-
book describes the state-of-the-art and good-
practices to implement planetary protection re-
quirements internationally. 
This handbook will help you: 
 Understand what planetary protection is, 
and why it is important; 
 Get acquainted with the Outer Space 
Treaty and the ESA/NASA requirements 
and their implementation; 
 Learn about the state-of-the-art regarding 
Best Practice of Organic Contamination 
Control (BPOCC) for Icy Moons and Mars 
missions; 
 Discover the lessons learned from plane-
tary protection experts, underlining the dos 
and don’ts in planetary protection imple-
mentation; 
 Familiarize yourself with Planetary Protec-
tion implementation through the Planetary 
Protection Check List. 
To this end, the Handbook will go through 
the basics of microbiology needed to under-
stand planetary protection processes. It will 
then go through planetary protection at ESA 
and NASA, the best practices in organic 
contamination control, the practical lessons 
learned through Q&A and a Planetary Pro-
tection Check-list. 
 
International Partners 
 
This handbook has been coordinated with in-
ternational partners from ESA, NASA, CNES, 
CAST, and the JAXA planetary protection of-
fice to ensure that requirements, documenta-
tion and reviews cover the needs and obliga-
tions of the respective space agencies for joint 
missions. 
Four training workshops2 (“Tutorials”) were 
held using an initial version of this Handbook, 
in Tsukuba, Japan (May 2017), Pasadena, CA, 
USA (July 2018), Bremen, Germany (October 
2018) and Beijing, China (October 2018). 
 
                                                 
2 Visit www.pposs.org/tutorial/ 
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Chapter 1. Planetary Protection Basics 
The present chapter provides an overview of planetary protection basics, including an introduction to 
the COSPAR Panel on Planetary Protection, elements of microbiology, basic information on biobur-
den, assay and sterilization and some useful rudiments of orbital dynamics. 
 
PLANETARY PROTECTION 
BASICS3 
WHAT PLANETARY PROTECTION IS NOT 
To begin with, a clarification of what planetary 
protection is not may be useful: 
 It is not about asteroid defense: 
• Covered in the Near Earth Objects 
(NEO) and Space Situational Aware-
ness (SSA) programs. 
 It is not about space debris: 
• Covered in the Space Surveillance and 
Tracking (SST), space debris, and sus-
tainability programs. 
 It is not about cultural or natural world her-
itage: 
• Covered by UNESCO based on a con-
vention (for Earth) and the COSPAR 
Panel on Exploration (for space). 
 It is not a green party for space. 
 It is not about playing around with fictional 
“blasters” and ET. 
HISTORY OF PLANETARY PROTECTION 
“…we are in the awkward situation of being 
able to spoil certain possibilities for scientific 
investigations for a considerable interval be-
fore we can constructively realize them…we 
urgently need to give some thought to the con-
servative measures needed to protect future 
scientific objectives on the moon and the plan-
ets…” (J. Lederberg and D. B. Cowie, Science, 
1958). 
The above statement reflects the concern 
raised by the International Astronautical Fed-
                                                 
3 By Gerhard Kminek, ESA and Jean-Louis Fellous, 
COSPAR. 
eration (IAF), UN-COPUOS and the US Na-
tional Academy of Science (NAS) in the time 
period that led to the Committee on Contami-
nation by Extraterrestrial Exploration 
(CETEX), established by the International 
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). 
In 1958, ICSU adopted the CETEX Code-of-
Conduct and established the Committee on 
Space Research (COSPAR). 
COSPAR established the Consultative Group 
on Potentially Harmful Effects of Space Ex-
periments. 
The first spaceflight missions to use this Code-
of-Conduct were the Ranger missions in 1961. 
Since then, all planetary missions had to imple-
ment planetary protection measures at different 
degrees – ranging from simple documentation 
to terminal sterilization of entire flight sys-
tems. 
More detailed quantitative regulations, in par-
ticular for Mars, were adopted by COSPAR in 
1964 (e.g., Sagan and Coleman, 1965; Sagan 
et al., 1968). 
RATIONALE FOR PLANETARY PROTECTION 
The rationale for planetary protection can be 
formulated as follows: 
 Ensure that scientific investigations re-
lated to the origin and distribution of life 
are not compromised by: 
• Protecting our investment in space sci-
ence and exploration; 
• Protecting the unique opportunity to 
learn more about the origin of life in a 
way that is no longer possible on Earth 
because of reprocessing/overprinting of 
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earliest evidences of life by the abun-
dant more recent life forms; 
• And then, there is the more philosophi-
cal issue about the Drake equation, and 
whether or not we are alone in the Uni-
verse. 
 Protecting the Earth from the potential 
hazard posed by extraterrestrial matter 
carried by a spacecraft returning from 
an interplanetary mission: 
• Simple prudence – protect the Earth! 
• In line with the precautionary principle 
of environmental protection. 
FRAMEWORK FOR PLANETARY PROTEC-
TION 
The legal basis and the goal for planetary pro-
tection were established in Article IX of the 
United Nations Treaty on Principles Govern-
ing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and other Celestial Bodies (UN Outer Space 
Treaty, 1967): 
“...parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of 
outer space including the Moon and other ce-
lestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them 
so as to avoid their harmful contamination and 
also adverse changes in the environment of the 
Earth resulting from the introduction of extra-
terrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall 
adopt appropriate measures for this pur-
pose...” 
COSPAR maintains and promotes a planetary 
protection policy for the reference of spacefar-
ing nations, both as an international standard 
on procedures to avoid organic constituent and 
biological contamination in space exploration, 
and to provide accepted guidelines and re-
quirements in this area to guide compliance 
with the Outer Space Treaty. 
                                                 
4 Implies the absence of environments where terrestrial 
organisms could survive and replicate, or a very low 
likelihood of transfer to environments where terrestrial 
organisms could survive and replicate. 
PLANETARY PROTECTION CATEGORIES 
The different planetary protection categories 
(I-V) reflect the level of interest and concern 
that contamination can compromise future in-
vestigations. The categories and associated re-
quirements depend on target body and mission 
type combinations. 
Category I: All types of missions to a target 
body which is not of direct interest for under-
standing the process of chemical evolution or 
the origin of life. 
Category II: All types of missions (gravity as-
sist, orbiter, lander) to a target body where 
there is significant interest relative to the pro-
cess of chemical evolution and the origin of 
life, but where there is only a remote4 chance 
that contamination carried by a spacecraft 
could compromise future investigations. 
Category III: Flyby (i.e., gravity assist) and 
orbiter missions to a target body of chemical 
evolution and/or origin of life interest and for 
which scientific opinion provides a significant5 
chance of contamination which could compro-
mise future investigations. 
Category IV: Lander/impactor missions to a 
target body of chemical evolution and/or origin 
of life interest and for which scientific opinion 
provides a significant6 chance of contamina-
tion which could compromise future investiga-
tions. 
Category V: Two subcategories exist: unre-
stricted Earth return for solar system bodies 
deemed by scientific opinion to have no indig-
enous life forms, and restricted Earth return for 
all others. 
The following list summarizes the current 
Planetary Protection Categories in terms of 
types of missions and targets: 
Category I: Flyby, Orbiter, Lander: Undiffer-
entiated, metamorphosed asteroids; others 
TBD. 
5 Implies the presence of environments where terrestrial 
organisms could survive and replicate, and some likeli-
hood of transfer to those places by a plausible mecha-
nism. 
6 Ibid. 
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Category II: Flyby, Orbiter, Lander: Venus; 
Moon (with organic inventory); Comets; Car-
bonaceous chondrite asteroids; Jupiter; Saturn; 
Uranus; Neptune; Ganymede†; Titan†; Tri-
ton†; Pluto/Charon†; Ceres; Kuiper-Belt Ob-
jects > 1/2 the size of Pluto†; Kuiper-Belt Ob-
jects < 1/2 the size of Pluto; others TBD. 
Category III: Flyby, Orbiters: Mars; Europa; 
Enceladus; others TBD. 
Category IV: Lander Missions: Mars; Europa; 
Enceladus; others TBD. 
Category V: Any Earth-return mission. 
 “Restricted Earth return”: Mars; Europa; 
Enceladus; others TBD. 
 “Unrestricted Earth return”: Venus, Moon; 
others TBD. 
This list is current at the time of writing, but is 
periodically updated based on latest scientific 
information. 
† denotes the need for additional analysis. 
PLANETARY PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS 
The Planetary Protection requirements are de-
scribed hereafter in more detail. 
MARS 
Launcher upper stage7: The probability of 
impact on Mars by any element not assembled 
and maintained in ISO level 8 conditions shall 
be ≤ 1x10-4 for the first 50 years after launch. 
Category III: gravity assist, orbiter, or-
biter/lander composite, cruise stage/lander 
composite8. One of the following conditions 
shall be met: 
 The probability of impact on Mars by any 
part of a spacecraft assembled and main-
tained in ISO level 8 cleanrooms, or better, 
is ≤ 1x10-2 for the first 20 years after 
launch, and ≤ 5x10-2 for the time period 
from 20 to 50 years after launch; 
 The total bioburden of the spacecraft, in-
cluding surface, mated, and encapsulated 
bioburden, is ≤ 5x105 bacterial spores. 
                                                 
7 Based on ESA ESSB-ST-U-001, editorial modification 
of COSPAR text. 
Category IV: All the requirements for cate-
gory III as well as: 
Category IVa: Lander systems not carrying 
instruments for the investigations of extant 
Martian life are restricted to a surface biobur-
den level of ≤ 3 x 105 spores, and an average of 
≤ 300 spores per square meter. 
Category IVb: For lander systems designed to 
investigate extant Martian life, all of the re-
quirements of Category IVa apply, along with 
the following requirement: 
 The entire landed system is restricted to a 
surface bioburden level of ≤ 30 spores, or 
to levels of bioburden reduction driven by 
the nature and sensitivity of the particular 
life-detection experiments, 
OR 
 The subsystems which are involved in the 
acquisition, delivery, and analysis of sam-
ples used for life detection must be steri-
lized to these levels, and a method of pre-
venting recontamination of the sterilized 
subsystems and the contamination of the 
material to be analyzed is in place. 
Category IVc: For missions which investigate 
Martian special regions (see definition below), 
even if they do not include life detection exper-
iments, all of the requirements of Category IVa 
apply, along with the following requirement: 
 Case 1. If the landing site is within the spe-
cial region, the entire landed system is re-
stricted to a surface bioburden level of ≤ 30 
spores 
 Case 2. If the special region is accessed 
through horizontal or vertical mobility, ei-
ther the entire landed system is restricted to 
a surface bioburden level of ≤ 30 spores, 
OR 
 the subsystems which directly contact the 
special region shall be sterilized to these 
8 Ibid. 
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levels, and a method of preventing their re-
contamination prior to accessing the spe-
cial region shall be provided. 
If an off-nominal condition (such as a hard 
landing) would cause a high probability of in-
advertent biological contamination of the spe-
cial region by the spacecraft, the entire landed 
system must be sterilized to a surface biobur-
den level of ≤ 30 spores and a total (surface, 
mated, and encapsulated) bioburden level of 
≤ 30 + (2 x 105) spores. 
Planned 3-sigma pre-launch landing ellipses 
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as 
part of the (landing) site selection process, to 
determine whether the mission would land or 
come within contamination range of areas or 
volumes meeting the parameter definition for 
Mars Special Regions or would impinge on al-
ready described features that must be treated as 
Mars Special Regions. 
The evaluation must be based on the latest sci-
entific evidence and in particular include an as-
sessment of the extent to which the tempera-
ture and water activity values specified for 
Mars Special Regions are separated in time 
The evaluation must be updated during the 
mission whenever new evidence indicates that 
the landing ellipse and/or the operational envi-
ronment contain or are in contamination range 
of areas or volumes meeting the parameter def-
inition for Mars Special Regions or already de-
scribed features that must be treated as Mars 
Special Regions. 
Definition of Special Region 
A Special Region is defined as a region within 
which terrestrial organisms are likely to repli-
cate Any region which is interpreted to have a 
high potential for the existence of extant Mar-
tian life forms is also defined as a Special Re-
gion. Given current understanding of terrestrial 
                                                 
9 A description for Gully taxon can be found in Rummel 
et al, 2014. 
10 Observational evidence for Recurrent Slope Lineae 
(RSL), adapted McEwen et al., 2014: 
• Confirmed: observed simultaneous incremental 
growth of flows on a warm slope, fading, and recurrence 
of this sequence in multiple Mars years; 
organisms, Special Regions are defined as ar-
eas or volumes within which sufficient water 
activity AND sufficiently warm temperatures 
to permit replication of Earth organisms may 
exist. 
The physical parameters delineating applicable 
water activity and temperature thresholds are 
given below: 
 Lower limit for water activity: 0.5; Upper 
limit: 1.0; 
 Lower limit for temperature: -28°C; No 
Upper limit defined; 
The timescale within which limits can be iden-
tified is 500 years. 
Observed features to be treated as Special Re-
gions until demonstrated otherwise: 
 Gullies (taxon 2-4)9, and bright streaks as-
sociated with gullies; 
 Subsurface cavities; 
 Subsurface below 5 meters; 
 Confirmed and partially confirmed Recur-
rent Slope Lineae (RSL)10. 
Features, if found, to be treated as a Special 
Region until demonstrated otherwise: 
 Groundwater; 
 Source of methane; 
 Geothermal activity; 
 Modern outflow channel. 
Observed features that require a case-by-case 
evaluation before being classified as a Special 
Region: 
 Dark streaks; 
 Pasted-on terrain; 
 Candidate RSL11. 
Spacecraft-induced special regions are to be 
evaluated, consistent with these limits and fea-
tures, on a case-by-case basis. 
• Partially confirmed: observed either incremental 
growth or recurrence; 
• Candidate: slope lineae that resembles RSL but where 
observations needed for partial confirmation are cur-
rently lacking. 
11 Ibid. 
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In the absence of specific information, no Spe-
cial Regions are currently identified on the ba-
sis of possible Martian life forms. 
Category V: Earth return missions from Mars 
are classified, “Restricted Earth return” 
 Unless specifically exempted, the out-
bound leg of the mission shall meet Cate-
gory IVb requirements; 
 Unless the samples to be returned from 
Mars are subjected to an accepted and ap-
proved sterilization process, the canister(s) 
holding the samples returned from Mars 
shall be closed, with an appropriate verifi-
cation process, and the samples shall re-
main contained during all mission phases 
through transport to a receiving facility 
where it (they) can be opened under con-
tainment; 
 The mission and the spacecraft design must 
provide a method to “break the chain of 
contact” with Mars, i.e., no uncontained 
hardware that contacted Mars, directly or 
indirectly, shall be returned to Earth; 
 Reviews and approval of the continuation 
of the flight mission shall be required at 
three stages: 1) prior to launch from Earth; 
2) prior to leaving Mars for return to Earth; 
and 3) prior to commitment to Earth 
reentry; 
 For unsterilized samples returned to Earth, 
a program of life detection and biohazard 
testing, or a proven sterilization process, 
shall be undertaken as an absolute precon-
dition for the controlled distribution of any 
portion of the sample. 
Principles for Human Missions to Mars 
The intent of the COSPAR planetary protec-
tion policy is the same whether a mission to 
Mars is conducted robotically or with human 
explorers; 
 Planetary protection goals should not be re-
laxed to accommodate a human mission to 
Mars, i.e., they become even more directly 
relevant to such missions – even if specific 
implementation requirements must differ; 
 Safeguarding the Earth from potential back 
contamination is the highest planetary pro-
tection priority in Mars exploration; 
 The greater capability of human explorers 
can contribute to the astrobiological explo-
ration of Mars only if human-associated 
contamination is controlled and under-
stood. 
Establishment of engineering requirements re-
sponsive to these principles is under way 
through a series of NASA and COSPAR work-
shops involving all the necessary stakeholders 
(Kminek et al., 2017). 
EUROPA AND ENCELADUS 
Category III and IV: Requirements for Eu-
ropa and Enceladus flybys, orbiters and 
landers, including bioburden reduction, shall 
be applied in order to reduce the probability of 
inadvertent contamination of a Europan or En-
celadian ocean to less than 1 x 10-4 per mis-
sion. 
The probability of inadvertent contamination 
of a Europan or Enceladian ocean of 1 x 10-4 
applies to all mission phases including the du-
ration beyond end-of-mission that spacecraft 
introduced terrestrial organisms remain viable 
and could reach a subsurface liquid water en-
vironment. 
Specific requirements will likely be refined 
and standardized in future years, but the calcu-
lation of this probability should include a con-
servative estimate of poorly known parame-
ters, and address the following factors, at a 
minimum: 
 Bioburden at launch; 
 Cruise survival for contaminating organ-
isms; 
 Organism survival in the radiation environ-
ment adjacent to Europa or Enceladus; 
 Probability of landing on Europa or Encel-
adus; 
 The mechanisms and timescales of 
transport to a Europan or Enceladian sub-
surface liquid water environment; 
 Organism survival and proliferation be-
fore, during, and after subsurface transfer. 
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Preliminary calculations of the probability of 
contamination suggest that bioburden reduc-
tion will likely be necessary even for Europa 
and Enceladus orbiters (Category III) as well 
as for landers, requiring the use of cleanroom 
technology and the cleanliness of all parts be-
fore assembly, and the monitoring of space-
craft assembly facilities to understand the bio-
burden and its microbial diversity, including 
specific problematic species. 
Methods of bioburden reduction should re-
flect the type of environments found on Europa 
or Enceladus, focusing on Earth extremo-
philes most likely to survive on Europa or En-
celadus, such as cold and radiation tolerant or-
ganisms. 
Category V: Earth return missions from Eu-
ropa and Enceladus are classified, “Restricted 
Earth return”: 
 Unless specifically exempted, the out-
bound leg of the mission shall meet re-
quirements for life detection missions; 
 Unless the samples to be returned from Eu-
ropa or Enceladus are subjected to an ac-
cepted and approved sterilization process, 
the canister(s) holding the samples re-
turned from Europa or Enceladus shall be 
closed, with an appropriate verification 
process, and the samples shall remain con-
tained during all mission phases through 
transport to a receiving facility where it 
(they) can be opened under containment; 
 The mission and the spacecraft design must 
provide a method to “break the chain of 
contact” with Europa or Enceladus, i.e., no 
uncontained hardware that contacts mate-
rial from Europa, Enceladus or their 
plumes, shall be returned to the Earth’s bi-
osphere or Earth’s Moon; 
 Reviews and approval of the continuation 
of the flight mission shall be required at 
three stages: 1) prior to launch from Earth; 
2) subsequent to sample collection and 
prior to a maneuver to enter a biased Earth 
return trajectory; and 3) prior to commit-
ment to Earth re-entry; 
 For unsterilized samples returned to Earth, 
a program of life detection and biohazard 
testing, or a proven sterilization process, 
shall be undertaken as an absolute precon-
dition for the controlled distribution of any 
portion of the sample. 
SMALL SOLAR SYSTEM BODIES 
The small bodies of the solar system not else-
where discussed in this document represent a 
very large class of objects. 
Imposing forward contamination controls on 
these missions is not warranted except on a 
case-by-case basis, so most such missions 
should reflect Categories I or II. 
Category V: Determination as to whether a 
mission is classified “Restricted Earth return” 
or not shall be undertaken with respect to the 
best multidisciplinary scientific advice. 
Specifically, such a determination shall ad-
dress the following six questions for each body 
intended to be sampled: 
1. Does the preponderance of scientific 
evidence indicate that there was never 
liquid water in or on the target body? 
2. Does the preponderance of scientific 
evidence indicate that metabolically 
useful energy sources were never pre-
sent? 
3. Does the preponderance of scientific 
evidence indicate that there was never 
sufficient organic matter (or CO2 or 
carbonates and an appropriate source of 
reducing equivalents) in or on the tar-
get body to support life? 
4. Does the preponderance of scientific 
evidence indicate that subsequent to the 
disappearance of liquid water, the tar-
get body has been subjected to extreme 
temperatures (i.e., > 160°C)? 
5. Does the preponderance of scientific 
evidence indicate that there is or was 
sufficient radiation for biological steri-
lization of terrestrial life forms? 
6. Does the preponderance of scientific 
evidence indicate that there has been a 
natural influx to Earth, e.g., via mete-
orites, of material equivalent to a sam-
ple returned from the target body? 
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For containment procedures to be necessary 
(“Restricted Earth return”), an answer of “no” 
or “uncertain” needs to be returned to all six 
questions. 
For missions determined to be Category V, 
“Restricted Earth return,” the following re-
quirements shall be met: 
 Unless specifically exempted, the out-
bound leg of the mission shall meet re-
quirements for life detection missions; 
 Unless the samples to be returned are sub-
jected to an accepted and approved sterili-
zation process, the canister(s) holding the 
samples shall be closed, with an appropri-
ate verification process, and the samples 
shall remain contained during all mission 
phases through transport to a receiving fa-
cility where it (they) can be opened under 
containment; 
 The mission and the spacecraft design must 
provide a method to “break the chain of 
contact” with the small body, i.e., no un-
contained hardware that contacted the 
body, directly or indirectly, shall be re-
turned to Earth; 
 Reviews and approval of the continuation 
of the flight mission shall be required at 
three stages: 1) prior to launch from Earth; 
2) prior to leaving the body or its environ-
ment for return to Earth; and 3) prior to 
commitment to Earth re-entry; 
 For unsterilized samples returned to Earth, 
a program of life detection and biohazard 
testing, or a proven sterilization process, 
shall be undertaken as an absolute precon-
dition for the controlled distribution of any 
portion of the sample. 
REPORTING TO COSPAR 
COSPAR, 
Recommends that COSPAR members inform 
COSPAR when establishing planetary protec-
tion requirements for planetary missions, and 
Recommends that COSPAR members provide 
information to COSPAR within a reasonable 
time not to exceed six months after launch 
about the procedures and computations used 
for planetary protection for each flight and 
again within one year after the end of a solar-
system exploration mission about the areas of 
the target(s) which may have been subject to 
contamination. COSPAR will maintain a re-
pository of these reports, make them available 
to the public, and annually deliver a record of 
these reports to the Secretary General of the 
United Nations. For multinational missions, it 
is suggested that the lead partner should take 
the lead in submitting these reports. 
Reports should include, but not be limited to, 
the following information: 
1. The estimated bioburden at launch, the 
methods used to obtain the estimate (e.g., 
assay techniques applied to spacecraft or a 
proxy), and the statistical uncertainty in the 
estimate; 
2. The probable composition (identification) 
of the bioburden for Category IV missions, 
and for Category V “restricted Earth re-
turn” missions; 
3. Methods used to control the bioburden, de-
contaminate and/or sterilize the space 
flight hardware; 
4. The organic inventory of all impacting or 
landed spacecraft or spacecraft-compo-
nents, for quantities exceeding 1 kg; 
5. Intended minimum distance from the sur-
face of the target body for launched com-
ponents, for those vehicles not intended to 
land on the body; 
6. Approximate orbital parameters, expected 
or realized, for any vehicle which is in-
tended to be placed in orbit around a solar 
system body; 
7. For the end-of-mission, the disposition of 
the spacecraft and all of its major compo-
nents, either in space or for landed compo-
nents by position (or estimated position) on 
a planetary surface. 
THINGS TO REMEMBER 
Planetary protection is about protecting sci-
ence and the Earth 
 Planetary protection regulations are based 
on the UN Outer Space Treaty (1967); 
 COSPAR maintains a planetary protection 
policy and associated requirements as ref-
erence for spacefaring nations; 
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 Planetary protection categories and re-
quirements are not cast in stone and evolve 
over time as new information becomes 
available, i.e., check the latest version at 
the start of a new project. 
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THE COSPAR PANEL ON PLANE-
TARY PROTECTION12 
COSPAR AT A GLANCE 
The purpose of COSPAR, by its Charter from 
the International Council for Science (ICSU13), 
is to promote at an international level scientific 
research in space, with emphasis on the ex-
change of results, information and opinions, 
and to provide a forum, open to all scientists, 
for the discussion of problems that may affect 
scientific space research. 
The COSPAR missions are mainly achieved 
through the organization of scientific assem-
blies and publications (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 – The three main missions of COSPAR are repre-
sented on this graph. 
The organizational structure of COSPAR con-
sists of: 
 Scientific Commissions – representing 
each and every scientific discipline in-
volved in space research; 
 Panels – designed to deal with crosscutting 
issues that can affect particular segments of 
the international space research commu-
nity, often for which there is an urgent need 
for input. 
                                                 
12 By Jean-Louis Fellous, COSPAR, and Gerhard 
Kminek, ESA. 
13 The ICSU (formerly known as the International Coun-
cil of Scientific Unions) merged in July 2018 with the 
THE FRAMEWORK FOR PLANETARY PRO-
TECTION 
The legal basis and the goal for planetary pro-
tection were established in Article IX of the 
United Nations Treaty on Principles Govern-
ing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and other Celestial Bodies (UN Outer Space 
Treaty, 1967): 
“...parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of 
outer space including the Moon and other ce-
lestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them 
so as to avoid their harmful contamination and 
also adverse changes in the environment of the 
Earth resulting from the introduction of extra-
terrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall 
adopt appropriate measures for this pur-
pose...”. 
COSPAR maintains and promotes a planetary 
protection policy (PPP) for the reference of 
spacefaring nations, both as an international 
standard on procedures to avoid organic con-
stituent and biological contamination in space 
exploration, and to provide accepted guide-
lines and requirements in this area to guide 
compliance with the wording of the Outer 
Space Treaty. The stated aim of the policy is to 
fulfill the two following goals: 
 The conduct of scientific investigations 
of possible extraterrestrial life forms, 
precursors, and remnants must not be 
jeopardized; 
 In addition, the Earth must be protected 
from the potential hazard posed by ex-
traterrestrial matter carried by a space-
craft returning from an interplanetary 
mission. 
THE COSPAR PANEL ON PLANETARY 
PROTECTION 
The COSPAR Panel is concerned with biolog-
ical interchange in the conduct of solar system 
exploration, including: 
International Social Sciences Council to form the Inter-
national Science Council (ISC). 
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 Possible effects of contamination of plan-
ets other than the Earth, and of planetary 
satellites within the solar system by terres-
trial organisms; 
 Contamination of the Earth by materials re-
turned from outer space carrying potential 
extraterrestrial organisms. 
The primary objectives of the Panel within 
COSPAR are to develop, maintain, and pro-
mote planetary protection knowledge, policy, 
requirements and plans to prevent the harmful 
effects of such contamination, and through 
symposia, workshops, and topical meetings at 
COSPAR Assemblies to provide an interna-
tional forum for exchange of information in 
this area. 
At its General Assembly in 2017, the UN-
COPUOS noted the long-standing role of CO-
SPAR in maintaining the planetary protection 
policy as a reference standard for spacefaring 
nations and guiding compliance with article IX 
of the Outer Space Treaty. 
Through COSPAR the Panel informs the inter-
national community, e.g., the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) 
of the United Nations, as well as various other 
bilateral and multilateral organizations, of pol-
icy consensus in this area. 
MAINTAINING THE COSPAR PLANETARY 
PROTECTION POLICY 
Figure 2 provides a schematic view of the pro-
cess through which the PPP (and its associated 
requirements) are maintained. 
It is important to note that the COSPAR Plan-
etary Protection Policy does not describe how 
to implement the requirements nor does it pre-
scribe or require a certain organizational struc-
ture for the implementing entity (i.e., space 
agency); both aspects are under the discretion 
of the user (again, space agency). 
Starting July 2018, the COSPAR Panel on 
Planetary Protection is chaired by Dr. Athena 
Coustenis, with two Vice-Chairs, Dr. Niklas 
Hedman and Dr. Gerhard Kminek. Other 
members of the Panel are appointed represent-
atives of the major space agencies involved in 
planetary exploration, and scientists nomi-
nated by the relevant COSPAR Scientific 
Commissions (SC), namely SC B on “Space 
Studies of the Earth-Moon System, Planets, 
and Small Bodies of the Solar System” and SC 
F on “Life Sciences as Related to Space”. 
All COSPAR events, including Panel meet-
ings, are open forums: anyone interested can 
participate. But only members of the Panel can 
vote whenever such a procedure is required. 
 
 
Figure 2 – A schematic representation of the process followed by the COSPAR Panel on Planetary Protection to maintain the PPP. 
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THINGS TO REMEMBER 
 COSPAR is an international scientific 
committee established in 1958 by ICSU 
(now the ISC). 
 COSPAR has provided a forum for discus-
sions and advice on matters of planetary 
protection since its very beginning. The 
COSPAR Panel on Planetary Protection 
maintains the COSPAR Planetary Protec-
tion Policy. 
 Updating the COSPAR Planetary Protec-
tion Policy is a process that includes the 
scientific community. 
 Changes to the policy or requirements are 
not a one-person show, neither at COSPAR 
nor at the space agencies. 
 The COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy 
is published in Space Research Today, CO-
SPAR’s information bulletin (latest ver-
sion in SRT, n°200, December 2017). 
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BASICS OF MICROBIOLOGY14 
Microbiology is the study of “micro-organ-
isms”, i.e., unicellular organisms that can be 
observed directly only through a microscope. 
Such microorganisms are very diverse and om-
nipresent. They can grow as single cells, cell 
cluster, filaments, or as biofilms. 
The majority of microorganisms (Figure 3) are 
Prokaryotes (Bacteria and Archaea): they do 
not have a cell nucleus. Other microorganisms 
belong to the Eukaryotes with a cell nucleus, 
e.g., yeasts, algae, fungi, Protozoa. In addition, 
viruses that need a host cell for replication also 
belong to the group of microorganisms. 
 
Figure 3 – (Left) Eukaryotic cell (all plants and animals). 
(Right) Prokaryotic cell (microorganisms). 
The importance of microorganisms is illus-
trated by the harmful effects some of them are 
causing, such as: 
 Propagating infectious diseases in humans, 
animals or plants (human, animal or plant 
pathogens); 
 Food poisoning (production of toxic sub-
stances); 
 Deterioration of materials (bio-corrosion, 
biofouling); 
 Self-ignition of hay; 
 Etc. 
The importance of microorganisms is also il-
lustrated by their equally numerous positive ef-
fects, such as: 
                                                 
14 By Petra Rettberg and Christine Moissl-Eichinger, 
DLR. Graphics redrawn by Michel O. Grégoire, unless 
otherwise credited. 
 Decomposing organic compounds in natu-
ral nutrient cycles (decay, humus for-
mation); 
 Decomposing organic compounds in waste 
water (biological waste water treatment); 
 Decomposing organic compounds for bio-
gas production; 
 Nitrogen fixation (for plant fertilizers); 
 Acting as symbiotic bacteria in animals 
and plants (gut bacteria, suppression of 
pathogens, cellulose degradation); 
 Food production (dairy products, alcoholic 
beverages, bread, soy sauce, …) 
 Production of antibiotics, vitamins, ster-
oids; 
 Production of biocatalysts (enzymes); 
 Production of organic acids, solvents, hy-
drogen, ethanol, …; 
 Mining (leaching of iron, copper, uranium, 
…); 
 Etc. 
Microorganisms changed the environmental 
conditions on Earth, as illustrated in Figure 4 
which shows the change in the atmospheric 
composition as a result of biological metabo-
lism. 
MICROORGANISMS ARE THE OLDEST 
FORM OF LIFE ON EARTH 
The oldest fossils found thus far on Earth are 
approximately 3.4 to 3.5 billion-year-old fila-
mentous and coccoidal microbial remains in 
rocks of the Pilbara craton, Western Australia, 
and in rocks from the Barberton region, South 
Africa (Figure 5). 
Complementing the discovery of very old mi-
crofossils, the analysis of the evolution of the 
genetic material of all living cells can be used 
to trace back the emergence of life on Earth. 
The sequence of the gene for 16S (or 18S, re-
spectively) ribosomal RNA (ribonucleic acid), 
an important component of cell organelles nec-
essary for protein synthesis, can be applied as 
a molecular ‘clock’. 
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Figure 4 – Increase of the oxygen concentration in the Earth’s atmosphere due to photosynthetic microorganisms. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Microorganisms are the oldest form of life on Earth, dated back to approx. 3.5 billions of years. 
 
 BASICS OF MICROBIOLOGY   
The International Planetary Protection Handbook 
42 
This rRNA is universal, has the same function 
in all organisms, and changes in its sequence 
are presumed to occur constantly and ran-
domly in time: the history of life can be traced 
back by comparing all the 16S (and 18S) se-
quences to the so-called ‘last universal com-
mon ancestor’ (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 – The 16S RNA (in Prokaryotes) and 18S RNA (in Eukaryotes) have a common general structure and function 
 
Figure 7 – The last universal common ancestor is located at the root of the phylogenetic tree (adapted from H. Huber). 
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Figure 8 – Different size, shape and arrangement of bacterial cells. 
 
The ‘Tree of life’ derived from the sequence 
comparison shows the three domains of life 
(Figure 7), namely: 
 Eukarya 
 Bacteria 
 Archaea (not discovered until the 1970s) 
SIZES, SHAPES AND STRUCTURES OF MI-
CROORGANISMS 
Microorganisms that can only be observed 
with different types of microscopes exhibit a 
wide variety of sizes, shapes and structures, as 
exemplified in Figure 8. 
Bacteria and archaea (Figure 9) are generally 
single-celled and without a nucleus. Their size 
ranges from ~1 to 5 µm. They have different 
types of cell walls. Some of them are motile. 
Some bacteria have the ability to form spores 
(Figure 10), i.e., dormant, metabolically inac-
tive, resting stages. The spore formation is trig-
gered for example by starvation or unfavorable 
changes in the environment. The spores can 
germinate into the vegetative, metabolically-
active replicating form of the organism once 
under more suitable conditions. 
Bacterial spores are very resistant against 
many physical and chemical stress factors, 
e.g., radiation, oxidizing compounds, desicca-
tion, vacuum exposure, and are ubiquitous, as 
illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Figure 9 – Various shapes of bacteria. 
 
Figure 10 – The endospore formation is an active complex 
process to ensure the bacterial survival under unfavorable 
conditions. 
A virus is a small infectious agent that repli-
cates only inside living cells of other organ-
isms. Viruses can infect all types of life forms, 
from animals and plants to microorganisms, in-
cluding bacteria and archaea (then they are 
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called bacteriophages). Virus dimensions (Fig-
ure 11 and Figure 12) lie in the range 0.02-0.3 
µm. The question of whether viruses are living 
entities remains open. 
Where Who Details 
Sky B. stratosphericus above 24 km 
Soil B. thermoterrestis egypt. soil, 55°C 
Hay B. subtilis the „hay“-Bacillus 
Desert B. sonorensis Sonoran Desert, Arizona 
Rocks B. simplex (500 spores/g rock) 
Deep surface B. infernus  
SAF* B. pumilus SAFR  
Food B. cereus  
Pathogens B. anthracis  
Insects (patho-
gen) B. thuringiensis 
 
Table 1 – Occurrence of Bacillus spores in extreme environ-
ments (* SAF stands for Spacecraft Assembly Facility) 
 
Figure 11 – Sulfolobus spindle-shaped virus (after Ceballos 
et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 12 – Bacteriophage on a bacterial cell. 
Fungi belong to the group of eukaryotic organ-
isms with a membrane-bound nucleus (Figure 
13). Fungal cells are larger than bacterial cells. 
Most fungi grow as hyphae, which are cylin-
drical, thread-like structures 2–20 µm in diam-
eter and up to several centimeters in length. 
Depending on the species fungi can reproduce 
sexually and/or asexually, thereby forming 
spores in a very complex process. These fungal 
spores are larger than bacterial spores and in 
general less resistant. One group of unicellular 
fungi, the yeasts, replicate by budding. 
    
Figure 13 – (Left) Scanning electron microscopy image of 
Saccharomyces cerevisiae (Source: Rasha Aref, mpg.de). 
(Right) Penicillium sp. under bright field microscopy with 
lactophenol cotton blue stain. 
MICROBIAL DISTRIBUTION AND ABUN-
DANCE 
Microorganisms live almost everywhere on 
Earth, in ‘normal’ as well as in ‘extreme’ bio-
topes (Table 2). 
Where? How many? 
Garden soil, 1g 2.5 × 1010 (25,000,000,000) 
Milk (raw), 1l  2.5 × 109 
Air, 1 m3 2000 
Drinking water, 1 ml < 100 (nonpathogenic) 
Sea- and freshwater 1.2 × 1029 
Total (on Earth) 1030 (~1014 kg = 100 billion tons = 1430 
billion humans (each 70 kg; currently 7 
billion living humans on Earth)) 
Human skin 1012 
Human body 
- Own cells 
- Microbes 
 
1013 
1014-15 
Table 2 – Microbial distribution and abundance in various 
environments. 
What is ‘extreme’ in this case is of course from 
a human perspective. ‘Extremophiles’ are or-
ganisms that thrive in physically or geochemi-
cally extreme conditions that are detrimental to 
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most life forms on Earth. Such extremophile 
microorganisms can survive and live: 
 At very high temperatures (hydrothermal 
vents, hot springs, …); 
 At very cold temperatures (permafrost, sea 
ice, glaciers, …); 
 At high pH values (acidic lakes, solfataras, 
acid mine drainage, …); 
 At low pH values (alkaline lakes, …); 
 At high salt concentrations (evaporation 
ponds, Dead Sea, brines in salt mines, deep 
sea brines, …); 
 On rocks and in the upper millimeters of 
porous rocks; 
 In nutrient poor environments (deserts, wa-
ter, cleanrooms); 
 In anoxic (oxygen-free) environments 
(deep sea brines, deep sediments, …); 
 At low pressure (laboratory experiments); 
 In high radiation environments (vicinity to 
nuclear reactors, laboratory experiments); 
 Etc. 
Microorganisms are also associated with hu-
man, e.g., living on the skin, or in the intestine. 
According to a recent estimate, 90% of cells in 
the human body are bacterial, fungal, or other-
wise non-human. There are up to 10,000 mi-
croorganisms on 1 cm² of skin. The total num-
ber of human genes is approximately 23,000, 
the human microbiome encompasses more 
than 1,000,000 genes. 
 
Limits For growth For survival 
Temperature -20°C to +113°C  -263°C to +150°C 
Water stress aw  0.7 0  aw  1.0 Spores survive in vacuum (10-6 Pa) 
Salinity Salt concentration  30 %, salt crystals Salt crystals (endoevaporites) 
pH pH = 0-12 pH = 0 - 12.5 
Nutrients High metabolic versatility 
Lithoautotrophic growth 
High starvation tolerance 
not required, better without 
Oxygen Aerobic/Anaerobic growth not required, better without 
Radiation resistance 0- high radiation resistance (< 60 Gy/h) 0- high radiation resistance (< 5 kGy) 
Time 20 min up to years  25-40 × 106 years 
Table 3 – Growth and survival limits of microorganisms 
 
Each microorganism has its specific require-
ments for growth. Only approximately 1% of 
all microorganisms can be cultivated in the lab. 
The parameter ranges for survival are larger 
than for growth, i.e., replication. The limits for 
growth and survival of microorganisms are il-
lustrated in Table 3. 
Microorganisms can use one or more different 
metabolic strategies to obtain carbon for syn-
thesizing the cell mass, to obtain reducing 
equivalents used either in energy conservation 
or in bio-synthetic reactions, and to obtain en-
ergy for living and growing (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14 – Classification of microorganisms according to 
their metabolic characteristics 
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THE DETECTION OF MICROORGANISMS 
Cultivation is the propagation of microorgan-
isms with a suitable growth environment called 
a medium which can be solid or liquid. It may 
be purely chemical (a chemically defined me-
dium) or may contain organic compounds (like 
yeast extract) or may consist of living organ-
isms such as fertilized eggs. Microorganisms 
growing in or on such a medium form a culture. 
In addition to cultivation, microorganisms can 
also be detected by powerful molecular meth-
ods which also identify those organisms that 
cannot be cultivated in the lab. High-through-
put sequencing technologies and the corre-
sponding development of bioinformatics tools 
for data analysis allow the fast determination 
of the biodiversity in environmental samples 
(Table 4). 
 
 
Table 4 – Comparison of high-throughput sequencing methods (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNA_sequencing) with the original 
(Sanger) DNA sequencing method. 
 
A culture is considered a pure culture if only 
one type of organism is present, and a mixed 
culture if populations of different organisms 
are present (Figure 15). 
    
Figure 15 – Cultivated colonies of microorganisms: pure cul-
ture (left) and mixed culture (right). 
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Unlike capillary sequencing or PCR-based ap-
proaches, next-generation sequencing (NGS) 
is a culture-free method that enables analysis 
of the entire microbial community within a 
sample. With the ability to combine many sam-
ples in a sequencing run, microbiology re-
searchers can use NGS-based 16S rRNA se-
quencing as a cost-effective technique to iden-
tify strains that may not be found using other 
methods. A scheme illustrating the different 
steps in NGS is shown in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16 – Concept of next generation sequencing. 
 
NGS is widely used for planetary protection re-
lated studies, as shown in a number of scien-
tific publications, e.g., Bashir et al., 2016, 
Moissl-Eichinger et al., 2015, Vaishampayan 
et al., 2013, Mahnert et al., 2015, La Duc et al., 
2009. 
THINGS TO REMEMBER 
 Microorganisms are (almost) everywhere. 
 Many can survive extremely harsh condi-
tions. 
 Some microorganisms can form spores. 
 Bacterial spores are resistant to many phys-
ical and chemical stressors. 
 Each microorganism has specific require-
ments... only about 1% of all microorgan-
isms are cultivable in a laboratory. 
 Different cultivation-independent high-
throughput methods can be used to study 
the microbial diversity. 
 Most microbial contaminants in space-
craft assembly cleanrooms are human-as-
sociated. 
 Cleanroom isolates can be more resistant 
than comparable laboratory strains of the 
same species. 
 In cleanrooms, spore-formers are present 
as spores. 
 A broad diversity of microorganisms is 
present in cleanrooms, with different adap-
tations. 
 The microbial contamination is not homog-
enously distributed in a cleanroom. 
More information about microorganisms can 
be found in general microbiology textbooks, 
e.g., Madigan et al., 2018. 
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ORGANIC CONTAMINATION 
CONTROL15 
ORGANIC CONTAMINATION 
Organic molecules are carbon-containing com-
pounds which are the building blocks in bio-
logical systems. As such, organic molecules 
are often considered proxies for the presence 
of life, biomarkers. Therefore, the search for 
extra-terrestrial life concerns itself with their 
detection. Yet biological activity is not the 
only source of organic compounds, and abiotic 
or prebiotic chemistry can also produce or-
ganic molecules. Thus the search for organic 
molecules is crucial for our understanding of 
the chemistry of the cosmos, as well as our 
place within it. 
In attempts to analyze extra-terrestrial mole-
cules we want to detect organic molecules in-
digenous to the body of interest rather than just 
terrestrial contamination introduced through 
our process of exploration. This is where or-
ganic contamination control – the process of 
restricting the delivery of terrestrial organics to 
the target body, via the spacecraft, comes in. 
Organic contaminants are any organic mole-
cules which are on/in the spaceflight hardware 
and which may be detected by the analytical 
technique(s) used. They may be either particu-
late and/or molecular and have been intro-
duced to the system in numerous ways includ-
ing: atmospheric fallout or surface transfer 
during the build/assembly stages, impurities in 
materials used in the build or have been created 
by the release or breakdown of materials dur-
ing the flight as they are exposed to vacuum, 
extreme temperature and radiation environ-
ments. 
Biological contamination, is a subset of or-
ganic contamination as we detect organic mol-
ecules derived from microbial cells (whether 
they are alive or dead). However, not all or-
ganic contamination is biological (Figure 17) 
as organic molecules may come from numer-
ous non-biological sources. 
                                                 
15 By Samuel H Royle and Mark A. Sephton, Imperial 
College London. 
 
Figure 17 – All biological contamination (microbial) is or-
ganic but not all organic contamination is biological. 
IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIC CONTAMINA-
TION CONTROL 
For a current mission, the organic contamina-
tion control concern for planetary protection is 
that contamination will lead to incorrect con-
clusions being drawn from data collected dur-
ing the mission: either a false positive or a false 
negative. A false positive is when contamina-
tion is mistaken for the true presence of a com-
pound of interest (e.g., a proxy for life, a bi-
omarker, in a life detection mission). A false 
negative is when a high instrument back-
ground, due to terrestrial contaminants, masks 
a low signal from a compound of interest that 
is actually present in the sample – making it 
impossible to detect. This is illustrated in Fig-
ure 18. 
 
Figure 18 – How false positives and false negatives relate to 
analysis results and the true nature of the analyzed samples. 
An instrument needs to be precise with a minimal number of 
false results – illustrated by the narrower ‘Good’ ellipse. 
The questions of how much contamination is 
acceptable and what contaminants are prob-
lematic are highly specific to both the analyti-
cal instrument(s) and the target body. Contam-
inants are not a problem for a mission if they 
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either cannot be measured by the analytical 
technique(s) nor if they are easily identifiable 
as contaminants. The necessary cleanliness of 
the instrument is also governed by the expected 
levels of the compounds of interest on the tar-
get body, if the expected levels of organic com-
pounds will be low the instrument must be 
cleaner to reduce the signal to background 
noise ratio but if there will be high abundances 
of target compounds then the background can 
be higher and still obtain a positive detection 
(Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19 – Signal to background noise ratios, to detect com-
pounds x and y they must be present at significantly higher 
quantities than the background. To reduce the background, 
and therefore increase the sensitivity of the instrument, we 
must have less contamination. 
Unlike with biological contamination, forward 
contamination is less of an issue for organic 
contamination control as the organic molecules 
will not self-replicate (which is the potential 
worry with microbial contamination) and in-
stead are more likely to be diluted to very mi-
nute concentrations if they are spread across 
the body of interest and so will not be detecta-
ble by future missions. However, as it is ex-
pected that scientific instruments sent out in 
the future will be more sensitive and therefore 
have lower detection thresholds than the cur-
rent limits, this is still something we need to 
consider from a planetary protection perspec-
tive, in respect of a false positive life detection 
(Figure 18). 
PRACTICES OF ORGANIC CONTAMINATION 
CONTROL 
Organic contaminants may come from the ma-
terials used in the build phase. Plastics, resins, 
polymers, oils and lubricants may all contain 
and release organic compounds which, if not 
properly shielded, may contaminate sensitive 
areas of the spacecraft. Unless sufficient barri-
ers can be put in place to protect the instrumen-
tation or sample from contamination, materials 
need to be selected that will not induce con-
tamination that exceeds the allowed levels. 
Solid materials may contain impurities which 
are released to the environment by outgassing 
during exposure to vacuum, especially at ele-
vated temperatures. Materials must be non-
flaky, non-dusty, shatterproof and have limited 
outgassing under the expected conditions of 
the mission (e.g., temperature and radiation en-
vironments). Materials selected will also need 
to be able to withstand any contamination con-
trol cleaning procedures (e.g., high tempera-
tures during thermal bake out). 
Effective cleaning protocols need to be in 
place. These will be a series of suitable clean-
ing steps throughout the instrument and space-
craft build and assembly phases to reach and 
maintain required cleanliness levels. Repeated 
wiping down with solvents of diverse polarity, 
ultrasonic cleaning, mechanical cleaning, ther-
mal bake out under vacuum, plasma cleaning, 
accelerated CO2 snow are all accepted tech-
niques (e.g., Task Group on the Forward Con-
tamination of Europa, 2000; Committee on 
preventing the forward contamination of Mars, 
2006; ten Kate et al., 2008; Dworkin et al., 
2018), the selection of which will depend on 
the contaminants of interest and the compati-
bility of the materials being cleaned. Proce-
dures also need to be in place to monitor the 
effectiveness of these techniques and for miti-
gation in the case of accidental recontamina-
tion. 
Maintaining relevant clean room practices with 
the use of air filters, positive air pressure, pro-
tective clothing and barriers/covers to isolate 
the most sensitive parts of the instruments al-
lows cleanliness levels to be kept high and pre-
vent recontamination until launch. Monitoring 
to test for potential recontamination with the 
use of witness plates to check atmospheric fall-
out and surface swabbing is necessary. 
As it is currently not possible to build a space-
craft that is completely free from materials that 
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may introduce organic contamination, contam-
ination knowledge is as important as contami-
nation control. Keeping archives of all materi-
als used in the build to experiment on makes it 
quicker and easier to identify contaminants in 
the produced data by replicating analyses on 
the ground (Dworkin et al., 2018). Modelling 
how contaminants will be produced (e.g., by 
degassing and exposure to extreme radiation 
and thermal environments) and transported 
throughout the life of the mission is particu-
larly important and challenging (ten Kate et al., 
2008). 
HISTORY OF ORGANIC CONTAMINATION 
CONTROL 
The introduction of contamination control in 
the space exploration program originated not 
from concerns over reliable data but from a 
more fundamental reliability issue with the 
worry that missions could fail because particu-
late matter (i.e., dust) could interfere with the 
operation of highly precise electronic, hydrau-
lic, electromechanical or electro-optical sys-
tems. For example, causing a valve to stick in 
a propulsion system, resulting in control of the 
spacecraft being lost. This concern led to the 
implementation of the first NASA cleanroom 
technology in the 1950s (Useller, 1969). 
The earliest data-related contamination control 
worries were in the late 1950’s in the wake of 
Sputnik and subsequently in the run up to the 
Apollo lunar missions. It was realized that for-
ward terrestrial contamination from spacecraft 
could compromise future scientific experi-
ments and so the Committee on Contamination 
by Extraterrestrial Exploration (CETEX) was 
established (Meltzer, 2011). With little known 
about the Moon at the time, it was seen as im-
portant that terrestrial contamination was kept 
as localized as possible during the lunar land-
ings in case interesting prebiotic chemistry was 
irreversibly damaged. With further missions to 
the Moon leading to the discovery that the 
Moon is relatively uninteresting from a biol-
ogy/organic geochemistry point of view, con-
tamination control became a much lower prior-
ity for subsequent missions. 
At the time of planning the Viking missions, 
Mars was thought to be much more similar to 
Earth, and therefore potentially habitable and 
so contamination control for the Viking mis-
sions was taken very seriously. The main con-
tamination focus was on biological contamina-
tion due to the concern of terrestrial microbial 
life being released into, and proliferating on, 
the Martian surface, with unpredictable conse-
quences following interaction with indigenous 
Martian life. However, organics were still 
taken into consideration, with potential sources 
of contaminants analyzed; maximum allowa-
ble amounts of terrestrial contamination based 
on the sensitivity of the instruments set; and 
approaches to minimizing contamination 
throughout the design, build and operation 
stages planned at the early stages of mission 
development (Flory et al., 1974). Viking level 
cleanliness is still used as the benchmark for 
life-detection missions to Mars. 
The most recent mission to the Martian sur-
face, the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) on 
the Curiosity Rover was equipped with the 
Sample Analysis at Mars (SAM) instrument 
suite, able to detect organic molecules with 
sub-parts-per-billion sensitivity. While not 
strictly a life-detection mission, this high sen-
sitivity meant that high organic cleanliness of 
the instruments and sample handling chain 
were paramount. To direct this effort, NASA 
commissioned an Organic Contamination Sci-
ence Steering Group (OCSSG) which devel-
oped strategies for both the engineering and 
operations teams to reduce organic contamina-
tion down to acceptable levels (ten Kate et al., 
2008) and for the science teams responsible for 
data analysis so that they could recognize any 
contaminants detected in the data (Mahaffy et 
al., 2003). 
CURRENT CHALLENGES IN ORGANIC CON-
TAMINATION CONTROL 
Organic contamination control concerns will 
differ greatly depending on the environment of 
the target body. The exploration of the Icy 
Moons of the Outer Solar System is still very 
much in its infancy and there are many un-
knowns in the factors to be considered. 
 ORGANIC CONTAMINATION CONTROL   
The International Planetary Protection Handbook 
52 
All of our experience in organic contamination 
control in the context of planetary protection so 
far have been tailored to the Martian Environ-
ment, which, in comparison to the Icy Moons, 
is now relatively well understood. 
In particular, the radiation environment on the 
surface of the Icy Moons is yet to be con-
strained and it may well be that it will cause the 
alteration of terrestrial contaminants into unex-
pected forms. As this radiation environment is 
expected to also have created a complex suite 
of polymers and macromolecules from the 
plentiful organics supposed to be present at the 
Icy Moon surface (Johnson et al., 2012; Ki-
mura and Kitadai, 2015), it will be hard to dis-
tinguish these modified terrestrial contami-
nants, indigenous/exogenous non-biological 
products of this environment, and any indige-
nous biomarkers which may be present from 
each other. The presence, on the Icy Moons, of 
abundant liquid water (Waite Jr et al., 2009) 
and its unknown solute chemistry may also 
have significant effects. 
There are still substantial general knowledge 
gaps presenting challenges in organic contam-
ination control implementation. These include 
a lack of a rapid universal method for verifica-
tion of cleanliness, acceptable contamination 
levels for specific instruments and statistical 
methods for analytical certainty. Constant ad-
aptation and modification of existing contami-
nation control protocols will be necessary for 
incremental improvements in this field as 
knowledge processes. 
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BIOBURDEN, ASSAY AND STERI-
LIZATION16 
MICROBIAL DIVERSITY 
Applying the biodiversity considerations high-
lighted in the Basics of Microbiology section 
to the spacecraft environment, it is found that 
spacecraft are exposed to many organisms dur-
ing their pre-flight assembly. Figure 20 pro-
vides an example of the microbial diversity ob-
served in clean rooms (percentages are listed in 
Table 5). 
 
Figure 20 – Example for cultivable diversity at general level 
in cleanrooms (Courtesy C. Moissl). 
Microbial diversity includes differential re-
sistance to sterilization processes. Correspond-
ingly lethality (accounted by D10 value – see 
below) of dry heat for spore formers may vary 
from a few minutes to several tens of hours de-
pending on the species. The kinetics of this le-
thality (for both individual species and for 
communities of bacteria) typically follow an 
Arrhenius relationship (Figure 21). 
The hierarchy of resistance for dry heat pro-
cesses (from Low to High) for microorganisms 
typically follows this series: 
 Viruses (Influenza, HIV) 
 Bacteria, fungi (Salmonella, yeast) 
 Fungal spores (Molds) 
 Non-enveloped viruses (Hepatitis A) 
                                                 
16 By J Andy Spry, SETI. 
 Bacterial spores (Anthrax, tetanus) 
 Prions (BSE). 
This is the general case. However, exceptions 
and variability are the rule in biology. In the 
case of spacecraft bioburden management, it is 
usually the (relatively resistant) spore forming 
bacteria that are the indicator organisms (alt-
hough for Icy Moons, other organisms might 
also be important, for example radiation re-
sistant organisms sent to the Jovian system that 
might end up at Europa). 
 
Table 5 – Percentages of total isolates shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 21 – Kinetics of sterilization: number of surviving organisms as a function of time. 
 
STERILIZATION TERMINOLOGY 
In considering sterilization, it is appropriate to 
address specific the definitions of terms, which 
have more precise meaning in this application 
than in general speech or other industries: 
  Sterile: Free of living organisms, including 
bacterial spores, and may include infec-
tious substances (e.g., virus, prions) inacti-
vation. 
  Sterilization: A process (rather than an 
end point) that destroys or eliminates living 
organisms, including bacterial spores, and 
infectious substances. 
  Disinfection: Surface process that destroys 
vegetative (i.e., able to multiply) forms of 
harmful microorganisms, generally ex-
cluding spores. 
  Pasteurization: Heat process that arrests 
microbial growth but not necessarily lethal 
to all cell types. 
 Inactivation: Loss of ability of microor-
ganisms to grow and/or multiply. 
  D-value or D10: Time or dose required for 
a process to achieve inactivation of 90% of 
a test population (i.e., 1-log reduction). 
  z-value: Number of degrees required to 
change the D-value by 1-log. 
  (D)HMR: (Dry) Heat Microbial Reduc-
tion, the typically preferred method for bi-
oburden control of spacecraft hardware. 
  VHP: Vapor Hydrogen Peroxide an alter-
native method for bioburden control of 
spacecraft hardware. 
BIOBURDEN TERMINOLOGY 
Similarly, in considering management of 
spacecraft microbial cleanliness, it is appropri-
ate to address the definitions of terms typically 
used in the planetary protection endeavor: 
 Bioburden: Quantity of viable microorgan-
isms on a product detected with a specific 
assay. 
 Biodiversity: Identification of the spectrum 
of microorganisms on an item detected us-
ing a specific assay. 
 Biological indicator: Test system contain-
ing viable microorganisms providing a de-
fined resistance to a specified sterilization 
process. 
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Surface bioburden: 
 Bioburden on exposed surfaces, i.e., bio-
burden that can either redistribute to other 
parts of the S/C or bioburden that can be 
released to the environment 
 Mated bioburden: Bioburden between a 
matched join by fasteners rather than by 
adhesives. 
  Encapsulated bioburden:  Bioburden bur-
ied inside non-metallic materials, i.e., not 
 free for gas-exchange. 
STERILIZATION STANDARDS 
The medical industry has developed a set of 
standards and approaches that are relevant to 
developing a spacecraft sterilization process, 
and can be a resource for spacecraft managers 
and engineers, alongside ECSS and other doc-
uments described below: 
 ISO 11138: Sterilization of health care 
products – biological indicators 
 ISO 11137: Sterilization of health care 
products – radiation 
 ISO 17665: Sterilization of health care 
products – moist heat 
 ISO 11607: Packaging of terminally steri-
lized medical devices 
 ISO 20857: Sterilization of health care 
products – dry heat 
BIOBURDEN ON SPACECRAFT 
THE BIOBURDEN REDUCTION PROCESS OP-
TIONS 
In preparing a planetary protection implemen-
tation strategy to reduce the bioburden, one 
needs to consider: 
 Chemical vs. physical processes. 
 Surface vs. bulk processes. 
 Release criteria (parametric or verification 
of efficacy). 
 Short and long-term (materials) effects. 
 Recontamination prevention (packaging, 
storage, inventory). 
The decision on which option to choose will be 
dependent on the individual spacecraft and its 
mission. 
 
Table 6 – Bioburden reduction type and mission examples 
Table 6 illustrates sterilization process choices 
used by various interplanetary missions. Note 
that a particular project could use more than 
one process at different times in the project 
timeline and/or for different hardware ele-
ments of the spacecraft… 
In selecting a Bioburden Reduction Process, 
one also needs to consider: 
 Product (single/multi component, level of 
assembly, geometry); 
 Material compatibility: 
• Note that there are significant issues 
around variability; 
• It is always preferable to test the flight 
batch/article where possible. 
 Biological efficacy on the product (looking 
for a validated log-reduction, and whether 
pre/post-process conditioning is neces-
sary). 
BIOBURDEN REDUCTION PROCESS SPECIFI-
CATIONS 
Standard process specifications are available 
for (D)HMR and VHP, that can be used para-
metrically, without further need to optimize or 
qualify. Briefly, these are, respectively: 
 110-200˚C, +/- humidity control < 1.2 
g/m3, D110 (hrs) for 2-3 log reduction, D210 
(hrs) for 4-6 log [hardy] reduction for heat 
processing – see ECSS-Q-ST-70-57C). 
 25-45˚C, vacuum at 1-10 torr or controlled 
humidity, 3-50%, concentration of 0.5-1.1 
mg/L, D10 = 200 (mg/L).sec, acceptable ef-
ficacy range 2-6 log reductions for VHP 
processing – see ECSS-Q-ST-70-56C). 
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Note that: 
 Deviation from specification requires ap-
proval. 
 Use of other bioburden reduction processes 
(e.g., ionizing radiation) can be negotiated 
and is subject to approval. 
 To protect budget and schedule, using the 
synergy of bioburden reduction and, e.g., 
contamination control bake-out processes 
is recommended. 
The standard processes are described in more 
detail in the following section 
STERILIZATION TECHNOLOGIES AND BIO-
BURDEN REDUCTION 
The heat reduction processes have recently 
been modified, based on updated lethality in-
formation (Schubert et al., 2012). Missions 
from Viking up until MSL used the “old” 
method. NASA missions from InSight on-
ward have used the new specifications. 
DRY HEAT MICROBIAL REDUCTION 
(DHMR) PROCESS – OLD STYLE 
This process is implemented in a narrow tem-
perature range based on conditions used for Vi-
king and microbiological data generated in that 
era. The temperature is constrained to between 
104-125˚C, with additional credit to 146˚C ne-
gotiable with the PP Officer. 
DHMR is based on logarithmic reduction in 
microbial survival with increasing amount of 
heat process: 
logN(DHMR at time t) = logN(preDHMR) - t/D 
where D is the time to reduce the microbial 
population by 90%, given as (5 × 10((125-
T)/21)) for the reference organism (encapsu-
lated), t = time (hrs.), and T = Temp (C). 
The DHMR process requires stringent control 
of humidity. It is capped at 4 logs of reduction, 
based on the occurrence of so-called “hardy” 
organisms. Viking landers accounted 
~300,000 spores prior to terminal DHMR and 
~30 spores after DHMR. This is the source of 
the 300,000 specification number for landed 
spacecraft today as per Barengoltz (1989). 
The NASA Mars Program supported genera-
tion of experimental data in the 2005-2011 
timeframe to support expansion of: 
 Permitted temperature range. 
 Permitted humidity control environments. 
 Maximum permitted log reduction credit. 
Experimental data from USA and Europe sup-
port the revision of all three parameters. Revi-
sion is also needed to take into account in-
creased understanding of the terrestrial bio-
sphere. 
NEW (D)HMR PROCESS SPECIFICATIONS 
The good news for (D)HMR: 
 Bioburden reduction credit is allowed for 
processes up to 200°C (including manufac-
turing environments). 
 It is permitted to use ambient humidity pro-
cesses (simplifies the requirement and re-
duces the cost for HMR by allowing use of 
ambient humidity ovens instead of vacuum 
ovens). 
 There is opportunity to reduce mission 
costs associated with not having to reach 
500°C for 0.5 seconds before bioburden re-
duction credit can be obtained for atmos-
pheric entry heating in break up and burn 
up analyses. 
 Increased bioburden reduction credit be-
yond the four order of magnitude reduction 
limit can be accounted. 
 The new process facilitates spacecraft 
hardware manufacturing being able to 
achieve sterility (accounting < 1 [“zero”] 
survivor organisms). 
Table 7 shows a comparison between the old 
DHMR approach and the current practice. 
 
Table 7 – Comparison of HMR Implementation 
 BIOBURDEN, ASSAY AND STERILIZATION   
The International Planetary Protection Handbook 
57 
There are also some bad news aspects of the 
new process: 
 For a standard “4 log” reduction, the pro-
cess time will be substantially longer at the 
same temperature, OR, the temperature of 
process will need to be hotter for the same 
time duration. 
 For Phoenix/InSight hardware for exam-
ple: for surface Bioburden (mated sur-
faces): in general, the minimum PHX bake-
outs were 112°C, 37 hrs; for InSight, a 
comparable minimum. bake-out would be 
112°C, 132.2 hrs. 
 With choice comes complexity: (D)HMR 
becomes an implementation and manage-
ment challenge. 
THE VAPOR HYDROGEN PEROXIDE (VHP) 
PROCESS 
In this process (represented graphically in Fig-
ure 22), VHP Generator systems initially dehu-
midify the ambient air in the sterilization 
chamber, then produce VHP by passing aque-
ous hydrogen peroxide over a vaporizer, and 
circulate the vapor at a programmed concentra-
tion in the air, (typically from 140 ppm to 1400 
ppm). 
 
Figure 22 – The VHP Process timeline. 
By comparison, a concentration of 75 ppm is 
considered by NIOSH to be “Immediately 
Dangerous to Life or Health” in humans. 
The VHP maximum vapor level and corre-
sponding decontamination time has been vali-
dated by JPL using a 1 mg/L, 30 min process 
(1800(mg/L).sec = 9 log reduction). 
The VHP Process must still be matured for 
flight applications. Process electronic and me-
chanical parts need to be validated for aseptic 
assembly applications: micro-D flight connect-
ors without pigtails; bolted anodized and un-
treated aluminum plates are examples of com-
plex geometries that can be used to validate 
VHP performance. As developed, the process 
can be deployed in a variety of configurations, 
based on the hardware to be sterilized, from 
room size sterilization applications through 
benchtop cabinets to individual bagged parts 
such as printed wire boards. 
ACCOUNTING AND ASSAY 
APPLICATION OF A BIOBURDEN REDUC-
TION PROCESS 
Applying a Bioburden Reduction Process im-
plies a Quality System. To ensure efficacy in 
implementation and accounting of bioburden 
(reduction), one needs to consider: 
 Equipment Certification 
 Maintenance 
 Calibration of sensors 
 Training 
 Accessibility 
 Documentation/record keeping 
 Audits 
COMPATIBILITY 
As well as efficacy, compatibility of the hard-
ware with the process also needs to be demon-
strated. For part/component compatibility 
tests, one needs to know the parameters that 
need to be tested (strength, surface reflectance 
etc.). In particular, one needs to pay attention 
in the implementation phase to deltas between 
as-designed (when the sterilization approach 
will have been determined) and as-built. 
Further, one needs to perform integrated com-
patibility tests (incl. parameters such as CTE), 
and process cycle definition on development 
models. Validation of process and qualifica-
tion of product on qualification model is also 
needed. The process cycle must be applied to 
the flight model (and spare). 
PRECONDITIONING 
Dirty products cannot be sterilized effectively 
and reliably. One should achieve a pre-sterili-
zation cleanliness level of visibly clean (which 
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should be formally specified). IPA or ethanol 
cleaning can be used (may not be sporicidal). 
One must pay attention to grade (residue) and 
SMAC. ESA has shown that additives (e.g., a 
few % H2O2) can improve biological efficacy 
of cleaning, reducing the initial pre-steriliza-
tion bioload – contact time is important if this 
additional credit is taken and a standardized 
process needs to be developed and adopted. 
BIOBURDEN ASSESSMENT 
For process selection and planning, bioburden 
specification per cleanroom class can be used 
(table in NPR8020.12 and ECSS documents). 
For application of process on flight H/W, a pre-
process assay is usual. 
Assay procedures are available in NASA 
HDBK6022 or in ECSS documents. 
PREVENTING RECONTAMINATION 
Isolation of a cleaned item (e.g., spacecraft) 
from a less clean environment (e.g., launch ve-
hicle fairing) by an enclosure or “biobarrier” is 
necessary to preserve cleanliness levels. 
Such isolation approaches are also important 
for cleanliness preservation during e.g., stor-
age prior to integration, transportation between 
cleanrooms and/or test facilities. 
An end-to-end recontamination approach may 
use flight (deployable) biobarriers for preven-
tion of recontamination and/or non-flight (tem-
porary/ disposable) biobarrier items during as-
sembly. 
THINGS TO REMEMBER 
Bioburden, Assay and Sterilization Key Points 
include: 
 Determining the bioburden allocations; 
 Knowing the manufacturing processes and 
environments; 
 Selecting the most appropriate stage(s) in 
the assembly sequence for applying bio-
burden reduction; 
 Knowing the bioburden and biodiversity 
on the product; 
 Selecting a process, paying attention to ma-
terial compatibilities; 
 Integrating the process in the product de-
velopment and test plan; 
 Cleaning before you apply a bioburden re-
duction process; 
 Paying attention to appropriate recontami-
nation prevention; 
 Not forgetting the spares; 
 If things go wrong, it is necessary to re-
work, make sure that product can either 
take more cycles (part of qualification pro-
gram) or use spares. 
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ORBITAL DYNAMICS AND IM-
PACT PROBABILITY ANALYSIS17 
OVERVIEW 
This section mainly focuses on the following 
issues regarding planetary protection: How to 
prove that a mission satisfies the requirement 
from planetary protection policy quantita-
tively? And what should we care about in the 
mission design? 
These issues are discussed in the context of the 
Hayabusa-2 mission, the 2nd Japanese sample 
return mission to a small body, but the analysis 
method and process can be applied to other 
missions in general. 
Hayabusa-2 was launched by JAXA in Decem-
ber 2014, reached its target, C-type asteroid 
Ryugu, in June 2018 and will return back to the 
Earth in 2020. It is an interplanetary spacecraft, 
and the planetary protection policy had to be 
taken into account in such a mission. 
Hayabusa-2 Mission Schedule 
Earth Departure: December, 2014 
Earth Swing-by: December, 2015 
Ryugu Arrival: June, 2018 
Ryugu Departure: December, 2019 
Earth Reentry: December, 2020 
HAYABUSA-2 AND PLANETARY PROTEC-
TION 
When designing an interplanetary mission, one 
must consider and obey planetary protection 
policy, in order not to contaminate planets 
where the origin of life may exist (forward con-
tamination), and not to endanger the Earth by 
bringing extraterrestrial organisms, if such ex-
ist (backward contamination). In this study for-
ward contamination is considered as more im-
portant. 
COSPAR has developed recommendations 
aimed at avoiding interplanetary contamina-
tion. In particular, Mars, Europa and Enceladus 
                                                 
17 By Toshihiro Chujo, ISAS/JAXA. 
18 Category II: Flyby, Orbiter, Lander: Comets; Carbo-
naceous Chondrite Asteroids; Jupiter; Saturn; Uranus; 
Neptune; Pluto/Charon; Kuiper-Belt Objects; others 
TBD. 
are targets that should be taken care of in con-
sideration of potential life on these bodies. 
According to the destination and spacecraft 
type (e.g., orbiter, flyby, sample return…), the 
mission is categorized into one (or more than 
one) “Category” defined in the COSPAR Plan-
etary Protection Policy. 
 
Figure 23 – Hayabusa-2 artist rendition 
(Credit: JAXA/Hayabusa-2) 
The Hayabusa-2 mission (Figure 23) was con-
sidered as Category-II18 for the outbound jour-
ney with particular attention needed to “avoid 
impact with Mars under all mission scenar-
ios”, and as Category-V-Unrestricted19 during 
the inbound journey, corresponding to “unre-
stricted Earth return”. Figure 24 shows orbits 
of the Earth (blue line), Hayabusa-2 (green 
line), asteroid 1999JU3 or Ryugu (purple line), 
and Mars (red line). The orbits of the space-
craft and Mars are not so close to each other, 
but there are relatively higher chances of en-
counter compared to other planets of course. 
 
Figure 24 – Orbits of the Earth, Hayabusa-2, and 1999JU3 
(Ryugu). 
19 Category V: Any Earth-return mission. “Restricted 
Earth return”: Mars; Europa; others TBD; “Unrestricted 
Earth return”: Moon; others TBD. 
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should be formally specified). IPA or ethanol 
cleaning can be used (may not be sporicidal). 
One must pay attention to grade (residue) and 
SMAC. ESA has shown that additives (e.g., a 
few % H2O2) can improve biological efficacy 
of cleaning, reducing the initial pre-steriliza-
tion bioload – contact time is important if this 
additional credit is taken and a standardized 
process needs to be developed and adopted. 
BIOBURDEN ASSESSMENT 
For process selection and planning, bioburden 
specification per cleanroom class can be used 
(table in NPR8020.12 and ECSS documents). 
For application of process on flight H/W, a pre-
process assay is usual. 
Assay procedures are available in NASA 
HDBK6022 or in ECSS documents. 
PREVENTING RECONTAMINATION 
Isolation of a cleaned item (e.g., spacecraft) 
from a less clean environment (e.g., launch ve-
hicle fairing) by an enclosure or “biobarrier” is 
necessary to preserve cleanliness levels. 
Such isolation approaches are also important 
for cleanliness preservation during e.g., stor-
age prior to integration, transportation between 
cleanrooms and/or test facilities. 
An end-to-end recontamination approach may 
use flight (deployable) biobarriers for preven-
tion of recontamination and/or non-flight (tem-
porary/ disposable) biobarrier items during as-
sembly. 
THINGS TO REMEMBER 
Bioburden, Assay and Sterilization Key Points 
include: 
 Determining the bioburden allocations; 
 Knowing the manufacturing processes and 
environments; 
 Selecting the most appropriate stage(s) in 
the assembly sequence for applying bio-
burden reduction; 
 Knowing the bioburden and biodiversity 
on the product; 
 Selecting a process, paying attention to ma-
terial compatibilities; 
 Integrating the process in the product de-
velopment and test plan; 
 Cleaning before you apply a bioburden re-
duction process; 
 Paying attention to appropriate recontami-
nation prevention; 
 Not forgetting the spares; 
 If things go wrong, it is necessary to re-
work, make sure that product can either 
take more cycles (part of qualification pro-
gram) or use spares. 
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ORBITAL DYNAMICS AND IM-
PACT PROBABILITY ANALYSIS17 
OVERVIEW 
This section mainly focuses on the following 
issues regarding planetary protection: How to 
prove that a mission satisfies the requirement 
from planetary protection policy quantita-
tively? And what should we care about in the 
mission design? 
These issues are discussed in the context of the 
Hayabusa-2 mission, the 2nd Japanese sample 
return mission to a small body, but the analysis 
method and process can be applied to other 
missions in general. 
Hayabusa-2 was launched by JAXA in Decem-
ber 2014, reached its target, C-type asteroid 
Ryugu, in June 2018 and will return back to the 
Earth in 2020. It is an interplanetary spacecraft, 
and the planetary protection policy had to be 
taken into account in such a mission. 
Hayabusa-2 Mission Schedule 
Earth Departure: December, 2014 
Earth Swing-by: December, 2015 
Ryugu Arrival: June, 2018 
Ryugu Departure: December, 2019 
Earth Reentry: December, 2020 
HAYABUSA-2 AND PLANETARY PROTEC-
TION 
When designing an interplanetary mission, one 
must consider and obey planetary protection 
policy, in order not to contaminate planets 
where the origin of life may exist (forward con-
tamination), and not to endanger the Earth by 
bringing extraterrestrial organisms, if such ex-
ist (backward contamination). In this study for-
ward contamination is considered as more im-
portant. 
COSPAR has developed recommendations 
aimed at avoiding interplanetary contamina-
tion. In particular, Mars, Europa and Enceladus 
                                                 
17 By Toshihiro Chujo, ISAS/JAXA. 
18 Category II: Flyby, Orbiter, Lander: Comets; Carbo-
naceous Chondrite Asteroids; Jupiter; Saturn; Uranus; 
Neptune; Pluto/Charon; Kuiper-Belt Objects; others 
TBD. 
are targets that should be taken care of in con-
sideration of potential life on these bodies. 
According to the destination and spacecraft 
type (e.g., orbiter, flyby, sample return…), the 
mission is categorized into one (or more than 
one) “Category” defined in the COSPAR Plan-
etary Protection Policy. 
 
Figure 23 – Hayabusa-2 artist rendition 
(Credit: JAXA/Hayabusa-2) 
The Hayabusa-2 mission (Figure 23) was con-
sidered as Category-II18 for the outbound jour-
ney with particular attention needed to “avoid 
impact with Mars under all mission scenar-
ios”, and as Category-V-Unrestricted19 during 
the inbound journey, corresponding to “unre-
stricted Earth return”. Figure 24 shows orbits 
of the Earth (blue line), Hayabusa-2 (green 
line), asteroid 1999JU3 or Ryugu (purple line), 
and Mars (red line). The orbits of the space-
craft and Mars are not so close to each other, 
but there are relatively higher chances of en-
counter compared to other planets of course. 
 
Figure 24 – Orbits of the Earth, Hayabusa-2, and 1999JU3 
(Ryugu). 
19 Category V: Any Earth-return mission. “Restricted 
Earth return”: Mars; Europa; others TBD; “Unrestricted 
Earth return”: Moon; others TBD. 
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Ryugu is far enough (i.e., almost zero collision 
probability) both from the Earth and Mars. 
HOW TO PROVE COMPLIANCE? 
The required probability value differs, depend-
ing on the mission. In the case of the Haya-
busa-2 mission, the requirement was that the 
probability of impact of the spacecraft with 
Mars under all possible mission scenarios must 
be less than 10-4 in the 50-year period after its 
launch. 
The difficulty is to prove it quantitatively. 
Generally speaking, accidental impact is only 
realized in a sequence of spacecraft failure and 
the passive motion of that spacecraft following 
control loss after the failure. Therefore, one 
needs to compute the product of the failure 
probability by the impact probability after fail-
ure. The first term depends on the system fail-
ure rate and the meteoroid kill rate. The second 
term depends on the mission under considera-
tion or its trajectory design, as it is strongly re-
lated to orbital dynamics. 
FAILURE PROBABILITY: SPACECRAFT SYS-
TEM FAILURE RATE 
Estimating the spacecraft system failure rate 
requires referring to the reliability of subsys-
tems: What is the most critical component? 
Which component is the dominant factor? 
How to estimate the failure probability? 
These questions illustrate how important the 
design philosophy of the spacecraft is. 
For Hayabusa-2 (Figure 25), the design philos-
ophy was set such that any subsystem (i.e., data 
handling, communication, power manage-
ment, thermal control, attitude, etc.) of the 
spacecraft has higher reliability than the IES 
(Ion Engine System). In other words, the IES 
was considered to be the critical component 
and the failure of the IES must be considered 
first. 
The relationship between reliability R and fail-
ure rate λ is usually represented by: 
𝑅𝑅 = exp(−𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆) 
This relationship means that the reliability de-
creases exponentially as time passes. The pa-
rameter λ is determined by specification of a 
subsystem. For Hayabusa-2, the IES (the criti-
cal component) was designed in such a way 
that 3 out of 4 thrusters (75 %) must remain in 
good condition for 6 years. 
Then, with 𝑅𝑅 = 0.75, 𝜆𝜆 = 6 [yr], one can derive 
𝜆𝜆 = 1.3 × 10−4 [/day]. However, this is just a 
pure reliability evaluation of the IES itself. For 
the reliability related to Mars impact, which is 
represented as RMI, we have to consider the fact 
that even if system failure occurs, an impact 
with Mars can be avoided as long as at least 
one of the four IES thrusters is operative. 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝜆𝜆) = 1 – {1 – exp(−𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆)}4 − 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝜆𝜆) ≈ 1 – {1 – exp(−𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆)}4 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝜆𝜆) represents the Reliability re-
lated to Mars impact and 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the failure 
probability due to bus subsystem malfunction. 
RMI is the total probability 1 minus the proba-
bility that every thruster is dead and minus fail-
ure probability of other subsystems. As is men-
tioned, the critical component is the IES and 
𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 can be regarded as negligible in this case. 
 
 
Figure 25 – Hayabusa-2 (Credit : JAXA) 
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FAILURE PROBABILITY: METEOROID KILL 
RATE 
Hypervelocity impacts by meteoroids are una-
voidable. Therefore, the questions to address 
are: What are scenarios of fatal meteoroid im-
pact consequences? What is the minimum 
mass of meteoroid that realizes fatal impact? 
How to estimate the meteoroid kill rate? To an-
alyze these, we should list up all possible sce-
narios first. 
In the case of Hayabusa-2, we defined three 
scenarios. They are: disruption of all the 4 IES 
grids, penetration of 1 of the 12 RCS thrusters, 
and dark current by impact intruding to space-
craft circuits through the honeycomb panel. 
For each case, by considering the dimension 
and also attachment to the main body, proba-
bility of meteoroid impact can be calculated 
geometrically. Next, from the structural 
strength which is mainly thickness of the com-
ponents, minimum mass of meteoroid that de-
stroys them is estimated. 
Finally, from these two analyses and infor-
mation of interplanetary meteoroid flux, we 
can calculate the resulting probability of the 
kill rate for each component. In this case, the 
probability of the third case is much higher 
than the other two. 
Table 8 below shows the analysis in the case of 
Hayabusa-2. 
The dark current scenario overwhelms other 
effects so that the total meteoroid impact kill 
rate is approximated as 𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ≈ 0.026 [𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦−1]. 
Thus, the total probability q of a failure occur-
ring between t1 and t2 is given by: 
𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡1,𝑡𝑡2) = 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡1) – 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡2) + 𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡2−𝑡𝑡1) 
The important things to remember are: the de-
sign philosophy of the spacecraft; the critical 
system component for failure; the reliability 
function; the critical component for meteoroid 
kill; and, the kill rate analysis referring to com-
ponent properties. 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
Scenario Disruption of all the 4 IES 
grids 
Penetration of 1 of the 12 
RCS thrusters 
Dark current by impact in-
truding to spacecraft cir-
cuits through the honey-
comb panel 
Component dimension 150 mm diameter 64×64 mm 1.6×1.0×1.25 m 
Minimum mass of meteor-
oid 
8×10-6 g 1×10-4 g 1×10-3 g 
Kill rate 2.5×10-7 [yr-1] 2.1×10-4 [yr-1] 2.6×10-2 [yr-1] 
Table 8 – Meteoroid kill rate in three scenarios for Hayabusa-2 
 
IMPACT PROBABILITY AFTER FAILURE 
The total probability Ptotal of Mars impact is 
represented by: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 =  𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞d𝑡𝑡 
where p is the Mars impact probability after 
spacecraft failure. In other words, it is the prob-
ability that the spacecraft out of control reaches 
Mars on a ballistic trajectory. Here ballistic in-
dicates that the spacecraft flies according to ex-
ternal force (Figure 26).  
Figure 26 – Spacecraft impact on Mars on a ballistic trajec-
tory. 
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This problem relates to orbital dynamics. The 
question is: What is the probability to acci-
dentally enter a trajectory that leads to Mars? 
In the case of a Mars orbiter, the relevant pa-
rameters are the gravity of Mars (as well as the 
Sun), and perhaps the air drag. For an inter-
planetary probe, one must consider the gravity 
of the Sun and possibly the gravity of the Earth 
and other planets. That will accelerate the 
spacecraft and change the trajectory signifi-
cantly, which is really a complex problem. We 
focus here on the case of interplanetary probes 
using the example of Hayabusa-2. 
In Figure 27, the Mars orbit is in red, the Earth 
orbit in blue and Hayabusa-2 orbits in the nom-
inal and backup windows in green. 
A rough estimate of the impact probability can 
be obtained by looking at the minimum dis-
tance to Mars. The minimum distance between 
the Hayabusa-2 spacecraft and Mars is 
14×106 km for the mission trajectory of the 
nominal window (which was actually used). 
For the backup windows, it was 14×106 km 
and 5×106 km, respectively. 
Since the trajectory guidance accuracy is of a 
few hundred kilometers at worst, an impact of 
the spacecraft with Mars is unlikely, due to un-
certainties in trajectory determination. 
Next, the guidance error should be evaluated. 
As already mentioned, impact to Mars is un-
likely, and that means that ΔV assistance is 
necessary to reach Mars. As a typical cause of 
ΔV, guidance error is investigated here. Here, 
the operation frequency is important. For 
Hayabusa-2, the trajectory navigation and 
guidance is performed using one-week cycles 
and orbit determination is updated no later than 
one month. Maximum acceleration produced 
by the IES is ~100 m/s per month. The attitude 
to operate the IES is constrained to within 10° 
from the Sun direction. Therefore, in the worst 
case, the maximum guidance error for one 
month20 is given by: 
100 [m/s] × 10 [deg.] × 𝜋𝜋/180 ≈ 20 [m/s] 
                                                 
20 The ΔV produced by the RCS is negligible. 
 
End-to-end mission trajectory for Nominal Window[N] 
Minimum Dist. = 0.091AU (= 14 Mkm) 
 
End-to-end mission trajectory for Backup 
Window1[BU1] 
Minimum Dist. = 0.091AU (= 14 Mkm) 
 
End-to-end mission trajectory for Backup 
Window2[BU2] 
Minimum Dist. = 0.032AU (= 5 Mkm) 
Figure 27 – Minimum distance between Hayabusa-2 and 
Mars for the nominal and backup windows 
The left term is the product of the maximum 
ΔV by the IES by the maximum angle error. 
The result on the right is the worst ΔV in the 
undesired direction (Figure 28). Whether this 
estimated worst ΔV may realize Mars impact 
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or not can be calculated using the method of 
Lambert's problem (see below). 
 
Figure 28 – ΔV generated by guidance error. 
Based on the Lambert’s problem, the minimum 
departure ΔV to intercept the Mars orbit – ig-
noring its orbital position – can be evaluated. 
The results are shown in Figure 29 for the three 
launch windows. Horizontal axis and vertical 
axis indicate time and required ΔV for inter-
ception. Leg 1, 2, 3, 4 just mean phases of the 
mission. The threshold of 20 m/s, maximum 
ΔV produced by guidance error, is displayed 
by yellow lines. On the other hand, required 
ΔV to reach Mars is shown with red lines. Dis-
continuous points are observed between Leg 1 
and 2, because the Hayabusa-2 spacecraft per-
forms the Earth swing-by to get gravity assist. 
The value of the red line is much larger than 
the yellow line, especially in the nominal win-
dow and the backup window 1. Smaller values 
are observed in the backup 2, where the highest 
Mars orbit intercept risk occurs, but still, re-
quired ΔV exceeds the produced ΔV capabil-
ity. 
This result indicates that the probability of 
Mars direct impact is practically zero. How-
ever, we also investigated ΔV to reach the 
Earth based on Lambert's problem. Since 
Hayabusa-2 will come back to the nearby re-
gion to the Earth for swing-by, the required ΔV 
will be much smaller than Mars. This implies 
that the probability to impact Mars via Earth 
gravity assist is not negligible and should be 
discussed additionally. It is beyond Kepler or-
bit and Lambert's problem to resolve, so we 
had to cope with the problem in another way. 
 
 
Figure 29 - Results of rough estimation of direct impact to Mars 
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Transfer trajectory to Mars dealt with as a 
Lambert’s problem 
Lambert’s problem assumes a spacecraft un-
der the influence of a central gravitational 
force traveling from point P1 to a point P2 in a 
time T (Figure 30). Then the ballistic transfer 
trajectory can be solved, assuming a two-body 
problem with Kepler orbit. If the gravity of 
the Sun is dominant, it is useful. r1, r2, and T 
being given, the initial velocity v1 is resolved. 
Then the impulse ΔV necessary to reach P2 
can be solved numerically. 
 
Figure 30 – Graphic representation of Lambert’s problem. 
In the Hayabusa-2 mission, the probability of 
direct impact to Mars is zero, but the probabil-
ity of getting gravity assist of the Earth is not 
zero. This happens because the original trajec-
tory aims at the Earth swing-by. Thus, the orig-
inal trajectory design is also important. 
If the spacecraft may pass near the Earth or 
other planets such as Venus, it should be taken 
into account in the probability analysis. There-
fore, we used Monte-Carlo simulation, which 
was thought to be a suitable method because 
the dynamics of swing-by is really sensitive to 
initial conditions, or approach way to the 
Earth, and that causes a large dispersion of 
probability. We think that Monte-Carlo simu-
lation was better than other possible simpler 
methods. Figure 31 shows a flow chart of im-
pact probability analysis, both for direct impact 
cases and swing-by cases for comparison. 
The algorithm used for the Hayabusa-2 mis-
sion consists of two steps: the first step is 
Monte-Carlo propagation and the second step 
is statistical processing, which is necessary be-
cause the number of cases in the Monte-Carlo 
simulation is practically limited, considering 
the computational cost. The probability is eval-
uated by the time integral of the probability 
function, so ideally we have to consider every 
single case of timing when the system failure 
occurs, which is infinite. In practice, however, 
we discretized the time every one month, and 
performed Monte-Carlo simulation starting 
each day. 
 
 
Figure 31 – Flow chart of impact probability analysis. 
 
For each starting day, we defined the number 
of cases as 1,000, and propagation time was set 
to be 50 years after the launch, as is required 
by the Planetary Protection Policy (Figure 32). 
For initial deviations, we gave Gaussian ran-
dom numbers with variation according to ac-
curacy of orbit determination and guidance er-
ror. In the computation, we took gravity influ-
ence of all the planets and the Sun using 
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ephemeris. Also, we should not forget that the 
roughness caused by the approximation of dis-
cretization is calculated as ΔV times t, which 
is around 50,000 km. 
 
Figure 32 – Representation of discretized Monte-Carlo simu-
lation. 
Judgement of swing-by cases or no swing-by 
cases, or direct impact cases, was evaluated by 
the distance from the Earth to the intersection 
point of the spacecraft on the B-plane of the 
Earth. B-plane is a plane perpendicular to the 
orbital motion around the Sun. We defined the 
threshold as 1 million km. If the spacecraft 
passes near the Earth by 1 million km even 
once, the case is defined as a "swing-by case", 
and otherwise, "no swing-by case". For exam-
ple, in our analysis, for cases where system 
failure occurs on January 1, 2016, 915 cases 
out of 1,000 cases were defined as no swing-
by cases and other 85 cases were defined as 
swing-by cases. For both of these, we prepared 
different statistic processing algorithms. 
The algorithm for “no swing-by cases” is 
briefly described. First, we investigated every 
intersection point on the Mars B-plane. Figure 
33 shows the actual results for the one group of 
cases. In the figure, the position of the Sun is 
fixed and therefore the position of Mars ex-
pressed by red points moves a bit according to 
its orbital motion. Blue plots are intersection 
points of the spacecraft, and some dispersion 
originating from the initial deviations can be 
observed. Among these, no case reached the 
Mars positions, and this is why we have to do 
statistic processing. Figure 34 shows the devi-
ation of the plots on Figure 33. It looks it can 
be approximated by Gaussian distribution by 
fitting calculation, which is shown by the red 
line. This extends the probability to the infinity 
distance. Then the probability of Mars impact 
can be calculated to be non-zero. Of course, it's 
actually almost zero. 
 
Figure 33 - Example of intersection points on Mars B-plane. 
 
Figure 34 - Deviation of the plots on Figure 33 
Next, the algorithm for “swing-by cases” is 
briefly described in a simplified manner. First, 
transfer trajectory after gravity assist by the 
Earth to Mars is made by Lambert's problem in 
the same way. Second, a keyhole on the Earth 
B-plane that connects to the transfer trajectory 
is searched (Figure 35). The ratio of the area of 
this key hole to the area of a circle with the ra-
dius of 1 million km is one reference for the 
probability. Then statistical processing is con-
ducted, and finally the probability of Mars im-
pact is derived. 
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Figure 35 - Representation of the algorithm for “swing-by cases”. 
 
Finally, the results of these calculations for 
Hayabusa-2 in the case of the nominal window 
is given in the Table 9 below. For each trajec-
tory leg, the third column is the total probabil-
ity of no swing-by cases, and fourth column 
shows the impact probability of swing-by 
cases. The fifth column shows the failure prob-
ability and the right column gives the resulting 
total probability. Zero values in the Table cor-
respond to values less than 10-50. 
Total probability for backup window 1 and 2 
are 8.0 × 10-12and 5.6 × 10-7, respectively. 
Therefore, the Hayabusa-2 mission satisfies 
the COSPAR requirement that the Mars impact 
probability should be less than 10-4 for 50 years 
after launch for all mission scenarios. 
 
 
Table 9 – Impact probability for the nominal window. 
 
THINGS TO REMEMBER 
 Spacecraft failure rate and probability of 
impact after the failure have been respec-
tively calculated to prove the probability of 
Mars impact quantitatively. 
 The design philosophy of the spacecraft 
and reliability of subsystem component are 
important factors when considering system 
failure. 
 Making ballistic trajectory to Mars and es-
timating probability to enter it accidentally 
is the first step for estimation of impact 
probability. 
 For missions where the spacecraft may be 
assisted by the Earth gravity, it may be nec-
essary to analyze the probability using 
Monte-Carlo simulation. 
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Chapter 2. Case Studies 
This chapter presents a number of case studies illustrating the various categories introduced in Chap-
ter 1, from Category II to Category V. 
 
PLANETARY PROTECTION CATE-
GORY II21 
PLANETARY PROTECTION CATEGORY II 
DESCRIPTION 
All types of missions (gravity assist, orbiter, 
lander) to a target body where there is signifi-
cant interest relative to the process of chemical 
evolution and the origin of life, but where there 
is only a remote22 chance that contamination 
carried by a spacecraft could compromise fu-
ture investigations. 
Applicability: Moon (with organic inventory), 
Venus, comets, carbonaceous chondrite aster-
oids, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, Gany-
mede*, Callisto, Titan*, Triton*, 
Pluto/Charon*, Ceres, KBO >½ size of Pluto*, 
KBO <½ size of Pluto. 
*The mission-specific assignment of these 
bodies to Category II must be supported by an 
analysis of the remote potential for contamina-
tion of a liquid-water environment that may ex-
ist beneath their surfaces, addressing both the 
existence of such environments and the pro-
spect of accessing them. 
CASE STUDY FOR PLANETARY PROTEC-
TION CATEGORY II: BEPICOLOMBO 
 Target body: Mercury (Category I); 
 Propulsion: Electrical for cruise (transfer 
module jettisoned before arrival at Mer-
cury), chemical around Mercury; 
 Transfer: Multiple Earth, Venus (Category 
II), and Mercury gravity assists  mission 
level Category II. 
REQUIREMENTS FOR CASE STUDY 
Requirements for Category II missions are lim-
ited to documentation: 
                                                 
21 By Gerhard Kminek, ESA. 
22 Implies the absence of environments where terrestrial 
organisms could survive and replicate, or a very low 
 Planetary Protection Plan  due at CDR 
(draft at PDR useful); 
 Pre-Launch, Post-Launch, and End-of-
Mission Reports at the respective mile-
stones. 
However, … 
…all missions leaving Earth orbit must 
demonstrate compliance with impact probabil-
ities or bioburden limits for Mars and probabil-
ity of contamination limits for Europa & En-
celadus. 
 For the specific case study of Bepi-
Colombo there is no plausible trajectory 
leading to the outer solar system; 
 The probability of impact on Mars by any 
element not assembled and maintained in 
ISO level 8 conditions (i.e. launcher upper 
stage) shall be ≤ 1x10-4 for the first 50 
years after launch; 
 The probability of impact on Mars by any 
part of a spacecraft assembled and main-
tained in ISO level 8 cleanrooms, or better, 
is ≤ 1x10-2 for the first 20 years after 
launch, and ≤ 5x10-2 for the time period 
from 20 to 50 years after launch. 
THINGS TO REMEMBER 
 Requirements for Category II missions are 
limited to documentation and reviews; 
 Additional analysis and consequences on 
flight system design and mission operation 
can be necessary in particular for missions 
crossing the orbit of Mars, going to the 
outer solar system, or performing gravity 
assist maneuvers; 
 Probability of impact requirements can 
have an effect on the trajectory design, the 
likelihood of transfer to environments where terrestrial 
organisms could survive and replicate. 
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delta-v budget (re-targeting), and space-
craft design (e.g., location of tanks, addi-
tional micrometeoroid protection); 
 To accommodate these effects, have a first 
trajectory analysis ready for the PDR; 
 This first trajectory analysis should not be 
too simplistic – otherwise late changes in 
the spacecraft design or operation might 
become necessary; 
 Ensure good interface with launcher sys-
tem for upper stage impact analysis; 
 All activities necessary to perform a prob-
ability of impact analysis are interdiscipli-
nary and require the interactions between 
different engineering disciplines! 
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PLANETARY PROTECTION CATE-
GORY III23 
PLANETARY PROTECTION CATEGORY III 
DESCRIPTION 
Flyby (i.e., gravity assist) and orbiter missions 
to a target body of chemical evolution and/or 
origin of life interest and for which scientific 
opinion provides a significant24 chance of con-
tamination which could compromise future in-
vestigations. 
Applicability: Mars, Europa, Enceladus. 
However, if an orbiter mission is looking for 
life, the mission will have to meet require-
ments for a life detection mission (i.e., avoid 
compromising the life detection measure-
ment). 
CASE STUDY FOR PLANETARY PROTEC-
TION CATEGORY III: EXOMARS TRACE GAS 
ORBITER (TGO) 
 Target body: Mars. 
 Propulsion: Chemical. 
 Transfer: Deterministic Deep Space Ma-
neuver (DSM) with several 100 m/s and 
stochastic Trajectory Correction Maneu-
vers (TCMs) with several m/s. 
 Orbit acquisition: Mars Orbit Insertion 
(MOI) maneuver with several 100 m/s and 
aerobraking. 
 Final orbit: 400x400 km, 373:30 repeat 
pattern. 
REQUIREMENTS FOR CASE STUDY 
Launcher upper stage 
The probability of impact on Mars by any ele-
ment not assembled and maintained in ISO 
level 8 conditions shall be ≤ 1x10-4 for the first 
50 years after launch 
Note: This requirement also applies if a launch 
service is provided to another customer, e.g., 
the planned launch of the Emirates Mars Mis-
sion (EMM) on the Japanese H-IIA launcher. 
                                                 
23 By Gerhard Kminek, ESA. 
Spacecraft 
One of the following conditions shall be met: 
 The probability of impact on Mars by any 
part of a spacecraft assembled and main-
tained in ISO level 8 cleanrooms, or better, 
is ≤ 1x10-2 for the first 20 years after 
launch, and ≤ 5x10-2 for the time period 
from 20 to 50 years after launch (e.g., Mars 
Express, TGO). 
 The total bioburden of the spacecraft, in-
cluding surface, mated, and encapsulated 
bioburden, is ≤ 5x105 bacterial spores (e.g., 
MRO, MAVEN). 
IMPLEMENTATION OF REQUIREMENTS 
FOR CASE STUDY 
Launcher upper stage 
The probability of impact on Mars by any ele-
ment not assembled and maintained in ISO 
level 8 conditions shall be ≤ 1x10-4 for the first 
50 years after launch*. 
*Relevant requirement should be reflected in 
Launcher Interface Requirements. 
Trajectory analysis based on Monte Carlo 
method to achieve a one-sided 99% level-of-
confidence. 
 Trajectory analysis covers all reference tra-
jectories for the launch window (i.e., > 1). 
 Number of Monte Carlo runs depends on 
the detected number of impacts (iterative). 
Analysis typically includes: 
 Gravity potential of Earth and Mars and 
3rd body perturbation by Sun, Moon, Jupi-
ter and Saturn; 
 Solar radiation pressure (SRP) with un-
controlled attitude; 
 Propellant blow-down as directed contri-
bution, outgassing as spherical contribu-
tion; 
 In case there is a maneuver of the upper 
stage after the release of the spacecraft 
24 Implies the presence of environments where terrestrial 
organisms could survive and replicate, and some likeli-
hood of transfer to those places by a plausible mecha-
nism. 
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(e.g., for Breeze-M and Centaur), the relia-
bility of this maneuver (from flight rec-
ords) has to be part of the overall analysis; 
 In case impact probability is too high, the 
project should increase launch bias away 
from Mars (effect on delta-v budget for 
spacecraft). 
Spacecraft 
1. Analyze the stability of the final sci-
ence orbit to demonstrate it is stable for 
the next 50 years. 
 Numerical propagation of orbit with at-
mospheric variation (driven by solar cy-
cle); evaluate right ballistic parameter and 
proper parameters from the atmospheric 
model 
2. Analyze the impact probability of the 
spacecraft before the DSM to demon-
strate there is no impact in the next 50 
years. 
 Monte Carlo method to achieve a one-
sided 99% level-of-confidence; 
 Necessary input is the launcher dispersion 
matrix (injection conditions); 
 Gravity potential of Earth; 
 3rd body perturbation by Sun, Moon, Jupi-
ter and Saturn; 
 Solar radiation pressure (SRP) with con-
trolled and un-controlled attitude. 
3. Analyze the impact probability be-
tween the DSM and reaching the final 
science orbit 
 Assume trajectory impact probability of ‘1’ 
after DSM (conservative); 
 Assess the reliability of the flight hardware 
necessary to control the spacecraft and re-
liability of operation; 
 Take account of atmospheric variation for 
Mars aerobraking phase; ignore chance for 
recovery (conservative); 
 Include micrometeoroid impact and effect 
analysis (details next). 
Probability of impact: PHWfailure + POP failure + 
Pmeteoroid kill ≤1x10-2 
1. Micrometeoroid model definition 
 Selection of micrometeoroid flux model 
(e.g., Grün, 1993), velocity distribution 
(e.g., 20 km/s), micrometeoroid density 
(e.g., 2.5 g/cm3), and average impact angle 
(e.g., 45°). 
2. Analysis of consequences 
 Select critical units necessary to control 
spacecraft (see reliability analysis); 
 Assess protection based on presence of 
MLI, panels, honeycomb panels, etc. in 
terms of equivalent thickness; take into ac-
count view factors; 
 Assess protection based on distances be-
tween different elements to select use of 
proper ballistic limit equation (BLE from 
IADC); 
 Assess the failure modes of critical hard-
ware; 
 Typical problematic hardware, e.g., tanks, 
star trackers, propulsion lines, UHF RFDN 
waveguides. 
The approach used for the TGO is conservative 
in many ways but demonstrates compliance 
and is also easier to evaluate. 
This approach can be used for orbiter missions 
and for cruise stages delivering a lander. 
In case this approach is not sufficient to 
demonstrate compliance with the probability 
of impact requirements, other approaches 
could be used (but do not guarantee compli-
ance): 
 Replacing the fixed micrometeoroid veloc-
ity with a velocity distribution (e.g., Tay-
lor, 1997); 
 Replacing the trajectory impact probability 
value of 1 during part of the cruise phase 
with a value based on a trajectory analysis 
and allowing recovery maneuvers; 
 Allowing recovery maneuvers during aero-
braking. 
THINGS TO REMEMBER 
 Probability of impact requirements can 
have an effect on the qualification of hard-
ware (e.g., solar arrays for aerobraking), 
the trajectory design, the ΔV budget (re-
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targeting), and spacecraft design (e.g., lo-
cation of tanks, additional micrometeoroid 
protection); 
 To accommodate these effects, have a first 
analysis ready at the time of the PDR; 
 This first analysis should not be too sim-
plistic – otherwise late changes in the 
spacecraft design or operation might be-
come necessary; 
 Note that there is a trade-off in the aero-
braking design between more gentle and 
longer aerobraking (negative for microme-
teoroid effects and reliability) and more ag-
gressive and shorter aerobraking (negative 
for hardware qualification and operation); 
 Ensure good interface with launcher sys-
tem for upper stage impact analysis; 
 All activities necessary to perform a prob-
ability of impact analysis are interdiscipli-
nary and require the interactions between 
different engineering disciplines! 
REFERENCES 
Grün, E., Dust in the Planetary System, Ad-
vances in Space Research, Volume 13, Issue 
10, October 1993, Pages 139-151. 
Taylor, A.D., Radiant distribution of meteor-
oids encountering the Earth, Advances in 
Space Research, Volume 20, Issue 8, 1997, 
Pages 1505-1508. 
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PLANETARY PROTECTION CATE-
GORY IVA – INSIGHT25 
CATEGORY IVA CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
For Category IVa missions to Mars (as op-
posed to Category I, II and III) the main feature 
is bioburden control of the spacecraft hardware 
prior to launch, to achieve a particular micro-
bial cleanliness level. Similar approaches 
would be valid for lander missions to Europa 
or Enceladus, depending on mission design, 
but would potentially also include some Cate-
gory III missions to those targets, where indi-
cations are that the required contamination 
avoidance cannot be met by simply avoiding 
impact at the target body at the required prob-
ability level. 
PLANETARY PROTECTION CATEGORY IVA 
DESCRIPTION 
Formally, Category IV missions are lander 
missions to a target body of chemical evolution 
and/or origin of life interest and for which sci-
entific opinion provides a significant chance of 
contamination which could compromise future 
investigations. As noted, based on COSPAR 
policy at the time of writing, the applicability 
is to Mars, Europa and Enceladus. 
For Europa and Enceladus, compliance with 
the planetary protection policy is by the Project 
demonstrating that the probability of inadvert-
ent contamination of a body of liquid water is 
limited to less than 1 × 10-4 per mission. The 
microbial cleanliness level is one input factor 
in a probability of contamination calculation. 
However, for Mars missions, the policy com-
pliance is demonstrated by achieving a specific 
microbial cleanliness level alone, based on one 
out of three subcategories (a, b, c), as described 
in Chapter 1, “Planetary Protection Require-
ments”. 
For missions to outer solar system targets, 
“spores” may not be the relevant measure: 
some other organism may be the relevant re-
sistant organism to be used for spacecraft bio-
burden accounting. However, the standard 
                                                 
25 By J Andy Spry, SETI. 
spore assay is a robust assessment of spacecraft 
microbial cleanliness, and can often be related 
to the abundance of other organisms (see e.g., 
NAS, 2000), hence the InSight case study is 
relevant in the context of a bioburden con-
trolled mission to other targets as well as Mars. 
CASE STUDY FOR PLANETARY PROTEC-
TION CATEGORY IVA – INSIGHT 
INSIGHT MISSION OVERVIEW 
 
Figure 36 – Illustration of the InSight mission deployed on 
the Martian surface (Courtesy NASA/JPL) 
The InSight mission (Interior Exploration us-
ing Seismic Investigations, Geodesy and Heat 
Transport) was launched on May 5, 2018 and 
landed on November 26, 2018. 
Key information on the mission characteristics 
are as follows: 
 Target body: Mars; 
 Mars Lander (360 kg) based on Phoenix 
heritage (Figure 36); 
 Science instruments contributed by CNES 
(SEIS) and DLR (HP3); 
 Launch Window May 5, 2018, on ATLAS 
V401 from Vandenberg AFB in California; 
 6.5-month cruise, type 1 trajectory, direct 
entry (Figure 37 and Figure 38). 
The mission is scheduled to perform one Mar-
tian year of science on the surface, to (i) Un-
derstand the formation and evolution of terres-
trial planets through investigation of the inte-
rior structure and processes of Mars, and (ii) to 
determine the present level of tectonic activity 
and meteorite impact rate on Mars. 
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Figure 37 – Entry descent and landing timeline for the InSight mission (Courtesy NASA/JPL) 
 
 
Figure 38 – Interplanetary trajectory for the InSight mission 
(courtesy NASA/JPL) 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INSIGHT MIS-
SION 
As a Mars lander mission without life detection 
instruments, the InSight mission has been des-
ignated PP Category IVa by the NASA Plane-
tary Protection Officer. In accordance with the 
requirements stated in NASA Procedural Re-
quirements document NPR8020.12 for this 
category and type of mission, the InSight Pro-
ject is required to comply with the following: 
Bioburden requirements: 
 At launch accounting of ≤5 × 105 total 
spores, ≤3 × 105 total spores on planned 
landed hardware and mean exposed surface 
density of < 300 spores/m2. 
Cleanliness requirements: 
 Assembly and testing in ISO 8 (or better) 
cleanroom environments. 
Recontamination avoidance requirements: 
 Launch recontamination not to exceed at 
launch bioburden requirements. 
Organic inventory requirements: 
 Archiving of samples of at least 50 grams 
of each organic material type for which 
more than 25 kg is transported to Mars. 
 Documentation of organic materials for 
which are present on the spacecraft in 
quantities of ≥ 1 kg. 
Probability of Impact requirements: 
 Launch vehicle Mars avoidance of less 
than 1 × 10-4 for 50 years after launch, and 
probability of a non-nominal impact of 
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Mars by the spacecraft due to cruise phase 
failure shall be ≤ 1 × 10–2. 
In addition, in following current established 
practice and after consultation to obtain best 
available advice, the NASA PPO imposed the 
following additional planetary protection re-
quirements: 
 The average internal (behind HEPA or tor-
tuous path) bioburden was required to be 
≤ 1,000 spores/m2. 
 The mole shall be unpowered and cease op-
erations immediately if the tether to the 
lander breaks during surface operations. 
 Ice shall not be present within reach of HP3 
instrument’s mole (to be demonstrated 
thermodynamically by pre-launch analy-
sis). 
 The mole shall not generate a thin liquid 
film as a result of operations (insufficient 
to transport a 50 nm particle, to be demon-
strated by pre-launch analysis). 
 Planetary Protection Landing Site Review 
was required. 
 Project shall utilize NASA PPO-provided 
‘new’ heat microbial reduction specifica-
tions which provide expanded implementa-
tion options (e.g., no humidity constraints, 
credit for manufacturing processing) as su-
perseding the ‘old’ specifications in the 
present NPR8020.12D document (Table 
7). 
 PP requirements to be captured into the 
Level 2 Project System Requirements Doc-
ument [first JPL Project to capture all PP 
requirements into the Dynamic Object Ori-
ented Requirements (DOORS) V&V tool]. 
 All Level 2 and 3 requirements are under 
Project Change Control Board manage-
ment. 
The early entries in these additional require-
ments are associated with the project demon-
strating that the mission would not cause trans-
gression of the parameters for a Category IVc 
                                                 
26 Note that the current Special Region lower tempera-
ture limit is -28°C, but at the time the InSight analyses 
were performed, the requirement was for T -18°C. 
mission that would have required a higher level 
of cleanliness. 
In the latter part of the list, the requirements are 
to ensure incorporation of planetary protection 
into system engineering best practice in the im-
plementation and V&V aspects of the require-
ments. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF REQUIREMENTS 
BIOBURDEN ACCOUNTING 
The project adopted the standard practice for 
Martian Category IVa missions by allocating 
the Maximum Accounted Bioburden Require-
ment of 500,000 spores into a budget (Table 
10), and managing the bioburden budget using 
a PPEL (Planetary Protection Equipment List), 
analogous to the spacecraft MEL (Mass Equip-
ment List) but with cleanliness heritage, as-
sayed and accounted bioburden and surface 
and volume entries, rather than mass (see ex-
cerpted illustration of a PPEL in Figure 39). 
 
Table 10 – Illustration of the spore bioburden budget for the 
InSight Mission (courtesy NASA/JPL) 
For the (project specific) special analyses that 
were needed to demonstrate that the mission 
would not transgress planetary protection Cat-
egory IVc constraints, the following work was 
performed: 
LANDING SITE ANALYSIS 
The Landing Site Characterization was to 
demonstrate that the selected Landing Site is 
NOT a Special Region (i.e., Aw> 0.5 AND 
T> -18°C)26. 
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In addition, thermal modeling was performed 
to show the bounding sub-surface temperatures 
at the landing site over the full Mars year on 
the specific sols of the InSight Mission, includ-
ing spacecraft activity, with the HP3 penetra-
tion phase expected around ~sol 67-100. A 
thermal model verification was also per-
formed. 
The analysis found that the short-lived temper-
ature elevation of the subsurface above ambi-
ent due to HP3 hammering and thermal con-
ductivity measurement activities is on the or-
der of 10°-50°C. Mean subsurface tempera-
tures at this site are -55°C, producing thermal 
elevations to ~0°C. 
However, the regolith in the Elysium region is 
dry and ice-free, eliminating the possibility 
that HP3 heating would generate water activi-
ties in pore spaces that exceed the threshold for 
microbial activity. The maximum possible 
bulk water activity (Aw = rh/100) was esti-
mated to be 0.09. 
Hence, at the bulk scale, although the temper-
ature regime during spacecraft operations may 
temporarily exceed one of the limits (tempera-
ture), the other (water activity) was not ex-
ceeded. So, in its native state, the landing site 
is not a special region, and with spacecraft op-
eration, there is no chance for a spacecraft-in-
duced special region to be created, hence the 
mission fulfils Category IVa requirements and 
is not a Category IVc mission. 
 
 
 
Figure 39 – Illustration of a NASA/JPL PPEL (Planetary Protection Equipment List) (Courtesy NASA/JPL) 
SPECIAL ANALYSES – THIN FILM ANALYSIS 
An analysis was also performed to understand 
the possibility that hydrous mineral composi-
tion in Martian soil capable of dehydration in 
the -55° -0°C range, following the activity of 
the mole, might liberate small amounts of wa-
ter. This water could migrate, potentially en-
training and carrying particles including terres-
trial microbes to other more favorable environ-
ments where they may be able to replicate. 
The analysis performed is conservative, as it 
(a) accounts for MgSO4 minerals not likely at 
equatorial sites, and (b) factors in the maxi-
mum quantity of water that could be lost from 
total dehydration of those minerals. 
The analysis found that a pulse of a small quan-
tity of water due to the mole activity would 
generate 8 to 10 monolayer equivalents in the 
immediate vicinity of the mole. This would re-
turn to its equilibrium value of 2 monolayers 
within hours. Liberated water would flow un-
der capillary action, spreading out in all direc-
tions, but the maximum film thickness is too 
small to entrain a 50 nm particle and is both a 
short-lived and small-distance phenomenon. 
This demonstrates that even at the micro-scale, 
the InSight mission does not transgress the spe-
cial region limits that would make it a Cate-
gory IVc mission. 
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PARTNER-CONTRIBUTED PAYLOAD MAN-
AGEMENT 
Another element of the InSight mission is the 
international partnership that exists for contri-
bution of payload elements. The SEIS package 
is contributed from CNES, while the HP3 pay-
load is contributed from DLR. For each of 
these elements, the InSight Project has PP Pay-
load Implementation Plans, with the instru-
ment providers then generating their own Insti-
tutional (i.e., CNES and DLR) Planetary Pro-
tection Plans. 
The plans are integrated with flow down of PP 
requirements to L4 payloads, and implementa-
tion managed by frequent teleconferences and 
email exchanges (effective & efficient commu-
nication), addressing implementation approach 
questions and providing assay updates. PP is a 
topic area of discussion for HP3 and SEIS 
weekly teleconferences. 
PP assay of interfaces, the hardware ac-
ceptance/certification process and status of 
bio-assays were on site activities at CNES and 
DLR with the InSight planetary protection en-
gineer. Such integration across organizational 
and international boundaries is extremely de-
sirable for smooth flow of operations, but 
needs early incorporation into inter-organiza-
tional planning (ICDs, contract agreements 
etc.). 
IMPACT AVOIDANCE ANALYSIS 
As with other missions, the InSight project has 
a requirement to ensure the probability of the 
(uncleaned) launch vehicle upper stage impact-
ing Mars is less than 1.0 × 10-4 for 50 years af-
ter launch. Typically, this is achieved by bias-
ing the injection aimpoint for launch away 
from Mars. Note that this requirement (for pro-
tection of Mars) would also be levied on mis-
sions to outer planets. 
The analysis for InSight also included consid-
eration of Centaur upper stage anomaly scenar-
ios in the assessment, including; failure to sep-
arate, failure to perform CCAM, failure to im-
plement blowdown. 
Based on the analysis, the following plan for-
ward was approved as acceptable for demon-
strating compliance with the requirement: 
1. Design the biased aimpoints and 
CCAM attitude to ensure a minimum first-pass 
probability of impact less than 0.5 × 10-4 for all 
anomalous scenarios. 
2. Design the blowdown attitude to ensure 
that the Mars encounter is sufficiently far away 
that the ΔV from the gravity assist is insuffi-
cient to place the Centaur on a 50-year resonant 
trajectory in the nominal scenario. 
3. Perform 5,000-case, 50-year Monte 
Carlo propagations of the three anomalous sce-
narios to determine the Beta distribution shape 
parameters for the 50-year probabilities of im-
pact. 
4. Generate one million samples of each 
of the six Beta distributions representing the 
probability of an anomaly and the resulting 50-
year probability of impact. 
5. Combine the six million-sample sets 
and analytical probabilities to determine the 
distribution of the estimate of the total proba-
bility of impact. 
At the time of writing, the approved methodol-
ogy is being written up and submitted to a peer 
reviewed journal. 
THINGS TO REMEMBER 
For any bioburden controlled planetary protec-
tion implementation approach, including outer 
solar system Category IV missions (and Cate-
gory III missions with bioburden requirements 
as a result of being unable to meet probability 
of impact avoidance requirements at an appro-
priate probability level), the implementation 
adopted by the InSight team provides a useful 
reference point. 
As implemented, the InSight case study high-
lights the need to: 
 Establish and maintain an end-to-end bio-
burden accounting approach. 
 Pay attention to the details of provenance 
(manufacturing credit), inside/outside 
cleanliness, interfaces/environments, test 
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activities, hardware processing, recontami-
nation. 
 Plan ahead for PP facilities needs and in-
corporation of PP into the ATLO flow. 
 Identify and build in the time/resources 
necessary for high stringency cleanroom 
operation. 
The InSight project highlights the benefit of 
good communication between PP implement-
ers, hardware engineers, launch vehicles oper-
ations, project management and contributing 
hardware partners to the smooth implementa-
tion of planetary protection – so build in plan-
etary protection in upfront, from the earliest 
planning stages of the project. 
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PLANETARY PROTECTION CATE-
GORY IVb27 – EXOMARS 
The ExoMars program is an International Co-
operation between the European Space Agency 
(ESA) and ROSCOSMOS (ROS) with instru-
ment contributions of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA). ExoMars 
is composed of two different missions, the Ex-
oMars 2016 mission, launched in 2016, and 
ExoMars 2020, to be launched in 2020. Both 
spacecraft are launched with the Russian Pro-
ton-M rocket fitted with the Breeze-M upper 
stage from the Cosmodrome of Baikonur. 
The objective of the ExoMars 2020 mission is 
to land the ESA Rover module and the Russian 
Landing Platform on Mars, which will perform 
exobiological and geological investigation on 
Mars surface. In particular, the technological 
and scientific objectives are the following: 
 To demonstrate the main technologies of: 
• Entry, descent and landing (EDL) of a 
payload on the surface of Mars; 
• Surface mobility with a rover; and, 
• Access to the subsurface to acquire sam-
ples, sample acquisition, preparation, 
distribution and analysis 
 Scientific objectives: 
• To search for signs of past and present 
life on Mars; 
• To investigate the water/geochemical 
environment as a function of depth in 
the shallow subsurface; and, 
• To characterize the surface environ-
ment. 
The ExoMars 2020 spacecraft composite 
(SCC, Figure 40) is composed of elements pro-
vided by ESA and ROS. ESA provides the Car-
rier Module (CM) and Rover Module (RM, 
Figure 41) with the Survey and Analytical Pay-
loads. ROS provides the Descent Module 
(DM) (without RM), which in turn is com-
posed of EDL/GNC System (with Parachute 
subsystem, Inertial Measurement Unit and Ra-
                                                 
27 By Diana B. Margheritis, Thales Alenia Space. 
dar Doppler provided by ESA), Landing Plat-
form (including UHF TLC Subsystem and On 
Board Computer and software provided by 
ESA) and CM-DM separation adapter. 
 
Figure 40 – SCC with deployed Solar Arrays (credit: TAS) 
 
Figure 41 – The ExoMars Rover (credit: TAS) 
 
Figure 42 – Interplanetary transfer for ExoMars 2020 mis-
sion (credit: TAS) 
The Launch window is July 25, 2020 (LPO)-
August 13, 2020 (LPC) and the Mission sce-
nario is direct, ballistic Earth-to-Mars Transfer 
Trajectory landing on March 19, 2021 (Figure 
42 and Figure 43). Currently, two different 
landing sites are under evaluation, Oxia 
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Planum (18,16° N, 335,67° E) and Mawrth 
Vallis (LPO 22.42° N,341,48° E; LPC 22,17° 
N, 341.99° E). 
 
Figure 43 – Entry, Descent and Landing of ExoMars 2020 
mission (credit: TAS) 
PLANETARY PROTECTION CATEGORY IVB 
DESCRIPTION 
“Category IV missions comprise certain types 
of missions (mostly probe and lander) to a tar-
get body of chemical evolution and/or origin of 
life interest and for which scientific opinion 
provides a significant chance of contamination 
which could compromise future investigations. 
Requirements imposed include rather detailed 
documentation (more involved than Category 
III), including a bioassay to enumerate the bi-
oburden, a probability of contamination analy-
sis, an inventory of the bulk constituent organ-
ics and an increased number of implementing 
procedures. The implementing procedures re-
quired may include trajectory biasing, clean-
rooms, bioburden reduction, possible partial 
sterilization of the direct contact hardware and 
a bioshield for that hardware. Generally, the re-
quirements and compliance are similar to Vi-
king, with the exception of complete 
lander/probe sterilization.” (Ref. COSPAR 
Planetary Protection Policy, October 20, 2002, 
as amended on March 24, 2011). 
Category IV specifications for selected solar 
system bodies are set forth in an Annex to the 
COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy, which 
also lists Solar system bodies considered to be 
classified as Category IV, namely, Lander 
Missions to Mars, Europa and Enceladus (oth-
ers TBD). 
PLANETARY PROTECTION CATEGORY IVB 
– THE EXOMARS MISSION 
As the Mars lander system is carrying instru-
ments for the investigation of Martian life and 
does neither land nor access a Mars special re-
gions, the ExoMars 2020 mission has been 
classified as Planetary Protection Category 
IVb in accordance with the ESA Planetary 
Protection Requirements and in agreement 
with the COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy. 
PLANETARY PROTECTION REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR EXOMARS 
The ExoMars 2020 Planetary Protection Re-
quirements are stated in the ESA Planetary 
Protection Requirements document EXM-M2-
RSD-ESA-00002 issued for the project Exo-
Mars 2020.Most of the technical Planetary 
Protection Requirements provided by ESA in 
this document can be gathered in three differ-
ent groups: 1) Probability of impact, 2) Biobur-
den and 3) Mars samples contamination re-
quirements. 
PROBABILITY OF IMPACT REQUIREMENTS 
Probability of impact requirements regarding 
the Launcher upper stage and the Spacecraft 
Composite (SCC) are the following: 
 The probability of impact on Mars of the 
launcher upper stage shall be ≤1 × 10-4 for 
the first 50 years after launch. 
 The probability of impact on Mars by the 
Spacecraft composite (SCC), including 
CM-DM separation, shall be ≤1 × 10-2. 
Inputs to be included in the execution of the 
SCC probability of impact analysis are also 
provided as requirements, for example: 
 Single/multiple pass analysis; 
 Spacecraft reliability; 
 Meteoroid impacts; 
 Knowledge of spacecraft state (location, 
velocity vector); 
 Maneuver and planet ephemeris uncer-
tainty; 
 Stochastic variability of the atmospheric 
density; and, 
 Solar cycle. 
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BIOBURDEN REQUIREMENTS 
Bioburden requirements deal, among other 
things, with the maximum number of bacterial 
spores allowable on the flight hardware: 
 Spacecraft: The total bioburden of the SCC 
shall be ≤ 5 × 105 bacterial spores, includ-
ing 20% ESA Project margin. 
• Note 1: Break up/burn-up of the CM en-
tering the Martian atmosphere can be 
used to claim bioburden reduction if the 
conditions of 500 C for ≥ 0.5seconds are 
reached. 
• Note 2: Encapsulated bioburden is only 
accountable on flight hardware intended 
for a hard impact, e.g., CM (minus 
credit for break up/burn-up), aeroshell, 
crushable structures. 
• Note 3: The 20% bioburden margin is 
intended for late contamination events 
and therefore would have to come out of 
the surface bioburden allocation. 
 DM (including the RM): The bioburden on 
the Descent Module including the RM 
shall be ≤ 3 × 105 bacterial spores on ex-
posed internal and external surfaces and 
the Descent Module including the RM av-
erage surface bioburden shall be ≤ 300 
spores/m2. 
 RM: The bioburden on the RM exposed in-
ternal and external surfaces shall be 
≤ 2 × 104 bacterial spores. 
 RM subsystems involved in the acquisi-
tion, delivery and analysis of Martian sam-
ples for life detection: The average biobur-
den on the RM subsystems involved in the 
acquisition, delivery, and analysis of Mar-
tian samples for life detection shall be 
≤ 0.03 bacterial spores/m2. 
Note that the definition of total bioburden in-
cludes surface, mated, and encapsulated bio-
burden. 
MARS SAMPLES CONTAMINATION REQUIRE-
MENTS 
Mars samples contamination requirements re-
fer to the maximum allowable terrestrial or-
ganic contamination level per substance class 
and per gram of Martian samples for life detec-
tion. These requirements are indicated in Table 
11. 
Substance class 
Maximum contamination level per 
gram of Martian sample delivered 
for life detection 
Material from 
biological sources ≤ 50 × 10
-9 gram 
Monomers of 
Kapton, Mylar and 
PTFE 
≤ 500 × 10-9 gram 
Fluorinated 
technical lubricants ≤ 500 × 10
-9 gram 
Any other organic 
compound ≤ 50 × 10
-9 gram 
Table 11 – Maximum allowable contamination levels per 
substance class per gram of Martian sample. 
OTHER PP REQUIREMENTS 
There are more PP requirements other than the 
ones indicated in the three main groups above. 
Some examples of them are the following: 
 Induced special regions: An analysis of 
flight hardware induced special regions to 
be provided for nominal and off-nominal 
mission events; 
 Organic inventory requirements: 
• Archiving of samples of at least 50 
grams of each organic material type of: 
(a) DM for which more than 25 kg is 
transported to Mars; (b) RM. 
• Documentation of SCC organic materi-
als. 
 Methods and procedures: is normative the 
use of the ECSS-Q-ST-70-53, ECSS-Q-
ST-70-55, ECSS-Q-ST-70-56, ECSS-Q-
ST-70-57 and ECSS-Q-ST-70-58 stand-
ards. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANETARY PRO-
TECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR EXOMARS 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PROBABILITY OF IM-
PACT REQUIREMENTS 
One of the mission constraints is the probabil-
ity of approaching the CM-DM separation 
point in off-nominal conditions (including also 
the failure of the separation mechanism). This 
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could affect the correct entry phase with con-
sequences on the Mars contamination risks. 
The probability of impact occurrence on Mars 
by the SCC, including CM-DM separation has 
to be less than 1 × 10-2. 
Probabilistic assessment is made to estimate 
the risk of approaching Mars with an off-nom-
inal trajectory, leading to an unwanted impact 
or planetary contamination. This probability is 
estimated with the equation: 
 
where: 
 pi = probability of off-nominal impact on 
Mars in case the ith maneuver is success-
fully executed (and no additional correc-
tion until CM-DM separation is performed 
due to system failure or impossibility to ex-
change data and commands). 
 qi+1 = probability to lose the system be-
tween the ith and ith+1 maneuver (this pre-
vents any additional attitude correction and 
the impact conditions depend on the last 
(i.e., ith) useful maneuver). 
 The probabilities of off-nominal impact on 
Mars (pi) are calculated as impact probabil-
ity after each planned maneuver, as pro-
vided in the Mission Analysis. 
 Probabilities qi are estimated by combining 
all the causes leading to the loss of the 
equipment/subsystems involved in the 
manoeuvers: (a) H/W failures (character-
ized by the Reliability data), (b) Space ra-
diation effects and (c) Micrometeor-
oids/Orbital debris impacts. 
MICRO-METEOROIDS (MM) 
The MM impact analysis of the SCC is per-
formed with relation to the MM environment 
described by the Grün model, as dictated by the 
ESA environmental specification. The effect 
of space debris has been ignored because they 
are limited to the near-Earth environment and 
are not present on Mars orbit environment. 
The probability of failure induced by MM is 
assessed for all the critical hardware at unit 
level which is required to sustain the SCC op-
erability during the flight phases until CM/DM 
separation. 
For each critical component its detailed config-
uration was studied to identify case materials 
and wall thicknesses, exposed areas and the 
shielding effect provided by SSC structural 
walls, MLI blankets and adjacent SCC items. 
In addition, the selection of the failure mode 
and the most appropriate Ballistic Limit Equa-
tion (BLE) is performed. Outcome of the ap-
plied BLE are the MM critical diameters to be 
used to determine the critical flux, i.e., the 
number of MM which cause failures in this 
unit. 
The numbers evaluated at component level are 
used as input to perform the SCC probability 
of impact analysis. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF BIOBURDEN RE-
QUIREMENTS 
The first step for implementing the bioburden 
requirements is to understand them and then to 
flow down the customer PP requirements into 
a Project System Level PP Requirements doc-
ument. Regarding the PP requirements of the 
DM-CM, DM-RM, Launch Vehicle-SCC and 
Payloads interfaces they are given in the re-
lated Interface Requirement Documents or 
IRDs. 
The SCC bioburden budget is prepared taking 
into account the RM, CM and DM (without 
RM) bioburden budgets. Verification of the 
compliance of the final SCC bioburden budget 
with the bioburden requirements is required 
before the launch. Two different bioburden 
budgets, the Surface Bioburden Budget and the 
Encapsulated Bioburden Budget, are prepared 
for the Flight System. The Total (surface, 
mated and encapsulated) bioburden and the 
Average Surface Bioburden Density are ob-
tained from these budgets and they have to be 
compliant with Planetary Protection Require-
ments given by the customer. 
Bioburden budgets are prepared for the single 
modules. The final bioburden budget to be pro-
vided to the customer before the launch con-
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tains also the values of bioburden recontami-
nation during the environmental tests, in par-
ticular the Thermal vacuum test, and the SCC 
recontamination during the launch campaign 
including the recontamination during the 
launch. 
The CM is considered part of the SCC with a 
planned hard landing because the probability 
of impact on Mars by the CM after DM sepa-
ration is 1. The CM budget is prepared taking 
into account the output of the break up/burn-up 
analysis of the CM entering the Martian atmos-
phere. Carrier Vehicle break up/burn-up anal-
ysis is made considering the nominal case with 
inputs the state vector at the pre-separation 
point and a Monte Carlo simulation using the 
state covariance matrix at the pre-separation 
point. Break up/burn-up analysis is based on a 
two-stage break up model: break off of the six 
solar panels of the CM at a given dynamic 
pressure (providing a critical root bending mo-
ment) and Catastrophic break up at which the 
Carrier Module with the detached solar panels 
totally disassembles in different parts named 
“debris catalogue”. The altitude at which this 
event occurs, the “break up altitude” depends 
on the break up criterion selected. Three break 
up criteria were considered, representing the 
various physical phenomena at work during 
the process. The most conservative break up 
criterion is the “Heat Load” criterion providing 
the lowest break up altitude and therefore the 
lowest heat load for each debris of the cata-
logue. 
The analysis provides also the assessment for 
each debris of the thermal performance be-
cause its ultimate aim is the assessment of the 
self-sterilization performance of the debris 
(meaning a temperature at 500°C for at least 
0.5s) or the bioburden reduction (the value is 
depending on the time above 200°C spent by 
the debris). 
The monolithic radiative equilibrium/bulk 
temperature have been considered as the two 
thermal models providing the two “tempera-
ture extreme values”. For conservative as-
sumption the debris temperatures from the 
monolithic bulk model have been selected, giv-
ing the lowest temperature. The requirement of 
CM total bioburden at delivery of maximum 
40,000 spores is achieved by means of: 
1. Break up/burn-up (BuBu) analysis to iden-
tify which elements can reach the Temper-
ature of 500°C (or higher) for a duration 
greater than 0.5 seconds during descent 
into Mars atmosphere, this condition in-
duces sterility. 
2. Active control (sterilization processing) of 
the elements which cannot achieve the con-
ditions of point (1) and cannot achieve any 
log of bioburden reduction as result of the 
BuBu analysis. 
3. Bioburden allocation for all the CM ele-
ments that cannot achieve the conditions of 
points (1) and (2) taking into account the 
log of bioburden reduction calculated with 
the BuBu analysis results. 
4. Sterilization processing of the CM MLIs 
and CM harness by Dry Heat Microbial 
Reduction (DHMR) process because it is 
not possible to be compliant with the bio-
burden value allocated to the CM if the 
MLIs are not sterilized due to their ex-
tended exposed (internal and external) sur-
faces. The harness was not considered in 
the BuBu analysis due to heritage from 
other missions: the harness does not 
achieve bioburden reduction during the 
catastrophic break up. 
Module Maximum 
Surface 
bioburden 
at delivery 
[spores] 
Maximum 
Total 
bioburden 
at delivery 
[spores] 
Maximum 
Surface 
bioburden 
at launch 
[spores] 
Maximum 
Total 
bioburden 
at launch 
[spores] 
SCC # 400 000 # 500 000 
CM # 40 000 # 40 000 
DM 170 000 360 000 270 000 460 000 
DM w/o 
RM 
150 000 340 000 250 000 440 000 
RM 20 000 # 20 000 # 
Table 12 – Bioburden allocated to each ExoMars 2020 mod-
ule at the beginning of the project. 
CM, RM and DM budgets are prepared at the 
beginning of the project in order to define the 
PP strategy to be applied to each equipment 
and subsystem before being integrated in the 
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module and the strategy to be applied at mod-
ule and SCC level during the assembly, envi-
ronmental tests, launch campaign and launch. 
The general approach is to sterilize the flight 
hardware before integration and to reduce as 
much as possible the bioburden recontamina-
tion during the successive activities up to the 
launch. When sterilization processing is not 
possible due to the incompatibility of the flight 
hardware with any sterilization technology, 
cleaning and bioburden assays are mandatory 
to achieve the value of bioburden allocated to 
the item before integration. 
In general, the sequence of activities is first to 
clean and then to bioburden assay the item in 
order to know its initial bioburden level, before 
applying a certified microbial reduction pro-
cess. The final bioburden level of the item is 
then calculated considering its initial biobur-
den level before applying the sterilization ap-
proach and the number of log reduction ob-
tained with the sterilization process. 
When to perform the cleaning and the biobur-
den assays before sterilization, e.g., during 
and/or before the assembly, depends on the 
type of item and has to be established for each 
one before the start of the assembly. 
The sterilized or cleaned items with the known 
bioburden level are integrated in bioburden 
controlled environments. Recontamination 
precautions and surface bioburden checks are 
continuously performed onto the flight hard-
ware during the environmental tests and launch 
campaign in order to make sure they are within 
the allocated bioburden levels. 
Output of the bioburden budgets are the defini-
tion of the log reduction to be applied at each 
item with the defined sterilization process and 
the definition of the ATLO environments. 
Dry Heat Microbial Reduction (DHMR) as per 
ECSS-Q-ST-70-57C, Vapor Phase Hydrogen 
Peroxide bioburden reduction as per ECSS-Q-
ST-70-56C, Ethylene oxide, Ultraviolet (UV) 
and Gamma radiation are the sterilization 
methods applied for the bioburden reduction of 
the flight hardware and related Ground Sup-
port Equipment (GSE) and tools. All the flight 
hardware to be sterilized is compatible with the 
selected sterilization process. Indications re-
garding the materials and hardware compati-
bility tests for sterilization processes are taken 
from the ECSS-Q-ST-70-53 standard. Demon-
stration of the item compatibility with the se-
lected sterilization process is required and it is 
done by analysis and/or test depending on the 
type of item. 
Environments of different levels are used for 
the SCC Assembly, Tests and Launch Opera-
tions. As far as the particulate cleanroom level 
is concerned, cleanrooms of ISO 8, ISO 7, ISO 
5 and ISO 3 level as per ECSS-Q-ST-70-01 
standard are used in the project. In addition, 
strict bioburden controlled environments 
named HC (Highly Controlled) level are used 
during handling/operations with bioburden 
controlled hardware aimed to achieve or pre-
serve the COSPAR Category IVb. Definition 
of these cleanrooms bioburden level is per-
formed following the ECSS-Q-ST-70-58 and 
ESSB-ST-U-001 standards. 
The following average surface spore density 
for cleanrooms in operation were used at the 
beginning of the project to estimate the recon-
tamination of an item into a bioburden con-
trolled cleanroom (The “real” bioburden re-
contamination numbers were then obtained as 
results of bioburden measurements). 
 ISO class 7 cleanroom or better, highly 
controlled: 50 spores/m2 
 ISO class 7 cleanroom or better, normally 
controlled: 500 spores/m2 
 ISO class 8 cleanroom, highly controlled: 
1,000 spores/m2 
 ISO class 8 cleanroom, normally con-
trolled: 10,000 spores/m2 
 Uncontrolled manufacturing: 105 
spores/m2 
During the handling/operations of bioburden 
controlled hardware, not dealing with the Mars 
samples, ISO 8 HC and ISO 7 HC cleanroom 
levels are used for the hardware integration. A 
portable ISO 5 HC tent is used for transporta-
tion and introduction in a sterile environment 
of flight hardware which is part of the Mars 
sample pathway. This flight hardware area is 
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named Ultra Clean Zone (UCZ). Sterile ISO 3 
environment with controlled airborne molecu-
lar and particulate contamination is used for 
the ultra-cleaning and integration of UCZ 
flight hardware. This environment is made by 
a train of sterile glove boxes (GBT). GBT air-
borne and surface contamination are continu-
ously controlled and monitored. 
Personnel working inside the bioburden con-
trolled environments have to be trained both in 
the use of sterile garments and in the behavior 
to be followed inside the controlled environ-
ment. Procedures for cleanroom cleaning and 
monitoring flight hardware cleaning and for bi-
oburden levels maintenance during the AIT ac-
tivities inside these bioburden-controlled 
cleanrooms are set. 
A bioburden assay plan is prepared for each 
item before applying the sterilization process. 
Bioburden assays plans are prepared at module 
level and at SCC level to evaluate the number 
of spores that can be introduced during the in-
tegration and to check, prevent and control the 
surface bioburden re-contamination during the 
flight hardware handling on ground at pre-AIT, 
AIT, testing and launch site operations. The bi-
oburden assay plans are continuously adapted 
following the evolution of the Project. 
The SCC Bioburden assay plan is issued at the 
final phase of the mission in the last version of 
the Pre-launch report. The last bioburden as-
says to be taken at the Launch site will be in-
cluded in the Post-Launch report. 
Bioburden assays (Figure 44) are performed 
following the procedures ECSS-Q-ST-70-55C 
tailored for the ExoMars project by the cus-
tomer. 
The bioburden assays are performed follow-
ing the bioburden assay plan issued by the Ex-
oMars project. The plan was created taken into 
account the following PP requirement (given 
by the customer): “Bioburden assessments on 
space-craft hardware shall be performed as re-
quired to meet the bioburden control plan for 
flight systems, but at least: 
 Prior to applying a bioburden reduction 
procedure (e.g., DHMR); 
 Prior to the delivery of a bioburden con-
trolled spacecraft hardware (and spare, if 
applicable); 
  Prior to integration steps that inhibit further 
access to exposed internal and external ex-
posed surfaces and mated surfaces – assay 
at last physical access – including prior to 
HEPA isolation; 
 At the acceptance of bioburden controlled 
spacecraft hardware (and spare, if applica-
ble); 
 Before and after critical operations (e.g., 
re-work, before and after transport of major 
sub-systems or modules); 
 After alert and action level deviations at 
cleanroom level; 
 After any incident that could increase the 
bioburden for the spacecraft hardware (and 
spare, if applicable); 
 Verification assays, prior to launch.” 
 
Figure 44 – Bioburden assay sampling using a swab (credit: 
TAS) 
The number of bioburden assays to be de-
fined for each assay set is planned taking into 
account the following requirements given by 
the customer: 
 Five swabs for each surface area on space-
craft hardware of 0.1 m2; 
 A proportionate number, but at least one 
swab, for each surface area on spacecraft 
hardware much smaller than 0.1 m2; 
 One wipe for each surface area on space-
craft hardware in the range of 1 m2; 
 Two wipes for each surface area on space-
craft hardware per 10 m2. 
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Concerning the encapsulated bioburden any 
subsystem that undergoes a planned hard land-
ing on Mars contributes towards the allowable 
encapsulated bioburden. A planned hard land-
ing refers to all parts of the SCC subsystem that 
are discarded prior to the terminal descent in 
the nominal scenario. In the ExoMars 2020 
Mission these subsystems are the CM and the 
DM without RM elements different from the 
Landing platform. 
It is pointed out that planned landing profiles 
constitute the nominal scenario, unplanned is 
any off-nominal event. Hardware that under-
goes an unplanned hard landing (e.g., due to 
landing failure) does not contribute to the al-
lowable encapsulated bioburden. 
Nevertheless, encapsulated bioburden shall be 
assessed for all the flight hardware, the encap-
sulated bioburden is allocated only for the fol-
lowing ExoMars 2020 SCC elements: 
 DM elements that are planned to land on 
Mars with a hard landing (crashing onto 
Mars surface) as Front Shield, Rear Jacket, 
DM-CM separation system and Parachute 
system; 
 CM not metallic elements that are not self- 
sterilized in the bulk material after the cat-
astrophic break up. 
Estimation of the encapsulated bioburden of 
the flight hardware for planning purposes are 
performed using the following values: 
 Average encapsulated spores’ density of 
spacecraft parts not defined as electronic or 
not electronic parts: 130 spores/cm3; 
  Electronic piece parts: 3-150 spores/cm3; 
  Other non-metallic materials: 1-30 
spores/cm3. 
In some particular cases, e.g., Thermal Protec-
tion System (TPS), the real density of encapsu-
lated spores (spores/cm3) can be measured 
with dedicated biological tests. 
There is not constraint on the encapsulated 
bacterial spores but as the total SCC bioburden 
constraint is to have less than 5 × 105 bacterial 
spores (including the ESA margin) and the sur-
face bioburden constraint for the DM is to have 
less than 3 × 105 bacterial spores (including the 
ESA margin), the encapsulated bioburden will 
have a value which will depend on the SCC 
materials as much as on the surface bioburden 
allocation. Taking into account the total bio-
burden allowed to the descent module, shifting 
surface bioburden to encapsulated bioburden 
allocation may be done as needed. 
As these are the final values to be met at 
launch, a de-rating factor is applied to the H/W 
delivered to the Prime for the AIT with allo-
cated values depending on their location as 
well as expected size, surface characteristics 
and AIT environments in addition to the over-
all maturity of the design. 
The sampling and analysis of all ExoMars 
2020 bioburden assays are performed by certi-
fied personnel at several Certified Microbio-
logical laboratories (Figure 45). 
 
Figure 45 – Microbiological Laboratory at TASinI Turin 
premises (credit: TAS) 
Bioburden re-contamination prevention plans 
are prepared at module and SCC levels in order 
to maintain the measured/estimated bioburden 
values of the flight hardware, recontamination 
prevention includes at least the following ac-
tivities: 
 Bioburden monitoring (of hardware and 
cleanroom) up to launch 
  Sterile alcohol wiping 
  Sterile covers/biobarriers/packaging mate-
rial 
  Sterile fluids (e.g., N2) in contact with the 
flight hardware 
  Use of HEPA filters, bioseals 
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  Bioburden control of Ground Support 
Equipment (GSE) in contact with the flight 
hardware or entering in controlled CRs 
  Contingency planning 
  Definition and use of cleaned transport 
containers with dedicated filters 
  Training Program for all personnel in-
volved with controlled environments 
Recontamination prevention systems as tem-
porary biobarriers, covers, overpressure flow 
systems, etc. are implemented during ATLO 
activities starting with the SCC design defini-
tion (Figure 46). 
 
Figure 46 – Temporary biobarriers covering flight hardware 
placed into a bioburden controlled cleanroom at TASinI 
premises (credit TAS) 
As far as the bioburden requirement of the RM 
subsystems involved in the acquisition, deliv-
ery, and analysis of Martian samples for life 
detection is concerned, the required average bi-
oburden requirement of having less than 0.03 
bacterial spores/m2 is achieved by the imple-
mentation of a dedicated strategy. The first 
step was to identify the RM surfaces that will 
be directly in contact with the Mars sample and 
the RM surfaces which enclose the volume 
(environment) that will be in contact with the 
Mars sample without being directly in contact 
with the sample (all the RM surfaces making 
part of the Martian sample pathway since the 
Mars sample extraction from the Mars subsur-
face up to final analysis by the analytical in-
strumentation). This zone is called “Ultra-
Cleaned Zone” or UCZ. 
The PP strategy consists in disassembling the 
flight hardware in order to have all the UCZ 
parts available for cleaning and sterilization. 
The cleaning is done with several solvents of 
different polarity including sterile isopropyl 
70% alcohol in order to remove the bacterial 
spores other than the organic contaminants. 
High performance techniques and related pro-
cedures of cleaning and packaging are devel-
oped. The cleaned UCZ parts are sterilized by 
Dry Heat Microbial Reduction (DHMR) pro-
cess in order to achieve the required average 
surface spore density less than 0.03 bacterial 
spores/m2. The transportation of the packed 
sterilized parts into a sterile environment is 
made without breaking the sterilization chain 
through a dedicated portable tent ISO 5 HC 
level. Dedicated procedures for handling, 
transportation into the portable tent and intro-
duction of the items into the sterile environ-
ment are developed. These activities are per-
formed by personnel wearing sterile garments 
such as bunny suits, boots, double gloves and 
mask. 
The unpacking, ultraclean with CO2 snow 
cleaning process, integration and test of the 
sterile disassembled UCZ parts is done in an 
isolate sterile environment. This environment 
is built as a “train” of sterile glove boxes, the 
Glove Box Train or GBT. The GBT is steri-
lized with the Vapor Phase Hydrogen Peroxide 
(UHP) technique. The GBT has an extremely 
well controlled atmosphere with respect to par-
ticulate, molecular and biological contamina-
tion. Regarding the biological contamination, 
the airborne and surface biological level of 
each glove box is monitored by the Microbio-
logical laboratory by means of bioburden air 
sampling and fall-out plates placed in each 
glove box. Dedicated procedures and monitor-
ing plans are developed. The bioburden levels 
required for each glove box are 0 CFU per m3 
of air and 0 CFU per fall-out plate in order to 
ensure no bioburden recontamination occurs 
during the UCZ integration inside the GBT 
(Figure 47). 
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Figure 47 – ISO 5 movable tent and sterile GBT at TASinI 
Turin premises (credit: TAS) 
Once the UCZ is integrated, it is over-pressur-
ized on ground with sterile gas and maintained 
until landing on Mars to prevent bioburden 
(and organic) recontamination. 
Analytical payload parts that belong to UCZ 
are also treated by the payloads providers in or-
der to achieve the required average surface 
spore density less than 0.03 bacterial 
spores/m2. Sterilization process is applied on 
the parts. Dedicated strategies for packaging, 
transport, unpacking and integrating the re-
lated analytical payloads parts with the other 
UCZ components are developed and imple-
mented. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MARS SAMPLES CON-
TAMINATION REQUIREMENTS 
The first step to addressing the requirements is 
to understand them and to define which space-
craft materials could directly or indirectly con-
taminate the Martian sample from where it is 
extracted with the drill tool until it is analyzed 
with the RM analytical payloads. A bottom-up 
approach is applied to derive the contamina-
tion of the Martian sample at the end of life 
sample as a sum of different contributions to 
the sample contamination. The following con-
tributions to the Martian sample contamination 
are evaluated: 
 UCZ surface contamination (residue of ul-
tra-cleaning, molecular and particulate 
contamination during UCZ AIT); 
 UCZ airborne contamination (off-gassing 
of UCZ materials); 
 Off-gassing of RM external surfaces (in-
cluding contamination from plumes, entry 
descent landing re-pressurization); 
 Drill tool chamber contamination (off-gas-
sing drill materials, molecular and particu-
late contamination during Drill AIT, con-
tamination from plumes, entry descent 
landing re-pressurization). 
The UCZ molecular organic contamination 
(MOC) and particulate contamination (PAC) 
are evaluated through witness samples placed 
inside the GBT. Static contact transfer coeffi-
cients for the UCZ static parts and dynamic 
transfer coefficients for the UCZ not static 
parts are used to evaluate the transfer of UCZ 
surface contamination to the Martian sample. 
The UCZ airborne molecular contamination is 
evaluated considering the outgassing of con-
taminants from polymeric materials present in 
the UCZ. At the beginning of operations on 
Mars the core sample transport mechanism 
door is opened and the UCZ pressure is equal-
ized to the Martian atmosphere pressure. 
Therefore, the outflow of contaminants occurs 
and the UCZ airborne molecular contamina-
tion is reduced. The contribution to the molec-
ular contamination of the Martian sample due 
to the adsorption of molecular contamination 
coming from the UCZ atmosphere is evaluated 
taking into account adhesion factors and the re-
duced UCZ airborne molecular contamination. 
Molecular contamination coming from the 
thrusters’ plume impingement and exhaust 
gases can contaminate the external surfaces of 
the RM. In addition, off-gassing of the non-
metallic materials present on the external sur-
faces of the RM can occur in the Mars atmos-
phere. Once extracted from the Mars subsur-
face the sample temperature can influence the 
transport of contaminant if it is colder than the 
environment, facilitating the condensation of 
molecular contaminants which can be trans-
ported from the external surfaces of the RM to 
the exposed sample. Evaluation of this contri-
bution to the Martian sample contamination is 
performed by means of CFD analysis taking 
onto account convection-diffusion transport in 
the flow regime present on Mars, the molecular 
contaminants off-gassing from the non-metal-
lic surfaces of the RM and the temperature dis-
tribution on the RM as the surrounding envi-
ronment. 
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Molecular contamination coming from the 
thrusters’ plume impingement and exhaust 
gases as well as particulate contamination dis-
lodging from the surfaces of descent module 
can potentially ingress into, and contaminate, 
the UCZ parts of the drill tool. This contribu-
tion is considered to evaluate the Mars sample 
contamination from the drill UCZ parts, in ad-
dition to the UCZ contamination acquired dur-
ing the AIT and UCZ airborne contamination 
due to UCZ materials off-gassing. Adsorption 
and dynamic transfer coefficients are used for 
the evaluation. 
A Martian sample contamination budget is de-
fined allocating contamination amounts to 
each mission phase. Outputs of this budget are 
the definition of the UCZ cleaning processes 
and the definition of the required UCZ AIT 
controlled environments (maximum accepta-
ble particulate and molecular contamination 
levels of the GBT air and surfaces) based on 
the maximum allowed UCZ surfaces contami-
nation. GBT molecular and particulate moni-
toring procedures and plans are issued together 
with the definition and implementation of 
monitoring procedures to check the molecular 
and particulate levels of the UCZ surfaces dur-
ing the AIT made inside the GBT. Reviews of 
the flight hardware materials are performed 
taking into account the different contributions 
to the Martian sample contamination. 
Over-pressurization of the UCZ prevents the 
organic, particulate and biological UCZ recon-
tamination. 
Several “blanks” are tested to demonstrate that 
the integrated Mars sample pathway contains 
“no biological” and “no organic” terrestrial 
contamination which could impact the test re-
sults when searching for life on Mars. 
PLANETARY PROTECTION REQUIRE-
MENTS VERIFICATION 
The verification of the PP requirements is pro-
gressively controlled by the issue of Verifica-
tion Control Documents (VCDs) that are con-
tinuously updated up to the end of the program. 
For each PP requirement the verification meth-
ods at the applicable level are indicated. The 
verification methods might be satisfied by test, 
analysis, inspection, review of design or a 
combination of multiple of verification tech-
niques. In general: 
1. Probability of impact requirements are 
verified by analysis; 
2. Bioburden requirements are verified by 
test and analysis; 
3. Mars samples’ contamination require-
ments are verified by test and analysis. 
LAUNCH CAMPAIGN RECONTAMINATION 
ON THE GROUND AND AT LAUNCH 
During the launch activities on the ground, the 
surface bioburden particulate and organic re-
contamination has to be monitored, including 
the period during which the SCC is encapsu-
lated into the Payload Fairing (PLF) up to 
launch. The recontamination values obtained 
during the bioburden particulate and organic 
monitoring are included in the respective con-
tamination budgets. 
After the SCC encapsulation into the PLF, the 
PLF is connected to the thermal control units 
of the train (during transport) and launch pad. 
Evolution of the bioburden contamination into 
both the PLF and the DM is computed by anal-
ysis in order to evaluate the recontamination of 
the DM internal exposed surfaces. 
The bioburden recontamination due to the 
acoustic environment at launch is evaluated by 
making a direct proportion between the area of 
the rear jacket valves and the area of the 
hatches of the fairing. The recontamination due 
to transfer effects from the fairing to the rear 
jacket during the launch is estimated by dedi-
cated analysis. 
All the obtained recontamination values are in-
cluded in the final SCC bioburden budget. 
PLANETARY PROTECTION DOCUMENTA-
TION 
The required Planetary Protection documenta-
tion with indication of the related reviews is 
listed in Table 13. The procedures of the re-
lated reviews contain the complete list of the 
Planetary Protection documents to be delivered 
in the respective review. This list can be up-
dated following the program evolution. 
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THINGS TO REMEMBER 
 It is fundamental to provide PP training 
courses for all the project team at the earli-
est phase of the project, especially to the 
subsystem engineers, before the selection 
of the subcontractors and before the defini-
tion of the flight H/W materials and design. 
 The lessons learned coming from previous 
projects with similar PP categorization 
must be taken into account. 
 The Prime PP requirement specification 
should be placed at the same level of sys-
tem specification as normative documents 
to flow down the PP requirements to the 
low level specifications. 
 An accurate evaluation of the PP Imple-
mentation costs should be made from the 
beginning of the project. 
 Time-intensive activities such as hardware 
cleaning, microbial assays and sterilization 
process should be included in the AIT 
schedule to avoid schedule criticalities in 
the AIT and Launch Operations plans. 
 As PP is an interdisciplinary competence, 
it is needed to ensure a good communica-
tion and effective relationships between the 
PP team and the project manager, engi-
neers, ATLO personnel, laboratories per-
sonnel and subcontractors. 
 
Documentation Draft Final PPO Approval/Review 
Planetary Protection Implementation Requirements - SRR A 
Planetary Protection Plan SRR PDR A 
Planetary Protection Implementation Plan PDR CDR A 
Pre-Launch Planetary Protection Report FAR FRR R 
Post-Launch Planetary Protection Report  As required R 
End-of-Mission Planetary Protection Report  As required R 
Organic Material Inventory CDR FRR R 
Table 13 – Planetary Protection documentation (see abbreviations in Glossary). 
 
 
  
 CASE STUDIES   
The International Planetary Protection Handbook 
90 
PAYLOAD CASE STUDY28 
This section describes the planetary protection 
activities undertaken prior and during the as-
sembly and test of the DREAMS instrument on 
board of ExoMars Entry Descent Module 
(EDM) launched in 2016. 
PAYLOAD OBJECTIVES 
DREAMS is the autonomous surface payload 
package accommodated on the ExoMars EDM 
launched in 2016. It is a meteorological station 
with the additional capability to perform meas-
urements of the electric fields close to the sur-
face of Mars. 
DREAMS scientific objectives are: 
 Meteorological measurements by monitor-
ing pressure, temperature, wind speed and 
direction, humidity and dust opacity during 
a Martian sol (10 measurements during 
daytime and 2 at night) at the landing site. 
 Characterization of the Martian boundary 
layer in dusty conditions. 
 Hazard monitoring by providing a compre-
hensive dataset to help engineers to quan-
tify hazards for equipment and human 
crew: velocity of windblown dust, electro-
static charging, existence of discharges, 
and electromagnetic (EM) noise poten-
tially affecting communications. 
 The first ever investigation of atmospheric 
electric phenomena on Mars. 
The DREAMS package included the following 
subsystems: 
 DREAMS-H (humidity sensor) 
 DREAMS-P (pressure sensor) 
 MarsTem (thermometer) 
 MetWind (wind sensor) 
 MicroARES (electric probe) 
 SIS (Solar Irradiance Spectrometer) 
 CEU (Central Electronic Unit) 
 Battery 
                                                 
28 By John Brucato, INAF. 
PLANETARY PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS 
Being part of a Category IVb mission, 
DREAMS was subject to PP requirements 
from the top level of the mission. 
DREAMS subunits were assembled in an ISO 
7 cleanroom environment. Common contami-
nants found in the cleanroom were generated 
from four basic sources: the facility, people, 
tools, and products. Areas adjacent to the 
cleanroom were less clean than the cleanroom; 
material airlock and clothing-change areas 
were contaminated by the activities going on in 
these areas, and the contaminations in the out-
side corridors and service plenums were not 
controlled. The air supplied to the cleanroom, 
if not correctly filtered, was a source of con-
tamination. The floor, walls, ceiling and other 
surfaces in the cleanroom were surface 
sources, their contamination being mostly de-
rived from personnel touching them or depos-
iting their contamination through the air. These 
surfaces were also sources of contamination if 
poor quality constructional components were 
used, which break up and disperse fibers, wood 
chips, plaster, etc. Cleanroom clothing, gloves 
and masks are other surfaces that are contami-
nated either by the people wearing them or by 
contact with other cleanroom surfaces. Person-
nel within the cleanroom can disperse contam-
ination from their skin, mouth and clothing. 
This contamination can be transferred to the 
sample through the air, or by contact with their 
hands or clothing. Machines are another 
source, as they can generate contamination by 
the movement of their constituent parts, or by 
generation by thermal, electrical or other 
means. Raw materials, sample containers and 
packaging that were brought in, or piped into 
the DREAMS cleanroom, could have been 
contaminated and were considered sources. 
BIOBURDEN ESTIMATION 
The best estimates of bioburden on DREAMS 
were based on estimated free and enclosed sur-
face areas, mated surfaces, and encapsulated 
non-metallic volumes of structures and compo-
nents. Estimates of bioburden levels assumed 
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that all hardware undergoes microbial reduc-
tion procedures. Procedures for preparing 
standard swab assay will follow those reported 
in ECSS-Q-ST-70-55C. According to Exo-
Mars top levels requirements, the payload shall 
have a cleanliness level of 300 spores/m² for 
external general surfaces (i.e., defined as non-
sensitive) at delivery for integration onto the 
EDM. 
Determination of microbial burden allocations 
for the hardware required detailed dimensions 
and specifications of all components and sub-
systems making up DREAMS. Enclosed sur-
faces, exposed surfaces, enclosed volumes and 
encapsulated volumes were determined for 
each component. Mated surfaces were not tal-
lied and a conservative assumption of the total 
mated area of DREAMS hardware was as-
sumed, and accounted for as free surface 
spores. 
Surface bioburden depends on the class of the 
clean room in which the subsystem is assem-
bled. 
MEETING THE PP REQUIREMENTS 
The determination of colony forming units 
(CFU) after the plating of cultivable microor-
ganisms from surfaces and from the air was 
made according to ESA ExoMars tailored bio-
burden assay procedures from ECSS-Q-ST-
70-55C. All air samples were analyzed accord-
ing to the ESA standard air sampling (no heat 
shock). The cleanroom temperature was 
24 ± 2°C and a positive pressure differential 
was maintained between the cleanroom and the 
outside. The relative humidity was 45 ± 10 %. 
For each surface, the number of samples to be 
taken was calculated as: 
#samples = √[Atot(cm2)/25(cm2)] 
Swab assay 
A sufficient number of sterile dry swabs (Co-
pan FLOQSwab, 552C), 2 ml Eppendorf tubes, 
sterile 15 ml Falcon tubes, and 500 ml glass 
bottles were prepared. We autoclaved the Ep-
pendorf tubes, and the water in the 500 ml glass 
bottles. Aseptically (i.e., in laminar flow cabi-
net) we pipetted 1 ml of sterile water into each 
sterile Eppendorf tube and 2.5 ml of sterile wa-
ter into each sterile Falcon tube. 
In the cleanroom a sterile swab was removed 
from its container and the head of the swab was 
moistened using the sterile water in the sterile 
Eppendorf tube. Excess moisture from the 
swab was expressed against the interior wall of 
the tube. 
The swab was held so that the handle made 
about a 30° angle with the surface to be sam-
pled. While moving the swab in one direction, 
we rotated the head of the swab slowly and 
thoroughly over a measured 25 cm2 surface 
area. The linear direction of the swabbing mo-
tion 90° was changed and again the surface 
swabbed thoroughly. We completed a third 
coverage of the surface by again changing the 
direction of the swabbing motion by 135°. 
The swab was put in a sterile Falcon tube con-
taining 2.5 ml sterile water, we broke the swab 
shaft at the breakpoint, and closed the Falcon 
tube for further processing. 
Transport and storage 
Samples were transported to the laboratory, 
stored at 4-8°C and processed within 24 hours. 
Extraction 
Each Falcon tube containing the water and the 
swab was placed on a vortex mixer and vortex 
at maximum power for 5-6 seconds. 
Each Falcon tube containing the water and the 
swab was then placed in an ultrasonic bath 
making sure the liquid level in the bath is 
above the fluid level in the tubes and sonicated 
for 120 ± 5 seconds with a power of 240 W and 
a frequency of 35 kHz. 
Heat shock 
The Falcon tube containing the vortexed and 
sonicated swab was placed in a water bath at 
80±2°C for 15 minutes, as determined by a pi-
lot tube containing a thermometer. We made 
sure the liquid level in the water bath is above 
the fluid level in the tube. 
After heat shock, we cooled the Falcon tube 
rapidly to bring the contents to 30-35°C. The 
entire plating procedure requires more than 10 
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minutes, thus the heat shocked tube shall be 
placed in an ice bath for no longer than 45 
minutes prior to plating. 
Plating 
Each Falcon tube containing the water and the 
swab was placed on a vortex mixer and vor-
texed at maximum power for 2 seconds. Asep-
tically (i.e., in laminar flow cabinet) we pipet-
ted 0.5 ml aliquots onto the surface of 4 R2A 
Petri plates. 
We used a sterile spreader to spread the dilu-
tion over the surface as evenly as possible and 
allowed the moisture to be absorbed into the 
agar before incubation. 
Incubation 
Plates were incubated at 32 ± 1°C. 
Counting 
We examined the plates at 24 and 48 hours. If 
colonies were visible by eye, we counted and 
recorded data. We examined and recorded final 
colony counts at 72 hours. We did not remove 
the Petri plate covers until the final 72-hour 
count was made. 
Controls 
For each ten or fewer samples collected, we 
also collected a 'field negative’ control, at least 
3 per day. In the cleanroom, we removed the 
sterile swab from its container and moistened 
the head of the swab using the sterile water in 
the sterile Eppendorf tube. Excess moisture 
from the swab was expressed against the inte-
rior wall of the tube. 
We waved the moistened swab through the air 
for 2 to 4 seconds and put the swab in a sterile 
Falcon tube containing 2.5 ml sterile water, 
broke the swab shaft at the breakpoint, and 
closed the Falcon tube for further processing. 
In the lab, we created at least two ‘lab negative 
controls’. In the laminar flow cabinet, we re-
moved the sterile swab from its container and 
moistened the head of the swab using the ster-
ile water in the sterile Eppendorf tube. Excess 
moisture was expressed from the swab against 
the interior wall of the tube. 
We put the swab in a sterile Falcon tube con-
taining 2.5 ml sterile water, broke the swab 
shaft at the breakpoint, and closed the Falcon 
tube for further processing. 
We analyzed the controls in the same way as 
the samples described above. 
Some examples of corresponding areas of 
DREAMS (in blue) sampled are reported in 
Figure 48 and Figure 49. 
 
Figure 48 – Area in blue represents an example of how to re-
port places where swab sampling was executed.
 
Figure 49 – Area in blue represents an example of how to re-
port places where swab sampling was executed. 
VERIFYING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS ARE 
MET 
The Dry Heat Microbial Reduction was per-
formed on DREAMS in the thermo-vacuum 
chamber equipped with twelve Pt100 tempera-
ture sensors to monitor the effective tempera-
ture at different chamber locations. Tempera-
ture was maintained at 115°C for 9 hours. 
After thermo-vacuum tests, DREAMS were 
swab sampled to control the final bioload. To-
tal counting of zero spores were measured and 
according to zero total case, a total bioload of 
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53 CFU were statistically accounted on the 
DREAMS flight model. 
DREAMS after bioburden reduction, showed 
average bioburden density less than 300 bacte-
rial spores/m2 on exposed surfaces. Having 
measured the bioload to be well below the 
Planetary Protection Implementation Require-
ment levels, the flight hardware was delivered 
to TAS-F under supervision of ASI in double 
barriers to preserve its sterility and bioburden 
allocation during shipping. Reports were pre-
pared and approved by the Planetary Protec-
tion Manager and authorized by the PPO. 
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CASE STUDY FOR PLANETARY 
PROTECTION CATEGORY V – UN-
RESTRICTED EARTH RETURN: 
HAYABUSA-1 & 229 
The main characteristics of the Hayabusa-1 
and 2 missions are described in Table 14. 
The Hayabusa-2 mission successfully reached 
its target, i.e., asteroid Ryugu, arriving at 20 
km altitude from the asteroid surface on June 
27, 2018 (Figure 50). The first rover deploy-
ment occurred in September and October and 
the first samples were grabbed in February 
2019, before the probe starts its one-year long 
journey back to Earth in December 2019. 
 
Figure 50 – Asteroid Ryugu as seen by Hayabusa-2 on 30 
June 2018 (Credit: JAXA). 
 
Table 14 – Main characteristics of the Hayabusa-1 and 2 missions. 
PLANETARY PROTECTION CATEGORY V 
DESCRIPTION 
The COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy30 
(Table 15) describes Category V as follows: 
“Category V missions comprise all Earth-
return missions. The concern for these mis-
sions is the protection of the terrestrial system, 
the Earth and the Moon. (The Moon must be 
protected from back contamination to retain 
freedom from planetary protection require-
ments on Earth-Moon travel). 
                                                 
29 By Hajime Yano and Toshi Chujo, JAXA/ISAS. 
For solar system bodies deemed by scientific 
opinion to have no indigenous life forms, a 
subcategory “unrestricted Earth return” 
(UER) is defined. Missions in this subcate-
gory have planetary protection requirements 
on the outbound phase only, corresponding to 
the category of that phase (typically Category 
I or II). 
For all other Category V missions, in a subcat-
egory defined as “restricted Earth return” 
(RER), the highest degree of concern is ex-
30 Published in Space Research Today, COSPAR's in-
formation bulletin, Number 200, December 2017. 
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pressed by the absolute prohibition of de-
structive impact upon return, the need for 
containment throughout the return phase of 
all returned hardware which directly con-
tacted the target body or unsterilized material 
from the body, and the need for containment of 
any unsterilized sample collected and returned 
to Earth. 
Post-mission, there is a need to conduct timely 
analyses of any unsterilized sample collected 
and returned to Earth, under strict containment, 
and using the most sensitive techniques. If any 
sign of the existence of a non-terrestrial rep-
licating entity is found, the returned sample 
must remain contained unless treated by an 
effective sterilizing procedure. 
Category V concerns are reflected in require-
ments that encompass those of Category IV 
plus a continuing monitoring of project ac-
tivities, studies and research (i.e., in steriliza-
tion procedures and containment techniques).” 
All sample return missions to the Earth-Moon 
system should be sub-divided into restricted 
and unrestricted Earth return, depending upon 
the confidence degree of terrestrial biosphere 
contaminations by these samples. 
 
 
Table 15 – COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy: Restricted Earth return vs. Unrestricted Earth return (Kminek et al., 2017). 
REQUIREMENTS FOR CASE STUDY 
According to the 1998 report of the US Na-
tional Research Council’s Space Studies Board 
entitled “Evaluating the Biological Potential in 
Samples Returned from Planetary Satellites 
and Small Solar System Bodies: Framework 
for Decision Making” (SSB, 1998), parameters 
relevant to assessing the potential for the pres-
ence of a biological entity in returned samples 
should be considered as follows: 
 Liquid water: Liquid water may safely be 
considered a requirement for life on small 
solar system bodies, because the chemistry 
on which life is based must take place in 
solution, and there is no other plausible sol-
vent. 
 Energy sources: A source of energy to 
support the origin and continuation of life 
in any environment is a thermodynamic ne-
cessity. For the extraterrestrial environ-
ment, the energy sources are both geo-
chemical and photosynthetic. 
 Organic compound: Chemical building 
blocks for organic polymers must be avail-
able. 
 Temperature: The temperature limits for 
the survival of metabolically active cells 
(160°C) at 1 atm are likely to apply to ex-
traterrestrial organisms also unless their bi-
ochemistry does not depend on the for-
mation of amide, ester or phosphodiester 
bonds. 
 Radiation intensity: Extraterrestrial bi-
opolymers are unlikely to differ greatly 
from terrestrial biopolymers with respect to 
radiation sensitivity. 
 Comparison to natural influx to Earth: 
Earth receives natural influx of extraterres-
trial material, mainly in the form of cosmic 
dust. Some materials may be delivered in 
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ways that shield it from sterilizing temper-
atures or radiation. 
CATEGORY V DESCRIPTION IN THE CASE OF 
SAMPLE RETURN MISSIONS FROM SMALL 
SOLAR SYSTEM BODIES 
Determination as to whether a mission is clas-
sified “Restricted Earth return” or not shall be 
undertaken with respect to the best multidisci-
plinary scientific advice, using the framework 
presented in (SSB, 1998). 
Specifically, such a determination shall ad-
dress the following six questions for each body 
intended to be sampled: 
1. Does the preponderance of scientific evi-
dence indicate that there was never liquid wa-
ter in or on the target body? 
2. Does the preponderance of scientific evi-
dence indicate that metabolically useful energy 
sources were never present? 
3. Does the preponderance of scientific evi-
dence indicate that there was never sufficient 
organic matter (or CO2 or carbonates and an 
appropriate source of reducing equivalents) in 
or on the target body to support life? 
4. Does the preponderance of scientific evi-
dence indicate that subsequent to the disap-
pearance of liquid water, the target body has 
been subjected to extreme temperatures (i.e., 
> 160°C)? 
5. Does the preponderance of scientific evi-
dence indicate that there is or was sufficient ra-
diation for biological sterilization of terrestrial 
life forms? 
6. Does the preponderance of scientific evi-
dence indicate that there has been a natural in-
flux to Earth, e.g., via meteorites, of material 
equivalent to a sample returned from the target 
body? 
For containment procedures to be necessary 
(“Restricted Earth return”), an answer of “no” 
or “uncertain” needs to be returned to all six 
questions. 
For missions determined to be Category V, 
“Restricted Earth return,” the following re-
quirements shall be met: 
 Unless specifically exempted, the out-
bound leg of the mission shall meet con-
tamination control requirements to avoid 
“false positive” indications in a life-detec-
tion and hazard-determination protocol, or 
in any search for life in the sample after it 
is returned. A “false positive” could pre-
vent distribution of the sample from con-
tainment and could lead to unnecessary in-
creased rigor in the requirements for all 
later missions to that body. 
 Unless the samples to be returned are sub-
jected to an accepted and approved sterili-
zation process, the canister(s) holding the 
samples shall be closed, with an appropri-
ate verification process, and the samples 
shall remain contained during all mission 
phases through transport to a receiving fa-
cility where it (they) can be opened under 
containment. 
 The mission and the spacecraft design must 
provide a method to “break the chain of 
contact” with the small body. No uncon-
tained hardware that contacted the body, 
directly or indirectly, shall be returned to 
Earth. Isolation of such hardware from the 
body’s environment shall be provided dur-
ing sample container loading into the con-
tainment system, launch from the body, 
and any in-flight transfer operations re-
quired by the mission. 
 Reviews and approval of the continuation 
of the flight mission shall be required at 
three stages: 1) prior to launch from Earth; 
2) prior to leaving the body or its environ-
ment for return to Earth; and 3) prior to 
commitment to Earth re-entry. 
For unsterilized samples returned to Earth, a 
program of life detection and biohazard test-
ing, or a proven sterilization process, shall be 
undertaken as an absolute precondition for the 
controlled distribution of any portion of the 
sample (SSB, 1998). 
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1 Evaluation on case by case basis. 
2 Samples from the outer 10 meter. 
3 Samples from the same parent bodies of this group. 
4 Limitation of available data led to a conservative assessment => need for containment 
Table 16 – Amended by COSPAR (March 2005) adapted from the Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Evaluating the 
biological potential in samples returned from Planetary Satellites and small Solar System Bodies, Task Group on Sample Return from 
small Solar System Bodies, National Academy of Science, Washington, D.C., 1998. 
Table 16 summarizes the Category V provi-
sions for small solar system bodies. 
Answers to the six questions mentioned above 
will now be reviewed in the case of Hayabusa. 
Question #1: Does the preponderance of sci-
entific evidence indicate that there was never 
liquid water in or on the target body? 
Answer #1: “UNCERTAIN”. Recent discov-
eries provide mounting evidence that there was 
water on and in main belt C-type asteroids. 
However, “liquid” cases for NEOs of the same 
type are less certain. 
 Aqueous alteration of primitive parent 
body material is well-known from carbona-
ceous chondrite samples in which it is 
likely that liquid water penetration ended 
billions of years ago. 
 Water ice and organic absorption signa-
tures have recently been reported for the 
surface of (24) Themis (C-type main belt 
asteroid). 
 The discovery of “main belt comets” raises 
the possibility of water presence inside co-
location of hydrated minerals and organic 
compounds are suggested for carbona-
ceous chondrites. 
 Dormancy period of hypothetic spores 
must be of the order of billions of years in 
a dry environment. 
Question #2: Does the preponderance of sci-
entific evidence indicate that metabolically 
useful energy sources were never present? 
Answer #2: “NO”. Primitive meteoritic mate-
rial could provide sufficient energy resources 
to potential life-forms. 
 Both photosynthetic and chemical pro-
cesses are considered at the near Earth 
space. 
 Chemical reduction-oxidation (red-ox) re-
actions are playing the key role 
 Mineralic components like phyllosilicates, 
sulfides, phosphates, carbonates, silicates 
provide nutrients like S, P, Ca, Mg, K, Fe, 
Cl, etc. 
 Mautner et al. (1997) reported that micro-
bial life and plants have been grown on 
Murchison extracts. 
Question #3: Does the preponderance of sci-
entific evidence indicate that there was never 
sufficient organic matter (or CO2 or carbonates 
and an appropriate source of reducing equiva-
lents) in or on the target body to support life? 
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Answer #3: “NO”. Carbonaceous meteorites 
contain organic material to support the growth 
of organisms. 
 Primitive meteoritic material usually con-
tains a “few” percent of carbon 
 Carbon phases are ubiquitous in primitive 
meteorites 
 Tagish Lake meteorites have up to 5% or-
ganic content (D/T-type?) 
 Callahan et al. of NASA/GSFC (2011) re-
ported that some nucleobases such as DNA 
blocks (Adenine, Guanine) and nucleo-
bases analogs were extracted from Antarc-
tic meteorites 
 Organic inventory makes them scientifi-
cally interesting 
Question #4: Does the preponderance of sci-
entific evidence indicate that subsequent to the 
disappearance of liquid water, the target body 
has been subjected to extreme temperatures 
(i.e., > 160°C)? 
Answer #4: “NO” for most pristine materials 
such as 1999 JU3 perihelion do not exceed the 
recommended temperature on their surface. 
“YES” for local heat maximums like impact 
craters. 
 Usually in meteorites there is no evidence 
that this temperature has been exceeded 
significantly. 
 Surface temperatures usually do not exceed 
130°C in NEO orbits, unless very close 
perihelion (e.g., 1989 UQ @ 0.67 AU 
> 200° C). 
 Impact processes create very local extreme 
temperatures. 
Question #5: Does the preponderance of sci-
entific evidence indicate that there is or was 
sufficient radiation for biological sterilization 
of terrestrial life-forms? 
Answer #5: “YES”. Given the extremely long 
exposure time with slow turnover rate, a steri-
lization of the top surface is assumed. Also 
sub-surface materials for both monolithic bed-
rock and regolith layers to be excavated by ar-
tificial cratering are assumed to be sterilized by 
galactic cosmic rays and radionuclides con-
tained in the carbonaceous chondritic interior 
of the target body. 
This question deserves more discussion in the 
case of Hayabusa-2, which involves two sam-
pling sequences: 
 (1) Surface Sampling, the same as for 
Hayabusa-1 
• Safe area (no boulders of spacecraft size 
in the landing ellipse) 
• Choosing the sites for both scientific 
and operational merits 
• Up to two different locations 
• Impact sampling by projectiles 
In this case, sterilization is sufficient by solar 
UV radiation, vacuum, and other space param-
eters, as illustrated in Figure 51. 
 
Figure 51 – Tens of seconds of exposure to extraterrestrial 
solar UV radiation in space killed 99% of bacterial spores 
(Experiment on Spacelab 1: B. subtilis spores) (After Hor-
neck G. et al., MMBR, 2010). 
 (2) Sub-surface sampling to be attempted a 
few weeks after SCI crater formation 
• If the new fresh crater is identified 
• If temporal dust torus settled down to be 
safe 
• If the vicinity of the artificial crater 
meets landing safety requirement 
• Only once, either inside or just outside 
of the crater 
• Total mass is at a range of > 100 mg 
In this case, the sterilization process must be 
examined as a function of time and depth. 
The deepest depth estimate of the artificial 
crater on regolith layers is ~200 cm and sam-
pling attempt will be taking place a few weeks 
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after the crater formation (UV sterilization is in 
effect to some degree). 
Sub-surface sterilization processes assessment 
results in the following conclusions: 
 (1) Sub-surface Temperature level 
• Heat sterilization of indigenous life in 
200 cm depth sub-surface of 1999 JU3 
does not seem likely. 
 (2) Penetration of GCR, with gardening ef-
fect 
• Gardening depth and time in the local 
area are unknown; yet Itokawa proved 
granular convection on the sub-km as-
teroid and its samples experienced 
< 8 Myr GCR exposure. The ~200 cm-
deep crater floor of 1999 JU3 regolith 
layers may be at the marginal depth of 
shield limit to protect indigenous life in 
< 1.1 Myr (Mileikowsky et al., 2000) or 
in > 10 Myr (Clark et al., 1999) with an 
uncertainty. 
 (3) Radionuclide exposure inside carbona-
ceous chondrite composition 
• Carbonaceous chondrites contain a 
number of long-lived radionuclides and 
Ryugu’s aqueous alteration occurred in-
side the parent body of 1999 JU3 right 
after its accretion at ~4.5-3.5 Ga. It is 
long enough to provide sufficient dos-
age to kill indigenous life by the present 
time. 
Question #6: Does the preponderance of sci-
entific evidence indicate that there has been a 
natural influx to Earth e.g., via meteorites, of 
material equivalent to a sample returned from 
the target body? 
Answer #6: “YES”. With variations over time, 
asteroidal (and certainly NEO) material includ-
ing carbonaceous chondrites and micrometeor-
ites has been collected on the Earth in large 
quantities. 
 Spectral comparison to date considers car-
bonaceous chondrites as representative of 
C-type asteroids. 
 There are indications that certain materials 
are underrepresented in the world’s mete-
orite collection (e.g., brittle carbonaceous 
material). 
 Today’s incoming stream of meteoritic ma-
terial may not be representative and may 
vary over time. 
 For NEO, the material should have already 
arrived on Earth. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF REQUIREMENTS 
FOR CASE STUDY 
The Hayabusa-2 project was officially ap-
proved for the Japanese Fiscal Year 2011 (FY-
2011). In January 2012, the Space Activities 
Commission of the Government of Japan ap-
proved the Hayabusa-2 mission. The manufac-
turing of subsystems started in FY-2012. In 
May 2012, the NAC Planetary Protection Sub-
committee gave a presentation of Hayabusa-2. 
That same month, the COSPAR PPP Collo-
quium at Alpbach recommended the UER cat-
egorization. In July 2012, at the COSPAR Sci-
entific Assembly in Mysore (India), a PPP res-
olution was granted. 
From January to April 2013, the first interface 
tests took place. From October 2013 to Sep-
tember 2014, FM integration tests were carried 
out. In July 2014, at the COSPAR Scientific 
Assembly in Moscow (Russia), Mars impact 
probability was reported and accepted. In De-
cember 2014, the spacecraft was launched by 
H-IIA from the Tanegashima Space Center. 
In December 2015, Hayabusa-2 was subject to 
Earth gravity assist. Arrival to target asteroid 
Ryugu occurred in June 2018. In October 
2018, the first rover deployment and the first 
sampling were made. Departure from Ryugu 
will be in December 2019. In December 2020, 
Hayabusa-2 will return to Earth and land at 
Woomera, Australia with asteroid samples. 
The implementation of requirements pertain-
ing to orbital analysis for impact probability on 
Mars has been dealt with in the section about 
Orbital Dynamics and Impact Probability 
Analysis. 
 CASE STUDIES   
The International Planetary Protection Handbook 
100 
THINGS TO REMEMBER 
 All sample return missions regardless of 
the target body are in Category V. 
 Category V comprises two sub-categories: 
Restricted and Unrestricted Earth Returns 
(RER & UER). 
 RER targets such as Mars, Europa, and En-
celadus must be scientifically prepared for 
the protection of both (potential) bio-
spheres in outbound and inbound legs. 
 Being categorized as a Category V mission 
to solar system small bodies is determined 
on a case-by-case basis, using the best sci-
entific knowledge available at the time of 
the category proposal to COSPAR PPP. 
 In order to assess RER/UER categoriza-
tions, small body sample return missions 
must go through the six question series. 
 If UER Category V is granted by CO-
SPAR, no further range of requirements is 
requested, except regular mission progress 
reports for all, and Mars impact probability 
analysis for those missions having a poten-
tial to go beyond the Martian orbit. 
 Mission design and spacecraft systems 
may be affected by PPP categorization. Act 
early to propose COSPAR PPP categoriza-
tion and get approved prior to finalizing the 
mission scenario and design. 
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Chapter 3. Lessons Learned – How to comply with Planetary Pro-
tection Standards31 
The Lessons Learned chapter highlights the most common mistakes and failures occurring during the 
implementation of planetary protection requirements and how to avoid them by understandings the 
“do’s and don’ts” in Planetary Protection. This chapter results from a set of interviews of International 
planetary protection experts from both the public and private sectors who shared their experience on 
the most common problems, consequences and possible solutions when implementing Planetary Pro-
tection requirements. 
The list of missions/instruments reported on in this chapter includes: Pioneer, Mariner, Viking, Mars 
Pathfinder (MPF), Mars Exploration Rover, Beagle 2, Europa Orbiter, Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter 
(MRO), Mars Science Laboratory (MSL), Juno, InSight, ExoMars 2016/2020, MOMA and 
DREAMS. 
COMMON PROBLEMS IN THE 
CHAIN OF COMMAND (MANAGE-
MENT/COORDINATION) 
PROBLEM 1: AN UNCLEAR CHAIN OF COM-
MAND WITH PART OF THE CHAIN LEFT WITH-
OUT A LINK TO THE PLANETARY PROTECTION 
OFFICER 
Consequence: Leads to difficulties in meeting 
PP requirements. 
Solution: Clarifying PP related staffers’ re-
sponsibilities throughout the project and or-
ganize the team so that one of the PP staffers 
(either the PPO, or someone from the project 
or mission or PP team) acts as a link at all 
stages of PP management, setting in with the 
PPO, the PP team, the contractors and sub-con-
tractors, helping the easy circulation of infor-
mation and updates along the project. For Cat-
egory IV, especially IVb, IVc and V-restricted 
Earth Return, the PPO should be considered an 
embedded member of the project PP team and 
has to be provided with information related to 
critical spacecraft operations on the planetary 
surface that may affect PP compliance and/or 
interests. 
PROBLEM 2: PLANETARY PROTECTION 
RELEVANT PERSONNEL ARE NOT INCLUDED 
AT KEY ORGANIZATIONAL PROJECT MEET-
INGS 
Consequence: Creates conflicts at all levels 
between scientists, engineers, technicians, and 
                                                 
31 By Alissa J. Haddaji, COSPAR. 
management and difficulties in following com-
pliance with PP requirements. 
Solution: Planning an early on meeting with 
all PP-related personnel involved at all levels 
of the chain of command ((PPO; Program man-
agement; project management; engineers; con-
tamination control personnel and project PP 
team) to coordinate PP efforts throughout the 
project and secure strong, clear and positive 
working relationships. 
PROBLEM 3: LACK OF PP SUPERVISION 
ALONG THE ENTIRE PROJECT 
Consequence: Miscommunication and diffi-
culties in handling contingencies. 
Solution: Planning regular meetings between 
the PPO, the Program management, the Project 
Management and the head of the PP team. 
Should be reviewed: a) The documentation 
concerning hardware requiring high levels of 
bioburden control; b) The schedule for the var-
ious PP trainings that must be put into place for 
the project staff; c) records for handling hard-
ware. 
PROBLEM 4: LACK OF LINKS BETWEEN 
THE DIFFERENT LEVELS MANAGING PP RE-
QUIREMENTS 
Consequence: Miscommunication leading to 
delays and difficulties in reaching PP require-
ments. 
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Solution: Having someone from the PP team 
as designated link with the PPO, Project team, 
Program management, engineering team and 
contamination control team, sitting in all re-
lated meetings, to ensure communication 
throughout the entire mission and avoid sur-
prises; communicate PP concerns; inform of 
PP requirements and follow up on the general 
PP status of the mission. For large projects, this 
designated link could also be in charge of man-
aging PP training for project personnel as well 
as review the documentation. For large pro-
jects, this is likely to be a full-time job. 
PROBLEM 5: OUT OF THE LOOP SUB-CON-
TRACTORS 
Consequence: Design flaws as the hardware 
and other parts can’t handle DHMR steriliza-
tion processing. 
Solution: Including sub-contractors in early 
project planning conversations/ invite them to 
PP project meetings, overseen by the PPO. 
This needs to be done in parallel to a Contam-
ination Control approach; sub-contractors 
should have to implement a CC plan. 
PROBLEM 6: LACK OF COORDINATION BE-
TWEEN PROJECT PP TEAM AND QA/QC 
STAFF 
Consequence: Difficulties in matching PP re-
quirements. 
Solution: Including QA/QC personnel in early 
PP Project meetings to facilitate awareness of 
handling constraints and additional scrutiny of 
hardware processing activities. 
PROBLEMS ON WHEN/HOW TO 
IMPLEMENT PLANETARY PRO-
TECTION REQUIREMENTS 
PROBLEM 7: GREAT VARIABILITY IN 
WHERE THE PP FUNCTION LAYS /RESIDES 
WITHIN A PROJECT 
Consequence: Difficulty in reaching PP re-
quirement compliance. 
Solution: Defining titles and PP responsibili-
ties better, at all levels (Space agency; project; 
contractor). 
PROBLEM 8: PLANETARY PROTECTION IS 
NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT DURING MISSION 
DESIGN 
Consequence: The selected material may not 
handle PP sterilization methods forcing to start 
material selection and hardware design over, 
costing money and creating severe delays to 
the entire project. 
Solution: Considering from the outset that PP 
affects mission design. It is consequently im-
portant to discuss hardware design and mate-
rial selection with the PPO at the beginning of 
the project. 
COMMON PROBLEMS DUE TO 
LACK OF TRAINING 
PROBLEM 9: A PROJECT MANAGER, MIS-
SION MANAGER OR EVEN PP TEAM LEAD WITH 
NO PREVIOUS SOLID PP TRAINING 
Consequence: Difficulties in understanding 
and therefore handling PP requirements at the 
right stage within the project, ultimately lead-
ing to failing to meet PP requirements. 
Solution: Peer training. A competent PP lead 
needs to have been the assistant of a competent 
PP lead in the past (general trainings are not 
enough in this case). If such competence is 
lacking, it is important for the PP staffer to fol-
low a more specific training, taught by past PP 
leads (as is currently the case through NASA 
and ESA Planetary Protection trainings). Ask 
your PPO how/when such training could be put 
into place. 
PROBLEM 10: NOT ENOUGH SPECIFIC 
TRAINING 
Consequence: PP is not properly taught at cer-
tain levels of the chain of command, leaving 
management staffers often with no deep com-
prehension of PP’s utility, while some sub-
contractors needing more hands-on training are 
sometimes only provided with theoretical 
courses. 
Solution: Creating a range of training adapted 
to the different ways PP is implemented 
throughout the project depending on the mis-
sion’s category ranking (ranging from leading 
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general trainings for management with incen-
tive on the historical role and fundamental pur-
pose of PP to trainings with a hands-on ap-
proach for engineers and designers). This prac-
tical training should be held where the plane-
tary protection requirements have to be applied 
to validate the consumables and procedures). 
PROBLEM 11: CONTRACTORS ARE NOT 
AWARE OF WHAT PP IS AND HOW IT MAY IN-
FLUENCE THEIR TASK 
Consequence: The PP manager will have to 
spend an important amount of time with con-
tractors to fix problems that could have been 
avoided. That time spent costs possibilities for 
the PP manager to link with other parts of pro-
ject teams that need him. The material used 
without taking into account PP requirement 
might also not handle sterilization methods 
such as DHMR and need to be re-designed. 
Solution: Plan on providing a formal PP train-
ing for the contractors involved in the space-
craft building phase. This way, the design and 
development of landers/rovers/hardware will 
take into account PP requirements from the 
very start, so the material will be able to resist 
required sterilization/decontamination temper-
atures. This can be planned with the help of the 
(PPO), the project manager and PP Lead at the 
start of the project, to help with material selec-
tion that could tolerate DHMR and other steri-
lization methods so as to fit PP requirements. 
BUDGET OVERRUNS 
PROBLEM 12: PROJECT FINANCIERS ARE 
NOT AWARE OF PP REQUIREMENTS 
Consequence: Mistakes when finalizing the 
cost, resource and AIT/ATLO plans. 
Solution: Early on in the project, teaching and 
training PP Financial and schedule aspects to 
project managers, supervisors and funding 
agencies. 
PROBLEM 13: DIFFICULTY IN ESTIMATING 
AN EXACT PP BUDGET, WITH CHALLENGES IN 
ACCOUNTING PERIPHERAL EXPENSES 
Consequence: If a clear PP budget is not set 
and funding is overrun during the course of the 
project, cuts may occur. They may entail, 
among others: lack of training, unsuited steri-
lization facilities etc. All of which will threaten 
compliance to PP requirements. 
Solution: The general consensus is to plan on 
acquiring one instrument to calculate the total 
project’s cost. 
PROBLEM 14: MASSIVELY UNDERESTI-
MATING SOME COSTS 
(ESPECIALLY THE COSTS OF OPERATING 
CLEANROOM AND GARMENTS, ADDITIONAL 
AND SPECIAL TOOLS AND LAB INSTRUMENTS, 
CONSUMABLES, PERSONNEL, ETC.) 
Consequence: Overrun budget due to the need 
for additional resources and workforce. 
Solution: Discussing PP cost for cleanrooms 
and material by establishing a clear PP budget 
with the PPO at the outset of the project. 
DELAYS 
PROBLEM 14: TIME FOR ANY CONTINGEN-
CIES IS NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN 
PLANNING THE PROJECT PP CALENDAR 
Consequence: Created over-time activities 
translated into over cost and delayed launch. 
Solution: Planning extra PP reviews time slots 
in the calendar for contingencies; warn person-
nel that they happen more often than not and 
need to be seriously taken into consideration. 
PROBLEM 15: STRONGLY UNDERESTIMAT-
ING WORKING TIME IN CLEANROOMS DUE TO 
THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF CLEANING/ASSEM-
BLY/ TESTING BUT ALSO TO STAFF BEHAVIOR 
Consequence: Delays and possible accidental 
recontamination. 
Solution: Plan working time in cleanrooms 
with the PPO. Necessity to scope the need for 
staff and insert in early PP calendar taking into 
consideration staff rotation (due to the risk of 
recontamination by clean room cleaning per-
sonnel). Staff need to adapt to the regulatory 
procedures within cleanrooms to ensure that no 
re-contamination occurs. 
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PROBLEM 16: UNDERESTIMATING THE 
PACKING OF HARDWARE DIFFICULTY FOR 
TRANSPORT AND TESTS 
Consequence: Delays. 
Solution: Taking into consideration the pack-
ing of hardware during the design phase. The 
PP lead should advise the sub-contractor on 
how to pack the hardware. 
PROBLEM 17: WHEN DESIGNS CHANGE, PP 
REQUIREMENTS MAY/WILL CHANGE 
Consequence: As PP needs to be set at the out-
set of the design chain, a change in the project 
could mean very costly changes, having to start 
over or re-design some of the PP procedures. 
Solution: Warning from the outset that some 
changes may happen or are being considered 
so that alternative PP procedures can be pre-
pared in advance and avoid over costs or de-
lays. 
COMMON ERRORS 
PROBLEM 18: OVERLAP/MISUNDERSTAND-
ING/INTERFERENCE BETWEEN PP AND CC RE-
QUIREMENTS 
Consequence: Leads to confusion between the 
two. 
Solution: Explaining the clear differences 
there are between PP and CC (possibly through 
cartoon-like sketches to visualize the differ-
ences) or grouping them under one caption 
such as “cleanliness”. Mixing all types of con-
taminants is all the more difficult as the meas-
urements techniques are really different; Par-
ticulate Contamination and Molecular Con-
tamination should, however, be treated to-
gether (their monitoring is often combined). 
PROBLEM 19: SHORT-STAFFED PP TEAMS 
(RIGHT AMOUNT NOT REQUESTED OR NOT AP-
PROVED BY PROJECT MANAGER) 
Consequence: Critical details go unchecked 
with staff missing critical meetings where they 
should have been informed of change in hard-
ware for example, entailing later on deficien-
cies in documentation and difficulties in reach-
ing PP requirements. 
Solution: Establishing with the project man-
ager and the PPO the appropriate number of 
staff needed for the embedded PP team. 
PROBLEM 20: WRONG CHOICE OF TEST FA-
CILITIES 
Consequence: Some of the test facilities 
(EMC, shock, vibration…) are not in a clean 
environment and require additional efforts to 
keep the hardware clean. 
Solution: Reviewing test facilities with the 
PPO at the beginning of the project. The pro-
ject manager needs to ensure that the needs re-
quested by the PP lead are matched in the con-
tracts about specifications procurements. An 
acceptance review is needed because some-
times, facilities cannot be cleaned up to the 
right cleanliness level. 
PROBLEM 21: WRONG SELECTION OF MA-
TERIAL 
Consequence: The material does not survive 
the ultra-cleaning process and either the mate-
rial or process has to be modified. 
Solution: Addressing the PP lead for selection 
of material. 
PROBLEM 22: TOO EARLY OR TOO LATE 
TRAINING PLANNING 
Consequence: Trainees who train too early 
have no clear recollection of how to operate 
well in the cleanroom. Same effect on trainees 
trained in a rush, or too late during the project. 
Likewise, no time was planned so that PP staff-
ers could adapt their behavior and get used to 
working in cleanrooms. 
Solution: Planning trainings early on with the 
PP Lead and the Project Manager Officer. 
PROBLEM 23: STAND-ALONE PLANETARY 
PROTECTION DOCUMENTATION 
Consequence: Difficulties in tracking the pro-
gress of PP requirement implementation 
throughout the project. 
Solution: PP documentation should be part of 
the overall project-level documentation. The 
PP lead should make sure that PP requirements 
are established and tracked within the project-
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level documentation throughout the entire pro-
ject. 
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Chapter 4. Planetary Protection Check List32 
The Check List chapter serves as a general summary of good practices and recommendations. 
 
PLANETARY PROTECTION 
CHECK LIST 
PLAN A FIRST MEETING WITH YOUR PPO 
DURING WHICH YOU WILL: 
1. Establish clear planetary protection 
roles and responsibilities. 
2. Designate dedicated and experi-
enced/trained PP staff at all levels 
(space agency, project and contrac-
tors). Discuss every PP staffer’s exact 
role and responsibilities throughout the 
project. Review the personnel compe-
tence, checking their previous involve-
ments assisting a competent PP lead. 
Considering their various levels of 
competence, plan for your staff to at-
tend mandatory PP training adequate to 
their knowledge and stages in the pro-
ject in which they will intervene. 
3. Discuss the various levels of training 
with various levels of specialization 
from manager to on deck staff, taking 
into account that some staffers will 
need time to adapt their behavior to 
strict cleanroom behavioral require-
ments. Do not forget to consider train-
ing your project contractors if they are 
involved in building elements on which 
PP requirements may apply. Thus, that 
material will be able to resist required 
sterilization/decontamination tempera-
tures. 
Training opportunities may include: 
 For managers: Planning mandatory train-
ings in order to teach PP financial and 
schedule aspects to project managers, su-
pervisors and funding agencies. 
 For sub-contractors: Planning mandatory 
hands-on application and implementation-
oriented trainings for sub-contractors. 
                                                 
32 By Alissa J. Haddaji, COSPAR. 
 Regular short repetition of all trainings in a 
small group (> 4) (e.g., every 2 years). 
 In case of mission delays leading to a sub-
stantial amount of hardware engineering 
personnel turnover, keep in mind it is im-
portant to train the new recruits on PP pro-
tocols. You will thus avoid new mistakes 
resulting in failure or problems to meet the 
PP requirements for launch approval. 
NEXT, PLAN AN EARLY PP MEETING WITH 
ALL AGENTS INVOLVED WITHIN THE MISSION 
PP meeting participants will include the PPO, 
program executive, program management, 
project management, program scientist, engi-
neers, contamination control personnel, project 
PP team and sub-contractors lead. 
DESIGNATE ONE PERSON PER PROJECT TO 
BE IN CHARGE OF ALL PP ISSUES AT EVERY 
STAGE OF THE PROJECT 
That person should be sitting in all PP related 
meetings with sub-contractors, program and 
mission management, the PPO, the Project 
team, engineering team, QA/QC personnel and 
contamination control team. That person will 
ensure communication throughout the entire 
mission, avoid surprises, communicate PP con-
cerns, inform of PP requirements and follow 
up on the general PP status of the mission. For 
large projects, this designated link could also 
be in charge of managing PP trainings for pro-
ject personnel as well as reviewing PP docu-
mentation. For large projects, this is likely to 
be a full time job. 
DISCUSS TECHNICAL ASPECTS SUCH AS: 
 Material selection and hardware design so 
it can tolerate PP sampling and DHMR and 
match PP temperature compliances, i.e., re-
sisting required sterilization/decontamina-
tion temperatures. 
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 Cleanroom environment and protocols 
(procedure, personnel, monitoring plan) 
and flowchart for sampling plan at various 
locations inside the cleanroom. 
DISCUSS THE PP BUDGET 
The PP budget should take into consideration 
the needs in personnel, various levels of train-
ings and prices of selected sterilization facili-
ties and material. 
PLAN THE PP PROJECT SCHEDULE, FEA-
TURING: 
 Training dates. 
 Testing dates. 
 Regular meetings between the PPO, the 
program management, the project manage-
ment and the head of the PP team. 
 Reviews with the PPO to oversee imple-
mentation. 
 A date by which documentation needs to be 
filled out to match project deadlines. 
 A timeline taking into account sterilization 
process times (sterilization facilities need 
to be booked early). 
 An estimate working time in cleanrooms 
(discussed with locals); remember to plan 
for the 72-hr bioburden count. 
 PP reviews/progress meetings with the 
PPO in-between formal project reviews. 
 Extra PP reviews to avoid contingencies 
(PPO, Project manager). 
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT THERE WILL 
BE CONTINGENCIES 
Contingencies can be due to, among others, 
changes in hardware, or longer than expected 
bioburden controlled assembly and testing. 
This should be taken into consideration when 
preparing the staff’s PP calendar. It is therefore 
necessary to plan extra PP reviews time slots 
in the calendar and warn the staff, from the 
very start, that such contingencies are ex-
tremely frequent. 
DISCUSS POSSIBLE CHANGES 
Changes may occur, for instance redesigning 
hardware. Alternative PP procedures can be 
prepared in advance and will avoid overcosts 
or delays. 
 Discuss staffing and workforce. 
 Accommodate verification essays. 
FOR CATEGORY IV AND V MISSIONS 
 For all Category IV missions: schedule 
mandatory PP trainings for ATLO (Assem-
bly, Test and Launches Operations) per-
sonnel. 
 For Categories IVb and IVc missions: 
identify a fallback landing site compatible 
with a PP category IVa implementation 
that would satisfy a significant fraction of 
the science requirements. 
 For category IV, especially IV b, IVc and 
V-restricted Earth Return: the PPO shall be 
considered an embedded member of the 
project PP team and has to be provided 
with information related to critical space-
craft operations on the planetary surface 
that may affect PP compliance and/or inter-
ests. 
WORKING WITH YOUR PLANE-
TARY PROTECTION OFFICER 
When project includes PP constraints on scien-
tific operations, most managerial difficulties 
stem from the fact that PP relevant personnel 
are not included at key organizational meet-
ings, which may create conflict at all levels. 
Fruitful exchanges with the PPO lead to the 
better editing of deliverables and a better rep-
resentation of the areas that were sampled 
through the use of Computer Aided Design 
(CAD) technical tools, like on DREAMS. 
CONTACT YOUR PPO TO: 
 Discuss the budget: taking into considera-
tion needs in personnel (determine the suf-
ficient number of staffers needed for the 
embedded PP team working throughout the 
project), various levels of trainings and 
prices of selected sterilization facilities and 
material. 
 Plan different sorts of trainings (for man-
agers; supervisors; funding agencies; tech-
nicians; contractors etc.). 
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 Select facilities and plan individual tests 
(taking into consideration time and equip-
ment for re-contamination control during 
environmental testing). 
 Estimate necessary working time in clean-
rooms. 
 Integrate calibration into the dry heat steri-
lization process, as it can impact shipment 
and process sequence. 
 Review documentation and records con-
cerning handling hardware that require 
high levels of bioburden control 
CONTACT YOUR PPO FOR: 
 Observation of operations affecting PP 
compliance. 
 Verification essays. 
 Project meetings. 
 All “life detection” experiment meetings 
with the mission management. 
 Documentation reviews (PP documenta-
tion is to be considered as part of the over-
all project-level documentation system). 
 PP reviews & progress meetings in-be-
tween formal project reviews. 
 Launch and landing. 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Implementation of PP requirements should 
be accomplished as a system-level process, 
with PP requirements translated into appro-
priately flowed-down technical specifica-
tions. 
 If Planetary Protection affects mission de-
sign: 
• Typical compatibility problems with bi-
oburden assay or sterilization process 
approaches should be addressed as early 
as the design stage (discuss optical coat-
ings, thermal paints, and general CTE 
mismatch). 
• DHMR, bio sampling, cleaning compat-
ibility and the packing of hardware need 
to be design drivers. 
 PP requirements impact ATLO (assembly, 
integration and test) activities and material 
selection (because of DHMR) (ceramics 
vs. plastic, lubricants, glues, magnets, laser 
window…), especially for components 
with different expansion coefficients. 
 In case of secondary payload, good com-
munication between the secondary payload 
team and the launch vehicle providers is es-
sential to ensure that planetary protection 
requirements on the primary payload are 
not violated. 
 Put into place frequent and even informal 
communication to easily maintain PP ef-
forts along the project chain of manage-
ment. 
TO AVOID DELAYS: 
 Plan time for hot and dry sterilization pro-
cessing as well as the waiting time for the 
results on the cultures (24-72hrs). 
 Take into consideration that bioburden 
controlled assembly and testing takes sub-
stantially longer than originally planned. 
 Working time in cleanrooms is often un-
derestimated. Staffers will need time to get 
used to strict specific cleanroom behavioral 
requirements. Make sure you discuss those 
matters with your PPO early on, so that 
they will be taken into consideration when 
building the PP calendar. 
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Annexes 
 
This section provides some insight on how major space agencies including ESA, NASA and JAXA 
manage planetary protection for their planetary exploration missions. 
 
Planetary Protection at 
ESA33 
ESA PLANETARY PROTECTION 
POLICY 
RATIONALE FOR A POLICY 
 Based on Article II of the ESA Convention, 
the Agency is acting on behalf of its Mem-
ber States 
 Execution of activities and programs by 
ESA shall therefore be consistent with the 
Member States rights and obligations pur-
suant to international agreements, includ-
ing the UN Outer Space Treaty 
 The ESA Planetary Protection Policy is in-
tended as an essential tool for ensuring that 
necessary means are made available to 
avoid interplanetary contamination when 
the Agency is carrying out activities in 
outer space, mindful of Member States’ 
corresponding obligations 
MAIN POLICY STATEMENT 
 This “ESA Planetary Protection Policy”, 
complies with the COSPAR planetary pro-
tection policy and the corresponding im-
plementation guidelines 
 Spaceflight missions carried out with any 
degree of ESA involvement shall comply 
with this policy and its associated require-
ments 
AUTHORITY LEVEL 
 ESA Council, document reference 
ESA/C(2007)112 
 Any revision is subject to approval by the 
ESA Council 
                                                 
33 By Gerhard Kminek, ESA. 
ESA PLANETARY PROTECTION 
REQUIREMENTS 
ESA PLANETARY PROTECTION REQUIRE-
MENTS, ESSB-ST-U-001 
 In line with the COSPAR Planetary Protec-
tion Requirements 
Approved by the ESA Standardization Steer-
ing Board 
SCOPE OF THE DOCUMENT 
 The overall planetary protection manage-
ment requirements 
 The technical planetary protection require-
ments for robotic and human missions (for-
ward and backward contamination) 
 The planetary protection requirements re-
lated to procedures 
 The Document Requirement Descriptions 
(DRD) and their relation to the respective 
reviews 
APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCUMENT 
 ESA spaceflight missions 
 Contributions to ESA spaceflight missions 
 ESA contributions to non-ESA spaceflight 
missions 
ESA PLANETARY PROTECTION 
ORGANIZATION 
The ESA Planetary Protection Organization is 
described in Figure 52 below. 
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ESA PLANETARY PROTECTION 
RESPONSIBILITY 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 Establish, maintain and act as custodian of 
the ESA Planetary Protection Require-
ments; 
 Advise and support relevant ESA pro-
grammes and projects on matters of plane-
tary protection; 
 Approve planetary protection categoriza-
tion and requirements for flight projects; 
 Perform assessments including inspections 
and reviews of facilities, equipment, proce-
dures and practices as appropriate to ensure 
compliance with the planetary protection 
requirements; 
 Certify the planetary protection compli-
ance in the course of flight projects (part of 
launch certification). 
 
 
Figure 52 – Organization of Planetary Protection at ESA. 
 
PROJECT RESPONSIBILITY 
The Project Manager is responsible for the cor-
rect identification and implementation of the 
planetary protection requirements at project 
level. 
In particular, the Project Manager is responsi-
ble to: 
 Identify the planetary protection require-
ments specific to the project by tailoring 
this standard and relevant planetary protec-
tion standards in the list of ESA approved 
standards; 
 Define the planetary protection implemen-
tation and management approach; 
 Define the planetary protection responsi-
bilities within the project; 
 Prepare project-level planetary protection 
documentation; 
 Consider the implementation of the recom-
mendations of reviews with respect to 
planetary protection aspects. 
 
THINGS TO REMEMBER 
 ESA is compliant with the COSPAR Plan-
etary Protection Policy; 
 The corporate planetary Protection respon-
sibility is with the Product Assurance & 
Safety Department; 
 The responsibility to correctly implement 
the planetary protection requirements is 
with the Project Manager; 
 A range of standards are available to sup-
port the implementation of the planetary 
protection requirements. 
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Planetary Protection at 
NASA34 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
In the early days of the space age, even before 
the launch of Sputnik, scientists had expressed 
concern on how planetary exploration should 
be conducted, with respect to guarding against 
the threat of contamination. The timeline be-
low reflects the development of the issue, lead-
ing up to the appointment of the first planetary 
protection officer at NASA, Dr. L. Hall: 
 September 1956: International Astronauti-
cal Federation meets in Rome, discussing 
lunar and planetary contamination; 
  February 1958: International Council for 
Science (ICSU) forms committee on Con-
tamination by Extra-Terrestrial Explora-
tion (CETEX); 
  June 1958: National Academies of Science 
establishes the Space Studies Board; 
  July 1958: Formation of the US National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA); 
  October 1958: Formation of COSPAR by 
ICSU; 
  July 1958: Formation of UN-COPUOS 
(Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer 
Space); 
  1959-1962: Publication of guidelines by 
the US, USSR, COSPAR; 
  1963: NASA acquires the first ‘Planetary 
Quarantine Officer’ – on loan from the 
Public Health Service. 
ORGANIZATION OF PLANETARY 
PROTECTION WITHIN NASA 
Even from this early time, before the first 
Apollo launches had begun, the Space Science 
Board (predecessor to the Space Studies Board 
of the National Academies of Sciences) was 
providing advice to NASA on the conduct of 
the exploration of Mars. For example, that 
NASA should “Accord the highest priority to 
the prevention of the biological contamination 
of Mars until sufficient information has been 
obtained about possible life forms there so that 
further scientific studies will not be jeopard-
ized” was early advice to the new PPO from the 
Space Science Board in August 1963. 
It should be noted that this exhortation pre-
dates knowledge of Europa and Enceladus as 
bodies of significant interest with respect to 
chemical evolution/origin of life in the solar 
system, and in the context of this volume, they 
are now similarly regarded in how NASA plan-
etary protection policy treats different solar 
system targets. 
 
 
Figure 53 – Notional paths for information flow on planetary protection issues for NASA missions. 
It also pre-dates the 1967 Outer Space Treaty 
which, in the current timeframe, is the law of 
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the land in the USA with which NASA has to 
demonstrate compliance (Figure 53). NASA 
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also receives advice and recommendations 
from its own advisory council (NAC) of which 
the Planetary Protection Sub-committee has 
been the primary non-NASA reviewer of plan-
etary protection implementation practices for 
NASA missions. 
DOCUMENT HIERARCHY 
Within NASA is a document hierarchy for 
planetary protection, to ensure planetary pro-
tection compliance for NASA missions: 
1. NASA Planetary Protection Policy 
NPD8020.7: The highest level planetary pro-
tection document describing policy goals and 
authority (the “why” for planetary protection 
implementation). 
2. NASA Planetary Protection Procedural 
Requirements for Robotic Missions 
NPR8020.12: Is the requirements document, 
describing what is needed to demonstrate com-
pliance with Policy goals (the “what” for plan-
etary protection implementation). 
3. NASA Technical Standard for Plane-
tary Protection NASA-STD-6022 Protocols 
and specifications achieve compliance with 
Policy goals (the “how” for planetary protec-
tion implementation). 
IMPLEMENTATION HISTORY 
NASA’s previous missions show a history of 
implementation practice and development to 
achieve compliance with planetary protection 
policy. The Apollo missions developed a mon-
itoring and quarantine approach for crewed 
missions. The Viking mission developed a ter-
minal system-level sterilization approach that 
allowed landing a spacecraft on Mars with ac-
ceptably low risk of forward contamination. 
In contrast, the Galileo and Cassini missions to 
the Jovian and Saturnian systems, respectively, 
maintained their risk of contamination by im-
pact avoidance. 
MRO, as a result of uncertainties in the execu-
tion of its aerocapture maneuver, could not 
meet the required risk of contamination by im-
pact avoidance alone, and hence utilized bio-
burden control and post-launch break up and 
burn-up analyses to demonstrate that it would 
not cause harmful contamination on Mars. 
Similarly, the Juno mission could not maintain 
a 1 × 10-4 probability of avoidance of impact at 
Europa, hence the bioburden of that mission 
had to be managed, but addressing the biobur-
den reduction effects of the jovian radiation en-
vironment and the heating effects of a potential 
impact at Europa to demonstrate the avoidance 
of contamination at the required level. 
For future missions, NASA policy describes 
requirements for Icy Moons (From 
NPR8020.12D) as follows: “Requirements for 
flybys, orbiters, and landers to Icy Satellites, 
including microbial reduction, shall be applied 
in order to reduce the probability of inadvert-
ent contamination of an ocean or other liquid 
water body to less than 1 × 10-4 per mission. 
These requirements will be refined in future 
years, but the calculation of this probability 
should include a conservative estimate of 
poorly known parameters and address the fol-
lowing factors, at a minimum: 
 Bioburden at launch. 
 Cruise survival for contaminating organ-
isms. 
 Organism survival in the radiation envi-
ronment adjacent to the target. 
 Probability of encountering/landing on the 
target, including spacecraft reliability. 
 Probability of surviving landing/impact on 
the target. 
 Mechanisms and timescales of transport to 
the subsurface. 
 Organism survival and proliferation be-
fore, during, and after subsurface transfer. 
Preliminary calculations of the probability of 
contamination suggest that microbial reduc-
tion will likely be necessary for PP Category 
III orbiters as well as for PP Category IV 
landers. This will require the use of cleanroom 
technology, the cleanliness of all parts before 
assembly, and the monitoring of spacecraft as-
sembly facilities to understand the bioload and 
its microbial diversity, including specific prob-
lematic species. Specific methods should be de-
veloped to eradicate problematic species.” 
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In developing a general approach for missions 
to the Jovian system where impact avoidance 
alone is insufficient to achieve compliance, it 
is necessary to take into account the differen-
tial survival of different sub-populations of the 
bioburden. Following on from the recommen-
dations of the SSB report “Preventing the For-
ward Contamination of Europa”, the JIMO (Ju-
piter Icy Moons Orbiter) project and successor 
studies partitioned the spacecraft bioburden 
into four sub-population types, categorized as 
in Figure 54: 
 
Figure 54 – Spacecraft bioburden categories in the JIMO 
project and successor studies. 
These categories could then be assessed as four 
different disjoint groups, for accounting pur-
poses (Table 17). 
Finally, in the analysis, these groups could then 
be enumerated and recombined to give surviv-
ing bioburden as an input to the overall proba-
bility of contamination calculation (Figure 55). 
 
Table 17 – Groupings of bioburden types for bioburden ac-
counting purposes in JIMO and successor studies. 
 
Figure 55 – Bioburden accounting by bioburden type through 
a mission study timeline. 
In summary, NASA has maintained compli-
ance with the Outer Space Treaty by following 
COSPAR Policy. The NASA PPO levies re-
quirements on projects via usual project re-
quirements flow-down, then monitors compli-
ance. NASA receives independent advice and 
guidance to maintain up to date policies and 
practice. Projects interpret and implement re-
quirements, developing mission-specific (and 
sometimes novel) strategies to achieve compli-
ance at time of launch. 
 
  
Example – Not Project Data 
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Planetary protection man-
agement in JAXA35 
Until ~2003 in Japan there were two space 
agencies which could launch rockets: 
 The Institute of Space and Astronautical 
Science (ISAS) which was responsible for 
spacecraft for science. 
 The National Space Agency of Japan 
(NASDA) which was responsible for 
spacecraft utilization (broadcast, Earth ob-
servation, engineering tests). 
ISAS was established as an institute of Tokyo 
University. It was directly controlled by the 
Ministry of Education. It participated in mis-
sions to Comet Halley since 1981. The 
Sagamihara campus was established in 1989. 
ISAS researchers are involved in education as 
professors. Graduate students and postdocs 
from universities are involved in ISAS pro-
grams. ISAS research departments encom-
passed both science and engineering. It oper-
ated a launch field at Uchino-ura from which 
solid fuel rockets were launched (e.g., M-V in 
the 1990s). 
 
Figure 56 – Launch of an H-II rocket (2 tons, 7-8 tons max.) 
to the Moon on 4 February 1994 (Credit: JAXA) 
NASDA was established in the 1960s, for 
space utilization and development under Ja-
pan’s national policy. NASDA had more than 
1,000 employees, most of whom were engi-
neers. It operated a launch field on 
Tanegashima Island, from which were 
launched rockets using liquid H and O (e.g., 
the H-II rocket, Figure 56). NASDA launched 
Earth observation satellites and modules for 
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the Space Station (astronauts). NASDA also 
owned the Tsukuba center (test facilities, re-
search center), and other facilities. 
In 1996 a Working Group started design stud-
ies of the SELENE project, which was offi-
cially approved in 1998 as a joint program of 
NASDA and ISAS. 
 
Figure 57 – SELENE (Kaguya) (Credit: JAXA) 
The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 
JAXA was founded in 2003 through the unifi-
cation of ISAS, NASDA and NAL, the Na-
tional Aerospace Laboratory. The SELENE 
(Kaguya) mission was “a symbol of unifica-
tion” (Figure 57). 
There is a sharing of responsibilities between 
JAXA and ISAS. ISAS proposes, develops and 
operates missions possibly relating to plane-
tary protection. JAXA is responsible for plan-
etary protection. The overall Planetary Protec-
tion organization of JAXA is represented in 
Table 18. 
The Department of Safety and Mission Assur-
ance (S&MA) establishes and maintains 
‘standards’ for planetary protection. It organ-
izes a planetary protection standardizing 
Working Group and supports its work. The 
Chair of the WG is K. Fujita (JAXA). 
The International Space Exploration Team has 
responsibility for the establishment of PP strat-
egy and storage of information and technolo-
gies along it, with organizing “PP research 
group”. The chief of the group is J. Haruyama 
(tentative). 
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The Planetary Protection Review Board re-
views PP of projects and/or relevant matters. 
The Chair of the board is A. Yamagishi (Tokyo 
University of Pharmacy and Life Sciences). 
 
 
Table 18 – “All-JAXA” planetary protection organization diagram (in the beginning) 
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